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+Background
+----------
+
+Pre-virtualization security protection was largely centered on the network.
+Malicious attacks from hostile machines, would seek to exploit network based
+operating systems and applications, with the goal of compromising their
+target node.
+
+Physical security had always been a much simpler business, with most focus on
+the secure access of the data center hardware.
+In-turn security was built up in layers (defense in depth) where machines
+would be
+daisy chained with network cables via  security appliances to provide
+controlled segmentation and isolation.
+This form of security was built upon the principle of an 'air gap'
+being present,
+whereby machines were separate physical units, joined largely by the
+network stack.
+
+With the advent of virtualization (namely the hypervisor), new attack
+vectors have
+surfaced as the 'air-gap' is no longer key design aspect for security.
+Further to this elements orchestation nodes and network controllers
+lead to an even wider attack surface:
+
+* Guests breaking isolation of the hypervisor.
+
+* Unauthorized access and control of supporting orchestration nodes.
+
+* Unauthorized access and control of supporting overlay network control systems.
+
+The hypervisor and the overlay network have now become the 'Achilles heel'
+whereby all tenant data isolation is enforced within the hypervisor and its
+abstraction
+of hardware and the virtualized overlay network.
+
+This guide has been formulated, in order to assist users of the OPNFV platform
+in securing an Telco NFV / SDN environment.