Fix security issues of eval-s in testapi

results from security audit show risks and recommendations to fix them

JIRA: RELENG-144

Change-Id: If128cc3ae230150a912b581dfb1ded543d851eb5
Signed-off-by: SerenaFeng <feng.xiaowei@zte.com.cn>

1 files changed, 3 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/result_collection_api/opnfv_testapi/resources/handlers.py b/result_collection_api/opnfv_testapi/resources/handlers.py
index f98c35e..5059f5d 100644
--- a/result_collection_api/opnfv_testapi/resources/handlers.py
+++ b/result_collection_api/opnfv_testapi/resources/handlers.py
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@
 import json
 from datetime import datetime
 
-from tornado.web import RequestHandler, asynchronous, HTTPError
 from tornado import gen
+from tornado.web import RequestHandler, asynchronous, HTTPError
 
 from models import CreateResponse
 from opnfv_testapi.common.constants import DEFAULT_REPRESENTATION, \
@@ -217,7 +217,8 @@ class GenericApiHandler(RequestHandler):
         return equal, query
 
     def _eval_db(self, table, method, *args, **kwargs):
-        return eval('self.db.%s.%s(*args, **kwargs)' % (table, method))
+        exec_collection = self.db.__getattr__(table)
+        return exec_collection.__getattribute__(method)(*args, **kwargs)
 
     def _eval_db_find_one(self, query, table=None):
         if table is None: