diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers')
| -rw-r--r-- | keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/__init__.py | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/common.py | 709 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/__init__.py | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/core.py | 267 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/token_formatters.py | 545 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/utils.py | 243 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/pki.py | 53 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/pkiz.py | 51 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/uuid.py | 33 |
9 files changed, 1914 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/__init__.py b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e69de29b --- /dev/null +++ b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/__init__.py diff --git a/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/common.py b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/common.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..717e1495 --- /dev/null +++ b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/common.py @@ -0,0 +1,709 @@ +# Copyright 2013 OpenStack Foundation +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain +# a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the +# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations +# under the License. + +from oslo_config import cfg +from oslo_log import log +from oslo_serialization import jsonutils +from oslo_utils import timeutils +import six +from six.moves.urllib import parse + +from keystone.common import controller as common_controller +from keystone.common import dependency +from keystone.contrib import federation +from keystone import exception +from keystone.i18n import _, _LE +from keystone.openstack.common import versionutils +from keystone import token +from keystone.token import provider + + +LOG = log.getLogger(__name__) +CONF = cfg.CONF + + +@dependency.requires('catalog_api', 'resource_api') +class V2TokenDataHelper(object): + """Creates V2 token data.""" + + def v3_to_v2_token(self, token_id, v3_token_data): + token_data = {} + # Build v2 token + v3_token = v3_token_data['token'] + + token = {} + token['id'] = token_id + token['expires'] = v3_token.get('expires_at') + token['issued_at'] = v3_token.get('issued_at') + token['audit_ids'] = v3_token.get('audit_ids') + + if 'project' in v3_token: + # v3 token_data does not contain all tenant attributes + tenant = self.resource_api.get_project( + v3_token['project']['id']) + token['tenant'] = common_controller.V2Controller.filter_domain_id( + tenant) + token_data['token'] = token + + # Build v2 user + v3_user = v3_token['user'] + user = common_controller.V2Controller.v3_to_v2_user(v3_user) + + # Set user roles + user['roles'] = [] + role_ids = [] + for role in v3_token.get('roles', []): + # Filter role id since it's not included in v2 token response + role_ids.append(role.pop('id')) + user['roles'].append(role) + user['roles_links'] = [] + + token_data['user'] = user + + # Get and build v2 service catalog + token_data['serviceCatalog'] = [] + if 'tenant' in token: + catalog_ref = self.catalog_api.get_catalog( + user['id'], token['tenant']['id']) + if catalog_ref: + token_data['serviceCatalog'] = self.format_catalog(catalog_ref) + + # Build v2 metadata + metadata = {} + metadata['roles'] = role_ids + # Setting is_admin to keep consistency in v2 response + metadata['is_admin'] = 0 + token_data['metadata'] = metadata + + return {'access': token_data} + + @classmethod + def format_token(cls, token_ref, roles_ref=None, catalog_ref=None, + trust_ref=None): + audit_info = None + user_ref = token_ref['user'] + metadata_ref = token_ref['metadata'] + if roles_ref is None: + roles_ref = [] + expires = token_ref.get('expires', provider.default_expire_time()) + if expires is not None: + if not isinstance(expires, six.text_type): + expires = timeutils.isotime(expires) + + token_data = token_ref.get('token_data') + if token_data: + token_audit = token_data.get( + 'access', token_data).get('token', {}).get('audit_ids') + audit_info = token_audit + + if audit_info is None: + audit_info = provider.audit_info(token_ref.get('parent_audit_id')) + + o = {'access': {'token': {'id': token_ref['id'], + 'expires': expires, + 'issued_at': timeutils.strtime(), + 'audit_ids': audit_info + }, + 'user': {'id': user_ref['id'], + 'name': user_ref['name'], + 'username': user_ref['name'], + 'roles': roles_ref, + 'roles_links': metadata_ref.get('roles_links', + []) + } + } + } + if 'bind' in token_ref: + o['access']['token']['bind'] = token_ref['bind'] + if 'tenant' in token_ref and token_ref['tenant']: + token_ref['tenant']['enabled'] = True + o['access']['token']['tenant'] = token_ref['tenant'] + if catalog_ref is not None: + o['access']['serviceCatalog'] = V2TokenDataHelper.format_catalog( + catalog_ref) + if metadata_ref: + if 'is_admin' in metadata_ref: + o['access']['metadata'] = {'is_admin': + metadata_ref['is_admin']} + else: + o['access']['metadata'] = {'is_admin': 0} + if 'roles' in metadata_ref: + o['access']['metadata']['roles'] = metadata_ref['roles'] + if CONF.trust.enabled and trust_ref: + o['access']['trust'] = {'trustee_user_id': + trust_ref['trustee_user_id'], + 'id': trust_ref['id'], + 'trustor_user_id': + trust_ref['trustor_user_id'], + 'impersonation': + trust_ref['impersonation'] + } + return o + + @classmethod + def format_catalog(cls, catalog_ref): + """Munge catalogs from internal to output format + Internal catalogs look like:: + + {$REGION: { + {$SERVICE: { + $key1: $value1, + ... + } + } + } + + The legacy api wants them to look like:: + + [{'name': $SERVICE[name], + 'type': $SERVICE, + 'endpoints': [{ + 'tenantId': $tenant_id, + ... + 'region': $REGION, + }], + 'endpoints_links': [], + }] + + """ + if not catalog_ref: + return [] + + services = {} + for region, region_ref in six.iteritems(catalog_ref): + for service, service_ref in six.iteritems(region_ref): + new_service_ref = services.get(service, {}) + new_service_ref['name'] = service_ref.pop('name') + new_service_ref['type'] = service + new_service_ref['endpoints_links'] = [] + service_ref['region'] = region + + endpoints_ref = new_service_ref.get('endpoints', []) + endpoints_ref.append(service_ref) + + new_service_ref['endpoints'] = endpoints_ref + services[service] = new_service_ref + + return services.values() + + +@dependency.requires('assignment_api', 'catalog_api', 'federation_api', + 'identity_api', 'resource_api', 'role_api', 'trust_api') +class V3TokenDataHelper(object): + """Token data helper.""" + def __init__(self): + # Keep __init__ around to ensure dependency injection works. + super(V3TokenDataHelper, self).__init__() + + def _get_filtered_domain(self, domain_id): + domain_ref = self.resource_api.get_domain(domain_id) + return {'id': domain_ref['id'], 'name': domain_ref['name']} + + def _get_filtered_project(self, project_id): + project_ref = self.resource_api.get_project(project_id) + filtered_project = { + 'id': project_ref['id'], + 'name': project_ref['name']} + filtered_project['domain'] = self._get_filtered_domain( + project_ref['domain_id']) + return filtered_project + + def _populate_scope(self, token_data, domain_id, project_id): + if 'domain' in token_data or 'project' in token_data: + # scope already exist, no need to populate it again + return + + if domain_id: + token_data['domain'] = self._get_filtered_domain(domain_id) + if project_id: + token_data['project'] = self._get_filtered_project(project_id) + + def _get_roles_for_user(self, user_id, domain_id, project_id): + roles = [] + if domain_id: + roles = self.assignment_api.get_roles_for_user_and_domain( + user_id, domain_id) + if project_id: + roles = self.assignment_api.get_roles_for_user_and_project( + user_id, project_id) + return [self.role_api.get_role(role_id) for role_id in roles] + + def _populate_roles_for_groups(self, group_ids, + project_id=None, domain_id=None, + user_id=None): + def _check_roles(roles, user_id, project_id, domain_id): + # User was granted roles so simply exit this function. + if roles: + return + if project_id: + msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access ' + 'to project %(project_id)s') % { + 'user_id': user_id, + 'project_id': project_id} + elif domain_id: + msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access ' + 'to domain %(domain_id)s') % { + 'user_id': user_id, + 'domain_id': domain_id} + # Since no roles were found a user is not authorized to + # perform any operations. Raise an exception with + # appropriate error message. + raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) + + roles = self.assignment_api.get_roles_for_groups(group_ids, + project_id, + domain_id) + _check_roles(roles, user_id, project_id, domain_id) + return roles + + def _populate_user(self, token_data, user_id, trust): + if 'user' in token_data: + # no need to repopulate user if it already exists + return + + user_ref = self.identity_api.get_user(user_id) + if CONF.trust.enabled and trust and 'OS-TRUST:trust' not in token_data: + trustor_user_ref = (self.identity_api.get_user( + trust['trustor_user_id'])) + try: + self.identity_api.assert_user_enabled(trust['trustor_user_id']) + except AssertionError: + raise exception.Forbidden(_('Trustor is disabled.')) + if trust['impersonation']: + user_ref = trustor_user_ref + token_data['OS-TRUST:trust'] = ( + { + 'id': trust['id'], + 'trustor_user': {'id': trust['trustor_user_id']}, + 'trustee_user': {'id': trust['trustee_user_id']}, + 'impersonation': trust['impersonation'] + }) + filtered_user = { + 'id': user_ref['id'], + 'name': user_ref['name'], + 'domain': self._get_filtered_domain(user_ref['domain_id'])} + token_data['user'] = filtered_user + + def _populate_oauth_section(self, token_data, access_token): + if access_token: + access_token_id = access_token['id'] + consumer_id = access_token['consumer_id'] + token_data['OS-OAUTH1'] = ({'access_token_id': access_token_id, + 'consumer_id': consumer_id}) + + def _populate_roles(self, token_data, user_id, domain_id, project_id, + trust, access_token): + if 'roles' in token_data: + # no need to repopulate roles + return + + if access_token: + filtered_roles = [] + authed_role_ids = jsonutils.loads(access_token['role_ids']) + all_roles = self.role_api.list_roles() + for role in all_roles: + for authed_role in authed_role_ids: + if authed_role == role['id']: + filtered_roles.append({'id': role['id'], + 'name': role['name']}) + token_data['roles'] = filtered_roles + return + + if CONF.trust.enabled and trust: + token_user_id = trust['trustor_user_id'] + token_project_id = trust['project_id'] + # trusts do not support domains yet + token_domain_id = None + else: + token_user_id = user_id + token_project_id = project_id + token_domain_id = domain_id + + if token_domain_id or token_project_id: + roles = self._get_roles_for_user(token_user_id, + token_domain_id, + token_project_id) + filtered_roles = [] + if CONF.trust.enabled and trust: + for trust_role in trust['roles']: + match_roles = [x for x in roles + if x['id'] == trust_role['id']] + if match_roles: + filtered_roles.append(match_roles[0]) + else: + raise exception.Forbidden( + _('Trustee has no delegated roles.')) + else: + for role in roles: + filtered_roles.append({'id': role['id'], + 'name': role['name']}) + + # user has no project or domain roles, therefore access denied + if not filtered_roles: + if token_project_id: + msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access ' + 'to project %(project_id)s') % { + 'user_id': user_id, + 'project_id': token_project_id} + else: + msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access ' + 'to domain %(domain_id)s') % { + 'user_id': user_id, + 'domain_id': token_domain_id} + LOG.debug(msg) + raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) + + token_data['roles'] = filtered_roles + + def _populate_service_catalog(self, token_data, user_id, + domain_id, project_id, trust): + if 'catalog' in token_data: + # no need to repopulate service catalog + return + + if CONF.trust.enabled and trust: + user_id = trust['trustor_user_id'] + if project_id or domain_id: + service_catalog = self.catalog_api.get_v3_catalog( + user_id, project_id) + # TODO(ayoung): Enforce Endpoints for trust + token_data['catalog'] = service_catalog + + def _populate_service_providers(self, token_data): + if 'service_providers' in token_data: + return + + service_providers = self.federation_api.get_enabled_service_providers() + if service_providers: + token_data['service_providers'] = service_providers + + def _populate_token_dates(self, token_data, expires=None, trust=None, + issued_at=None): + if not expires: + expires = provider.default_expire_time() + if not isinstance(expires, six.string_types): + expires = timeutils.isotime(expires, subsecond=True) + token_data['expires_at'] = expires + token_data['issued_at'] = (issued_at or + timeutils.isotime(subsecond=True)) + + def _populate_audit_info(self, token_data, audit_info=None): + if audit_info is None or isinstance(audit_info, six.string_types): + token_data['audit_ids'] = provider.audit_info(audit_info) + elif isinstance(audit_info, list): + token_data['audit_ids'] = audit_info + else: + msg = (_('Invalid audit info data type: %(data)s (%(type)s)') % + {'data': audit_info, 'type': type(audit_info)}) + LOG.error(msg) + raise exception.UnexpectedError(msg) + + def get_token_data(self, user_id, method_names, extras=None, + domain_id=None, project_id=None, expires=None, + trust=None, token=None, include_catalog=True, + bind=None, access_token=None, issued_at=None, + audit_info=None): + if extras is None: + extras = {} + if extras: + versionutils.deprecated( + what='passing token data with "extras"', + as_of=versionutils.deprecated.KILO, + in_favor_of='well-defined APIs') + token_data = {'methods': method_names, + 'extras': extras} + + # We've probably already written these to the token + if token: + for x in ('roles', 'user', 'catalog', 'project', 'domain'): + if x in token: + token_data[x] = token[x] + + if CONF.trust.enabled and trust: + if user_id != trust['trustee_user_id']: + raise exception.Forbidden(_('User is not a trustee.')) + + if bind: + token_data['bind'] = bind + + self._populate_scope(token_data, domain_id, project_id) + self._populate_user(token_data, user_id, trust) + self._populate_roles(token_data, user_id, domain_id, project_id, trust, + access_token) + self._populate_audit_info(token_data, audit_info) + + if include_catalog: + self._populate_service_catalog(token_data, user_id, domain_id, + project_id, trust) + self._populate_service_providers(token_data) + self._populate_token_dates(token_data, expires=expires, trust=trust, + issued_at=issued_at) + self._populate_oauth_section(token_data, access_token) + return {'token': token_data} + + +@dependency.requires('catalog_api', 'identity_api', 'oauth_api', + 'resource_api', 'role_api', 'trust_api') +class BaseProvider(provider.Provider): + def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs): + super(BaseProvider, self).__init__(*args, **kwargs) + self.v3_token_data_helper = V3TokenDataHelper() + self.v2_token_data_helper = V2TokenDataHelper() + + def get_token_version(self, token_data): + if token_data and isinstance(token_data, dict): + if 'token_version' in token_data: + if token_data['token_version'] in token.provider.VERSIONS: + return token_data['token_version'] + # FIXME(morganfainberg): deprecate the following logic in future + # revisions. It is better to just specify the token_version in + # the token_data itself. This way we can support future versions + # that might have the same fields. + if 'access' in token_data: + return token.provider.V2 + if 'token' in token_data and 'methods' in token_data['token']: + return token.provider.V3 + raise exception.UnsupportedTokenVersionException() + + def issue_v2_token(self, token_ref, roles_ref=None, + catalog_ref=None): + metadata_ref = token_ref['metadata'] + trust_ref = None + if CONF.trust.enabled and metadata_ref and 'trust_id' in metadata_ref: + trust_ref = self.trust_api.get_trust(metadata_ref['trust_id']) + + token_data = self.v2_token_data_helper.format_token( + token_ref, roles_ref, catalog_ref, trust_ref) + token_id = self._get_token_id(token_data) + token_data['access']['token']['id'] = token_id + return token_id, token_data + + def _is_mapped_token(self, auth_context): + return (federation.IDENTITY_PROVIDER in auth_context and + federation.PROTOCOL in auth_context) + + def issue_v3_token(self, user_id, method_names, expires_at=None, + project_id=None, domain_id=None, auth_context=None, + trust=None, metadata_ref=None, include_catalog=True, + parent_audit_id=None): + # for V2, trust is stashed in metadata_ref + if (CONF.trust.enabled and not trust and metadata_ref and + 'trust_id' in metadata_ref): + trust = self.trust_api.get_trust(metadata_ref['trust_id']) + + token_ref = None + if auth_context and self._is_mapped_token(auth_context): + token_ref = self._handle_mapped_tokens( + auth_context, project_id, domain_id) + + access_token = None + if 'oauth1' in method_names: + access_token_id = auth_context['access_token_id'] + access_token = self.oauth_api.get_access_token(access_token_id) + + token_data = self.v3_token_data_helper.get_token_data( + user_id, + method_names, + auth_context.get('extras') if auth_context else None, + domain_id=domain_id, + project_id=project_id, + expires=expires_at, + trust=trust, + bind=auth_context.get('bind') if auth_context else None, + token=token_ref, + include_catalog=include_catalog, + access_token=access_token, + audit_info=parent_audit_id) + + token_id = self._get_token_id(token_data) + return token_id, token_data + + def _handle_mapped_tokens(self, auth_context, project_id, domain_id): + def get_federated_domain(): + return (CONF.federation.federated_domain_name or + federation.FEDERATED_DOMAIN_KEYWORD) + + federated_domain = get_federated_domain() + user_id = auth_context['user_id'] + group_ids = auth_context['group_ids'] + idp = auth_context[federation.IDENTITY_PROVIDER] + protocol = auth_context[federation.PROTOCOL] + token_data = { + 'user': { + 'id': user_id, + 'name': parse.unquote(user_id), + federation.FEDERATION: { + 'identity_provider': {'id': idp}, + 'protocol': {'id': protocol} + }, + 'domain': { + 'id': federated_domain, + 'name': federated_domain + } + } + } + + if project_id or domain_id: + roles = self.v3_token_data_helper._populate_roles_for_groups( + group_ids, project_id, domain_id, user_id) + token_data.update({'roles': roles}) + else: + token_data['user'][federation.FEDERATION].update({ + 'groups': [{'id': x} for x in group_ids] + }) + return token_data + + def _verify_token_ref(self, token_ref): + """Verify and return the given token_ref.""" + if not token_ref: + raise exception.Unauthorized() + return token_ref + + def _assert_is_not_federation_token(self, token_ref): + """Make sure we aren't using v2 auth on a federation token.""" + token_data = token_ref.get('token_data') + if (token_data and self.get_token_version(token_data) == + token.provider.V3): + if 'OS-FEDERATION' in token_data['token']['user']: + msg = _('Attempting to use OS-FEDERATION token with V2 ' + 'Identity Service, use V3 Authentication') + raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) + + def _assert_default_domain(self, token_ref): + """Make sure we are operating on default domain only.""" + if (token_ref.get('token_data') and + self.get_token_version(token_ref.get('token_data')) == + token.provider.V3): + # this is a V3 token + msg = _('Non-default domain is not supported') + # user in a non-default is prohibited + if (token_ref['token_data']['token']['user']['domain']['id'] != + CONF.identity.default_domain_id): + raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) + # domain scoping is prohibited + if token_ref['token_data']['token'].get('domain'): + raise exception.Unauthorized( + _('Domain scoped token is not supported')) + # project in non-default domain is prohibited + if token_ref['token_data']['token'].get('project'): + project = token_ref['token_data']['token']['project'] + project_domain_id = project['domain']['id'] + # scoped to project in non-default domain is prohibited + if project_domain_id != CONF.identity.default_domain_id: + raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) + # if token is scoped to trust, both trustor and trustee must + # be in the default domain. Furthermore, the delegated project + # must also be in the default domain + metadata_ref = token_ref['metadata'] + if CONF.trust.enabled and 'trust_id' in metadata_ref: + trust_ref = self.trust_api.get_trust(metadata_ref['trust_id']) + trustee_user_ref = self.identity_api.get_user( + trust_ref['trustee_user_id']) + if (trustee_user_ref['domain_id'] != + CONF.identity.default_domain_id): + raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) + trustor_user_ref = self.identity_api.get_user( + trust_ref['trustor_user_id']) + if (trustor_user_ref['domain_id'] != + CONF.identity.default_domain_id): + raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) + project_ref = self.resource_api.get_project( + trust_ref['project_id']) + if (project_ref['domain_id'] != + CONF.identity.default_domain_id): + raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) + + def validate_v2_token(self, token_ref): + try: + self._assert_is_not_federation_token(token_ref) + self._assert_default_domain(token_ref) + # FIXME(gyee): performance or correctness? Should we return the + # cached token or reconstruct it? Obviously if we are going with + # the cached token, any role, project, or domain name changes + # will not be reflected. One may argue that with PKI tokens, + # we are essentially doing cached token validation anyway. + # Lets go with the cached token strategy. Since token + # management layer is now pluggable, one can always provide + # their own implementation to suit their needs. + token_data = token_ref.get('token_data') + if (not token_data or + self.get_token_version(token_data) != + token.provider.V2): + # token is created by old v2 logic + metadata_ref = token_ref['metadata'] + roles_ref = [] + for role_id in metadata_ref.get('roles', []): + roles_ref.append(self.role_api.get_role(role_id)) + + # Get a service catalog if possible + # This is needed for on-behalf-of requests + catalog_ref = None + if token_ref.get('tenant'): + catalog_ref = self.catalog_api.get_catalog( + token_ref['user']['id'], + token_ref['tenant']['id']) + + trust_ref = None + if CONF.trust.enabled and 'trust_id' in metadata_ref: + trust_ref = self.trust_api.get_trust( + metadata_ref['trust_id']) + + token_data = self.v2_token_data_helper.format_token( + token_ref, roles_ref, catalog_ref, trust_ref) + + trust_id = token_data['access'].get('trust', {}).get('id') + if trust_id: + # token trust validation + self.trust_api.get_trust(trust_id) + + return token_data + except exception.ValidationError as e: + LOG.exception(_LE('Failed to validate token')) + raise exception.TokenNotFound(e) + + def validate_v3_token(self, token_ref): + # FIXME(gyee): performance or correctness? Should we return the + # cached token or reconstruct it? Obviously if we are going with + # the cached token, any role, project, or domain name changes + # will not be reflected. One may argue that with PKI tokens, + # we are essentially doing cached token validation anyway. + # Lets go with the cached token strategy. Since token + # management layer is now pluggable, one can always provide + # their own implementation to suit their needs. + + trust_id = token_ref.get('trust_id') + if trust_id: + # token trust validation + self.trust_api.get_trust(trust_id) + + token_data = token_ref.get('token_data') + if not token_data or 'token' not in token_data: + # token ref is created by V2 API + project_id = None + project_ref = token_ref.get('tenant') + if project_ref: + project_id = project_ref['id'] + + issued_at = token_ref['token_data']['access']['token']['issued_at'] + audit = token_ref['token_data']['access']['token'].get('audit_ids') + + token_data = self.v3_token_data_helper.get_token_data( + token_ref['user']['id'], + ['password', 'token'], + project_id=project_id, + bind=token_ref.get('bind'), + expires=token_ref['expires'], + issued_at=issued_at, + audit_info=audit) + return token_data diff --git a/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/__init__.py b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..953ef624 --- /dev/null +++ b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain +# a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the +# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations +# under the License. + +from keystone.token.providers.fernet.core import * # noqa diff --git a/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/core.py b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/core.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b1da263b --- /dev/null +++ b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/core.py @@ -0,0 +1,267 @@ +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain +# a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the +# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations +# under the License. + +from oslo_config import cfg +from oslo_log import log + +from keystone.common import dependency +from keystone.contrib import federation +from keystone import exception +from keystone.i18n import _ +from keystone.token import provider +from keystone.token.providers import common +from keystone.token.providers.fernet import token_formatters as tf + + +CONF = cfg.CONF +LOG = log.getLogger(__name__) + + +@dependency.requires('trust_api') +class Provider(common.BaseProvider): + def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs): + super(Provider, self).__init__(*args, **kwargs) + + self.token_formatter = tf.TokenFormatter() + + def needs_persistence(self): + """Should the token be written to a backend.""" + return False + + def issue_v2_token(self, token_ref, roles_ref=None, catalog_ref=None): + """Issue a V2 formatted token. + + :param token_ref: reference describing the token + :param roles_ref: reference describing the roles for the token + :param catalog_ref: reference describing the token's catalog + :returns: tuple containing the ID of the token and the token data + + """ + # TODO(lbragstad): Currently, Fernet tokens don't support bind in the + # token format. Raise a 501 if we're dealing with bind. + if token_ref.get('bind'): + raise exception.NotImplemented() + + user_id = token_ref['user']['id'] + # Default to password since methods not provided by token_ref + method_names = ['password'] + project_id = None + # Verify that tenant is not None in token_ref + if token_ref.get('tenant'): + project_id = token_ref['tenant']['id'] + + parent_audit_id = token_ref.get('parent_audit_id') + # If parent_audit_id is defined then a token authentication was made + if parent_audit_id: + method_names.append('token') + + audit_ids = provider.audit_info(parent_audit_id) + + # Get v3 token data and exclude building v3 specific catalog. This is + # due to the fact that the V2TokenDataHelper.format_token() method + # doesn't build any of the token_reference from other Keystone APIs. + # Instead, it builds it from what is persisted in the token reference. + # Here we are going to leverage the V3TokenDataHelper.get_token_data() + # method written for V3 because it goes through and populates the token + # reference dynamically. Once we have a V3 token reference, we can + # attempt to convert it to a V2 token response. + v3_token_data = self.v3_token_data_helper.get_token_data( + user_id, + method_names, + project_id=project_id, + token=token_ref, + include_catalog=False, + audit_info=audit_ids) + + expires_at = v3_token_data['token']['expires_at'] + token_id = self.token_formatter.create_token(user_id, expires_at, + audit_ids, + methods=method_names, + project_id=project_id) + # Convert v3 to v2 token data and build v2 catalog + token_data = self.v2_token_data_helper.v3_to_v2_token(token_id, + v3_token_data) + + return token_id, token_data + + def _build_federated_info(self, token_data): + """Extract everything needed for federated tokens. + + This dictionary is passed to the FederatedPayload token formatter, + which unpacks the values and builds the Fernet token. + + """ + group_ids = token_data.get('user', {}).get( + federation.FEDERATION, {}).get('groups') + idp_id = token_data.get('user', {}).get( + federation.FEDERATION, {}).get('identity_provider', {}).get('id') + protocol_id = token_data.get('user', {}).get( + federation.FEDERATION, {}).get('protocol', {}).get('id') + if not group_ids: + group_ids = list() + federated_dict = dict(group_ids=group_ids, idp_id=idp_id, + protocol_id=protocol_id) + return federated_dict + + def _rebuild_federated_info(self, federated_dict, user_id): + """Format federated information into the token reference. + + The federated_dict is passed back from the FederatedPayload token + formatter. The responsibility of this method is to format the + information passed back from the token formatter into the token + reference before constructing the token data from the + V3TokenDataHelper. + + """ + g_ids = federated_dict['group_ids'] + idp_id = federated_dict['idp_id'] + protocol_id = federated_dict['protocol_id'] + federated_info = dict(groups=g_ids, + identity_provider=dict(id=idp_id), + protocol=dict(id=protocol_id)) + token_dict = {'user': {federation.FEDERATION: federated_info}} + token_dict['user']['id'] = user_id + token_dict['user']['name'] = user_id + return token_dict + + def issue_v3_token(self, user_id, method_names, expires_at=None, + project_id=None, domain_id=None, auth_context=None, + trust=None, metadata_ref=None, include_catalog=True, + parent_audit_id=None): + """Issue a V3 formatted token. + + Here is where we need to detect what is given to us, and what kind of + token the user is expecting. Depending on the outcome of that, we can + pass all the information to be packed to the proper token format + handler. + + :param user_id: ID of the user + :param method_names: method of authentication + :param expires_at: token expiration time + :param project_id: ID of the project being scoped to + :param domain_id: ID of the domain being scoped to + :param auth_context: authentication context + :param trust: ID of the trust + :param metadata_ref: metadata reference + :param include_catalog: return the catalog in the response if True, + otherwise don't return the catalog + :param parent_audit_id: ID of the patent audit entity + :returns: tuple containing the id of the token and the token data + + """ + # TODO(lbragstad): Currently, Fernet tokens don't support bind in the + # token format. Raise a 501 if we're dealing with bind. + if auth_context.get('bind'): + raise exception.NotImplemented() + + token_ref = None + # NOTE(lbragstad): This determines if we are dealing with a federated + # token or not. The groups for the user will be in the returned token + # reference. + federated_dict = None + if auth_context and self._is_mapped_token(auth_context): + token_ref = self._handle_mapped_tokens( + auth_context, project_id, domain_id) + federated_dict = self._build_federated_info(token_ref) + + token_data = self.v3_token_data_helper.get_token_data( + user_id, + method_names, + auth_context.get('extras') if auth_context else None, + domain_id=domain_id, + project_id=project_id, + expires=expires_at, + trust=trust, + bind=auth_context.get('bind') if auth_context else None, + token=token_ref, + include_catalog=include_catalog, + audit_info=parent_audit_id) + + token = self.token_formatter.create_token( + user_id, + token_data['token']['expires_at'], + token_data['token']['audit_ids'], + methods=method_names, + domain_id=domain_id, + project_id=project_id, + trust_id=token_data['token'].get('OS-TRUST:trust', {}).get('id'), + federated_info=federated_dict) + return token, token_data + + def validate_v2_token(self, token_ref): + """Validate a V2 formatted token. + + :param token_ref: reference describing the token to validate + :returns: the token data + :raises keystone.exception.Unauthorized: if v3 token is used + + """ + (user_id, methods, + audit_ids, domain_id, + project_id, trust_id, + federated_info, created_at, + expires_at) = self.token_formatter.validate_token(token_ref) + + if trust_id or domain_id or federated_info: + msg = _('This is not a v2.0 Fernet token. Use v3 for trust, ' + 'domain, or federated tokens.') + raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) + + v3_token_data = self.v3_token_data_helper.get_token_data( + user_id, + methods, + project_id=project_id, + expires=expires_at, + issued_at=created_at, + token=token_ref, + include_catalog=False, + audit_info=audit_ids) + return self.v2_token_data_helper.v3_to_v2_token(token_ref, + v3_token_data) + + def validate_v3_token(self, token): + """Validate a V3 formatted token. + + :param token: a string describing the token to validate + :returns: the token data + :raises keystone.exception.Unauthorized: if token format version isn't + supported + + """ + (user_id, methods, audit_ids, domain_id, project_id, trust_id, + federated_info, created_at, expires_at) = ( + self.token_formatter.validate_token(token)) + + token_dict = None + if federated_info: + token_dict = self._rebuild_federated_info(federated_info, user_id) + trust_ref = self.trust_api.get_trust(trust_id) + + return self.v3_token_data_helper.get_token_data( + user_id, + method_names=methods, + domain_id=domain_id, + project_id=project_id, + issued_at=created_at, + expires=expires_at, + trust=trust_ref, + token=token_dict, + audit_info=audit_ids) + + def _get_token_id(self, token_data): + """Generate the token_id based upon the data in token_data. + + :param token_data: token information + :type token_data: dict + :raises keystone.exception.NotImplemented: when called + """ + raise exception.NotImplemented() diff --git a/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/token_formatters.py b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/token_formatters.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..50960923 --- /dev/null +++ b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/token_formatters.py @@ -0,0 +1,545 @@ +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain +# a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the +# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations +# under the License. + +import base64 +import datetime +import struct +import uuid + +from cryptography import fernet +import msgpack +from oslo_config import cfg +from oslo_log import log +from oslo_utils import timeutils +import six +from six.moves import urllib + +from keystone.auth import plugins as auth_plugins +from keystone import exception +from keystone.i18n import _ +from keystone.token import provider +from keystone.token.providers.fernet import utils + + +CONF = cfg.CONF +LOG = log.getLogger(__name__) + +# Fernet byte indexes as as computed by pypi/keyless_fernet and defined in +# https://github.com/fernet/spec +TIMESTAMP_START = 1 +TIMESTAMP_END = 9 + + +class TokenFormatter(object): + """Packs and unpacks payloads into tokens for transport.""" + + @property + def crypto(self): + """Return a cryptography instance. + + You can extend this class with a custom crypto @property to provide + your own token encoding / decoding. For example, using a different + cryptography library (e.g. ``python-keyczar``) or to meet arbitrary + security requirements. + + This @property just needs to return an object that implements + ``encrypt(plaintext)`` and ``decrypt(ciphertext)``. + + """ + keys = utils.load_keys() + + if not keys: + raise exception.KeysNotFound() + + fernet_instances = [fernet.Fernet(key) for key in utils.load_keys()] + return fernet.MultiFernet(fernet_instances) + + def pack(self, payload): + """Pack a payload for transport as a token.""" + # base64 padding (if any) is not URL-safe + return urllib.parse.quote(self.crypto.encrypt(payload)) + + def unpack(self, token): + """Unpack a token, and validate the payload.""" + token = urllib.parse.unquote(six.binary_type(token)) + + try: + return self.crypto.decrypt(token) + except fernet.InvalidToken as e: + raise exception.Unauthorized(six.text_type(e)) + + @classmethod + def creation_time(cls, fernet_token): + """Returns the creation time of a valid Fernet token.""" + # tokens may be transmitted as Unicode, but they're just ASCII + # (pypi/cryptography will refuse to operate on Unicode input) + fernet_token = six.binary_type(fernet_token) + + # the base64 padding on fernet tokens is made URL-safe + fernet_token = urllib.parse.unquote(fernet_token) + + # fernet tokens are base64 encoded and the padding made URL-safe + token_bytes = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(fernet_token) + + # slice into the byte array to get just the timestamp + timestamp_bytes = token_bytes[TIMESTAMP_START:TIMESTAMP_END] + + # convert those bytes to an integer + # (it's a 64-bit "unsigned long long int" in C) + timestamp_int = struct.unpack(">Q", timestamp_bytes)[0] + + # and with an integer, it's trivial to produce a datetime object + created_at = datetime.datetime.utcfromtimestamp(timestamp_int) + + return created_at + + def create_token(self, user_id, expires_at, audit_ids, methods=None, + domain_id=None, project_id=None, trust_id=None, + federated_info=None): + """Given a set of payload attributes, generate a Fernet token.""" + if trust_id: + version = TrustScopedPayload.version + payload = TrustScopedPayload.assemble( + user_id, + methods, + project_id, + expires_at, + audit_ids, + trust_id) + elif federated_info: + version = FederatedPayload.version + payload = FederatedPayload.assemble( + user_id, + methods, + expires_at, + audit_ids, + federated_info) + elif project_id: + version = ProjectScopedPayload.version + payload = ProjectScopedPayload.assemble( + user_id, + methods, + project_id, + expires_at, + audit_ids) + elif domain_id: + version = DomainScopedPayload.version + payload = DomainScopedPayload.assemble( + user_id, + methods, + domain_id, + expires_at, + audit_ids) + else: + version = UnscopedPayload.version + payload = UnscopedPayload.assemble( + user_id, + methods, + expires_at, + audit_ids) + + versioned_payload = (version,) + payload + serialized_payload = msgpack.packb(versioned_payload) + token = self.pack(serialized_payload) + + return token + + def validate_token(self, token): + """Validates a Fernet token and returns the payload attributes.""" + # Convert v2 unicode token to a string + if not isinstance(token, six.binary_type): + token = token.encode('ascii') + + serialized_payload = self.unpack(token) + versioned_payload = msgpack.unpackb(serialized_payload) + version, payload = versioned_payload[0], versioned_payload[1:] + + # depending on the formatter, these may or may not be defined + domain_id = None + project_id = None + trust_id = None + federated_info = None + + if version == UnscopedPayload.version: + (user_id, methods, expires_at, audit_ids) = ( + UnscopedPayload.disassemble(payload)) + elif version == DomainScopedPayload.version: + (user_id, methods, domain_id, expires_at, audit_ids) = ( + DomainScopedPayload.disassemble(payload)) + elif version == ProjectScopedPayload.version: + (user_id, methods, project_id, expires_at, audit_ids) = ( + ProjectScopedPayload.disassemble(payload)) + elif version == TrustScopedPayload.version: + (user_id, methods, project_id, expires_at, audit_ids, trust_id) = ( + TrustScopedPayload.disassemble(payload)) + elif version == FederatedPayload.version: + (user_id, methods, expires_at, audit_ids, federated_info) = ( + FederatedPayload.disassemble(payload)) + else: + # If the token_format is not recognized, raise Unauthorized. + raise exception.Unauthorized(_( + 'This is not a recognized Fernet payload version: %s') % + version) + + # rather than appearing in the payload, the creation time is encoded + # into the token format itself + created_at = TokenFormatter.creation_time(token) + created_at = timeutils.isotime(at=created_at, subsecond=True) + expires_at = timeutils.parse_isotime(expires_at) + expires_at = timeutils.isotime(at=expires_at, subsecond=True) + + return (user_id, methods, audit_ids, domain_id, project_id, trust_id, + federated_info, created_at, expires_at) + + +class BasePayload(object): + # each payload variant should have a unique version + version = None + + @classmethod + def assemble(cls, *args): + """Assemble the payload of a token. + + :param args: whatever data should go into the payload + :returns: the payload of a token + + """ + raise NotImplementedError() + + @classmethod + def disassemble(cls, payload): + """Disassemble an unscoped payload into the component data. + + :param payload: this variant of payload + :returns: a tuple of the payloads component data + + """ + raise NotImplementedError() + + @classmethod + def convert_uuid_hex_to_bytes(cls, uuid_string): + """Compress UUID formatted strings to bytes. + + :param uuid_string: uuid string to compress to bytes + :returns: a byte representation of the uuid + + """ + # TODO(lbragstad): Wrap this in an exception. Not sure what the case + # would be where we couldn't handle what we've been given but incase + # the integrity of the token has been compromised. + uuid_obj = uuid.UUID(uuid_string) + return uuid_obj.bytes + + @classmethod + def convert_uuid_bytes_to_hex(cls, uuid_byte_string): + """Generate uuid.hex format based on byte string. + + :param uuid_byte_string: uuid string to generate from + :returns: uuid hex formatted string + + """ + # TODO(lbragstad): Wrap this in an exception. Not sure what the case + # would be where we couldn't handle what we've been given but incase + # the integrity of the token has been compromised. + uuid_obj = uuid.UUID(bytes=uuid_byte_string) + return uuid_obj.hex + + @classmethod + def _convert_time_string_to_int(cls, time_string): + """Convert a time formatted string to a timestamp integer. + + :param time_string: time formatted string + :returns: an integer timestamp + + """ + time_object = timeutils.parse_isotime(time_string) + return (timeutils.normalize_time(time_object) - + datetime.datetime.utcfromtimestamp(0)).total_seconds() + + @classmethod + def _convert_int_to_time_string(cls, time_int): + """Convert a timestamp integer to a string. + + :param time_int: integer representing timestamp + :returns: a time formatted strings + + """ + time_object = datetime.datetime.utcfromtimestamp(int(time_int)) + return timeutils.isotime(time_object) + + @classmethod + def attempt_convert_uuid_hex_to_bytes(cls, value): + """Attempt to convert value to bytes or return value. + + :param value: value to attempt to convert to bytes + :returns: uuid value in bytes or value + + """ + try: + return cls.convert_uuid_hex_to_bytes(value) + except ValueError: + # this might not be a UUID, depending on the situation (i.e. + # federation) + return value + + @classmethod + def attempt_convert_uuid_bytes_to_hex(cls, value): + """Attempt to convert value to hex or return value. + + :param value: value to attempt to convert to hex + :returns: uuid value in hex or value + + """ + try: + return cls.convert_uuid_bytes_to_hex(value) + except ValueError: + return value + + +class UnscopedPayload(BasePayload): + version = 0 + + @classmethod + def assemble(cls, user_id, methods, expires_at, audit_ids): + """Assemble the payload of an unscoped token. + + :param user_id: identifier of the user in the token request + :param methods: list of authentication methods used + :param expires_at: datetime of the token's expiration + :param audit_ids: list of the token's audit IDs + :returns: the payload of an unscoped token + + """ + b_user_id = cls.convert_uuid_hex_to_bytes(user_id) + methods = auth_plugins.convert_method_list_to_integer(methods) + expires_at_int = cls._convert_time_string_to_int(expires_at) + b_audit_ids = list(map(provider.random_urlsafe_str_to_bytes, + audit_ids)) + return (b_user_id, methods, expires_at_int, b_audit_ids) + + @classmethod + def disassemble(cls, payload): + """Disassemble an unscoped payload into the component data. + + :param payload: the payload of an unscoped token + :return: a tuple containing the user_id, auth methods, expires_at, and + audit_ids + + """ + user_id = cls.convert_uuid_bytes_to_hex(payload[0]) + methods = auth_plugins.convert_integer_to_method_list(payload[1]) + expires_at_str = cls._convert_int_to_time_string(payload[2]) + audit_ids = list(map(provider.base64_encode, payload[3])) + return (user_id, methods, expires_at_str, audit_ids) + + +class DomainScopedPayload(BasePayload): + version = 1 + + @classmethod + def assemble(cls, user_id, methods, domain_id, expires_at, audit_ids): + """Assemble the payload of a domain-scoped token. + + :param user_id: ID of the user in the token request + :param methods: list of authentication methods used + :param domain_id: ID of the domain to scope to + :param expires_at: datetime of the token's expiration + :param audit_ids: list of the token's audit IDs + :returns: the payload of a domain-scoped token + + """ + b_user_id = cls.convert_uuid_hex_to_bytes(user_id) + methods = auth_plugins.convert_method_list_to_integer(methods) + try: + b_domain_id = cls.convert_uuid_hex_to_bytes(domain_id) + except ValueError: + # the default domain ID is configurable, and probably isn't a UUID + if domain_id == CONF.identity.default_domain_id: + b_domain_id = domain_id + else: + raise + expires_at_int = cls._convert_time_string_to_int(expires_at) + b_audit_ids = list(map(provider.random_urlsafe_str_to_bytes, + audit_ids)) + return (b_user_id, methods, b_domain_id, expires_at_int, b_audit_ids) + + @classmethod + def disassemble(cls, payload): + """Disassemble a payload into the component data. + + :param payload: the payload of a token + :return: a tuple containing the user_id, auth methods, domain_id, + expires_at_str, and audit_ids + + """ + user_id = cls.convert_uuid_bytes_to_hex(payload[0]) + methods = auth_plugins.convert_integer_to_method_list(payload[1]) + try: + domain_id = cls.convert_uuid_bytes_to_hex(payload[2]) + except ValueError: + # the default domain ID is configurable, and probably isn't a UUID + if payload[2] == CONF.identity.default_domain_id: + domain_id = payload[2] + else: + raise + expires_at_str = cls._convert_int_to_time_string(payload[3]) + audit_ids = list(map(provider.base64_encode, payload[4])) + + return (user_id, methods, domain_id, expires_at_str, audit_ids) + + +class ProjectScopedPayload(BasePayload): + version = 2 + + @classmethod + def assemble(cls, user_id, methods, project_id, expires_at, audit_ids): + """Assemble the payload of a project-scoped token. + + :param user_id: ID of the user in the token request + :param methods: list of authentication methods used + :param project_id: ID of the project to scope to + :param expires_at: datetime of the token's expiration + :param audit_ids: list of the token's audit IDs + :returns: the payload of a project-scoped token + + """ + b_user_id = cls.convert_uuid_hex_to_bytes(user_id) + methods = auth_plugins.convert_method_list_to_integer(methods) + b_project_id = cls.convert_uuid_hex_to_bytes(project_id) + expires_at_int = cls._convert_time_string_to_int(expires_at) + b_audit_ids = list(map(provider.random_urlsafe_str_to_bytes, + audit_ids)) + return (b_user_id, methods, b_project_id, expires_at_int, b_audit_ids) + + @classmethod + def disassemble(cls, payload): + """Disassemble a payload into the component data. + + :param payload: the payload of a token + :return: a tuple containing the user_id, auth methods, project_id, + expires_at_str, and audit_ids + + """ + user_id = cls.convert_uuid_bytes_to_hex(payload[0]) + methods = auth_plugins.convert_integer_to_method_list(payload[1]) + project_id = cls.convert_uuid_bytes_to_hex(payload[2]) + expires_at_str = cls._convert_int_to_time_string(payload[3]) + audit_ids = list(map(provider.base64_encode, payload[4])) + + return (user_id, methods, project_id, expires_at_str, audit_ids) + + +class TrustScopedPayload(BasePayload): + version = 3 + + @classmethod + def assemble(cls, user_id, methods, project_id, expires_at, audit_ids, + trust_id): + """Assemble the payload of a trust-scoped token. + + :param user_id: ID of the user in the token request + :param methods: list of authentication methods used + :param project_id: ID of the project to scope to + :param expires_at: datetime of the token's expiration + :param audit_ids: list of the token's audit IDs + :param trust_id: ID of the trust in effect + :returns: the payload of a trust-scoped token + + """ + b_user_id = cls.convert_uuid_hex_to_bytes(user_id) + methods = auth_plugins.convert_method_list_to_integer(methods) + b_project_id = cls.convert_uuid_hex_to_bytes(project_id) + b_trust_id = cls.convert_uuid_hex_to_bytes(trust_id) + expires_at_int = cls._convert_time_string_to_int(expires_at) + b_audit_ids = list(map(provider.random_urlsafe_str_to_bytes, + audit_ids)) + + return (b_user_id, methods, b_project_id, expires_at_int, b_audit_ids, + b_trust_id) + + @classmethod + def disassemble(cls, payload): + """Validate a trust-based payload. + + :param token_string: a string representing the token + :returns: a tuple containing the user_id, auth methods, project_id, + expires_at_str, audit_ids, and trust_id + + """ + user_id = cls.convert_uuid_bytes_to_hex(payload[0]) + methods = auth_plugins.convert_integer_to_method_list(payload[1]) + project_id = cls.convert_uuid_bytes_to_hex(payload[2]) + expires_at_str = cls._convert_int_to_time_string(payload[3]) + audit_ids = list(map(provider.base64_encode, payload[4])) + trust_id = cls.convert_uuid_bytes_to_hex(payload[5]) + + return (user_id, methods, project_id, expires_at_str, audit_ids, + trust_id) + + +class FederatedPayload(BasePayload): + version = 4 + + @classmethod + def assemble(cls, user_id, methods, expires_at, audit_ids, federated_info): + """Assemble the payload of a federated token. + + :param user_id: ID of the user in the token request + :param methods: list of authentication methods used + :param expires_at: datetime of the token's expiration + :param audit_ids: list of the token's audit IDs + :param federated_info: dictionary containing group IDs, the identity + provider ID, protocol ID, and federated domain + ID + :returns: the payload of a federated token + + """ + def pack_group_ids(group_dict): + return cls.convert_uuid_hex_to_bytes(group_dict['id']) + + b_user_id = cls.attempt_convert_uuid_hex_to_bytes(user_id) + methods = auth_plugins.convert_method_list_to_integer(methods) + b_group_ids = map(pack_group_ids, federated_info['group_ids']) + b_idp_id = cls.attempt_convert_uuid_hex_to_bytes( + federated_info['idp_id']) + protocol_id = federated_info['protocol_id'] + expires_at_int = cls._convert_time_string_to_int(expires_at) + b_audit_ids = map(provider.random_urlsafe_str_to_bytes, audit_ids) + + return (b_user_id, methods, b_group_ids, b_idp_id, protocol_id, + expires_at_int, b_audit_ids) + + @classmethod + def disassemble(cls, payload): + """Validate a federated paylod. + + :param token_string: a string representing the token + :return: a tuple containing the user_id, auth methods, audit_ids, and + a dictionary containing federated information such as the the + group IDs, the identity provider ID, the protocol ID, and the + federated domain ID + + """ + def unpack_group_ids(group_id_in_bytes): + group_id = cls.convert_uuid_bytes_to_hex(group_id_in_bytes) + return {'id': group_id} + + user_id = cls.attempt_convert_uuid_bytes_to_hex(payload[0]) + methods = auth_plugins.convert_integer_to_method_list(payload[1]) + group_ids = map(unpack_group_ids, payload[2]) + idp_id = cls.attempt_convert_uuid_bytes_to_hex(payload[3]) + protocol_id = payload[4] + expires_at_str = cls._convert_int_to_time_string(payload[5]) + audit_ids = map(provider.base64_encode, payload[6]) + federated_info = dict(group_ids=group_ids, idp_id=idp_id, + protocol_id=protocol_id) + return (user_id, methods, expires_at_str, audit_ids, federated_info) diff --git a/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/utils.py b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/utils.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..56624ee5 --- /dev/null +++ b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/fernet/utils.py @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain +# a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the +# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations +# under the License. + +import os +import stat + +from cryptography import fernet +from oslo_config import cfg +from oslo_log import log + +from keystone.i18n import _LE, _LW, _LI + + +LOG = log.getLogger(__name__) + +CONF = cfg.CONF + + +def validate_key_repository(): + """Validate permissions on the key repository directory.""" + # NOTE(lbragstad): We shouldn't need to check if the directory was passed + # in as None because we don't set allow_no_values to True. + + # ensure current user has full access to the key repository + if (not os.access(CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository, os.R_OK) or not + os.access(CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository, os.W_OK) or not + os.access(CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository, os.X_OK)): + LOG.error( + _LE('Either [fernet_tokens] key_repository does not exist or ' + 'Keystone does not have sufficient permission to access it: ' + '%s'), CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository) + return False + + # ensure the key repository isn't world-readable + stat_info = os.stat(CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository) + if stat_info.st_mode & stat.S_IROTH or stat_info.st_mode & stat.S_IXOTH: + LOG.warning(_LW( + '[fernet_tokens] key_repository is world readable: %s'), + CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository) + + return True + + +def _convert_to_integers(id_value): + """Cast user and group system identifiers to integers.""" + # NOTE(lbragstad) os.chown() will raise a TypeError here if + # keystone_user_id and keystone_group_id are not integers. Let's + # cast them to integers if we can because it's possible to pass non-integer + # values into the fernet_setup utility. + try: + id_int = int(id_value) + except ValueError as e: + msg = ('Unable to convert Keystone user or group ID. Error: %s', e) + LOG.error(msg) + raise + + return id_int + + +def create_key_directory(keystone_user_id=None, keystone_group_id=None): + """If the configured key directory does not exist, attempt to create it.""" + if not os.access(CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository, os.F_OK): + LOG.info(_LI( + '[fernet_tokens] key_repository does not appear to exist; ' + 'attempting to create it')) + + try: + os.makedirs(CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository, 0o700) + except OSError: + LOG.error(_LE( + 'Failed to create [fernet_tokens] key_repository: either it ' + 'already exists or you don\'t have sufficient permissions to ' + 'create it')) + + if keystone_user_id and keystone_group_id: + os.chown( + CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository, + keystone_user_id, + keystone_group_id) + elif keystone_user_id or keystone_group_id: + LOG.warning(_LW( + 'Unable to change the ownership of [fernet_tokens] ' + 'key_repository without a keystone user ID and keystone group ' + 'ID both being provided: %s') % + CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository) + + +def _create_new_key(keystone_user_id, keystone_group_id): + """Securely create a new encryption key. + + Create a new key that is readable by the Keystone group and Keystone user. + """ + key = fernet.Fernet.generate_key() + + # This ensures the key created is not world-readable + old_umask = os.umask(0o177) + if keystone_user_id and keystone_group_id: + old_egid = os.getegid() + old_euid = os.geteuid() + os.setegid(keystone_group_id) + os.seteuid(keystone_user_id) + elif keystone_user_id or keystone_group_id: + LOG.warning(_LW( + 'Unable to change the ownership of the new key without a keystone ' + 'user ID and keystone group ID both being provided: %s') % + CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository) + # Determine the file name of the new key + key_file = os.path.join(CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository, '0') + try: + with open(key_file, 'w') as f: + f.write(key) + finally: + # After writing the key, set the umask back to it's original value. Do + # the same with group and user identifiers if a Keystone group or user + # was supplied. + os.umask(old_umask) + if keystone_user_id and keystone_group_id: + os.seteuid(old_euid) + os.setegid(old_egid) + + LOG.info(_LI('Created a new key: %s'), key_file) + + +def initialize_key_repository(keystone_user_id=None, keystone_group_id=None): + """Create a key repository and bootstrap it with a key. + + :param keystone_user_id: User ID of the Keystone user. + :param keystone_group_id: Group ID of the Keystone user. + + """ + # make sure we have work to do before proceeding + if os.access(os.path.join(CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository, '0'), + os.F_OK): + LOG.info(_LI('Key repository is already initialized; aborting.')) + return + + # bootstrap an existing key + _create_new_key(keystone_user_id, keystone_group_id) + + # ensure that we end up with a primary and secondary key + rotate_keys(keystone_user_id, keystone_group_id) + + +def rotate_keys(keystone_user_id=None, keystone_group_id=None): + """Create a new primary key and revoke excess active keys. + + :param keystone_user_id: User ID of the Keystone user. + :param keystone_group_id: Group ID of the Keystone user. + + Key rotation utilizes the following behaviors: + + - The highest key number is used as the primary key (used for encryption). + - All keys can be used for decryption. + - New keys are always created as key "0," which serves as a placeholder + before promoting it to be the primary key. + + This strategy allows you to safely perform rotation on one node in a + cluster, before syncing the results of the rotation to all other nodes + (during both key rotation and synchronization, all nodes must recognize all + primary keys). + + """ + # read the list of key files + key_files = dict() + for filename in os.listdir(CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository): + path = os.path.join(CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository, str(filename)) + if os.path.isfile(path): + key_files[int(filename)] = path + + LOG.info(_LI('Starting key rotation with %(count)s key files: %(list)s'), { + 'count': len(key_files), + 'list': key_files.values()}) + + # determine the number of the new primary key + current_primary_key = max(key_files.keys()) + LOG.info(_LI('Current primary key is: %s'), current_primary_key) + new_primary_key = current_primary_key + 1 + LOG.info(_LI('Next primary key will be: %s'), new_primary_key) + + # promote the next primary key to be the primary + os.rename( + os.path.join(CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository, '0'), + os.path.join(CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository, str(new_primary_key))) + key_files.pop(0) + key_files[new_primary_key] = os.path.join( + CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository, + str(new_primary_key)) + LOG.info(_LI('Promoted key 0 to be the primary: %s'), new_primary_key) + + # add a new key to the rotation, which will be the *next* primary + _create_new_key(keystone_user_id, keystone_group_id) + + # check for bad configuration + if CONF.fernet_tokens.max_active_keys < 1: + LOG.warning(_LW( + '[fernet_tokens] max_active_keys must be at least 1 to maintain a ' + 'primary key.')) + CONF.fernet_tokens.max_active_keys = 1 + + # purge excess keys + keys = sorted(key_files.keys()) + excess_keys = ( + keys[:len(key_files) - CONF.fernet_tokens.max_active_keys + 1]) + LOG.info(_LI('Excess keys to purge: %s'), excess_keys) + for i in excess_keys: + os.remove(key_files[i]) + + +def load_keys(): + """Load keys from disk into a list. + + The first key in the list is the primary key used for encryption. All + other keys are active secondary keys that can be used for decrypting + tokens. + + """ + if not validate_key_repository(): + return [] + + # build a dictionary of key_number:encryption_key pairs + keys = dict() + for filename in os.listdir(CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository): + path = os.path.join(CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository, str(filename)) + if os.path.isfile(path): + with open(path, 'r') as key_file: + keys[int(filename)] = key_file.read() + + LOG.info(_LI( + 'Loaded %(count)s encryption keys from: %(dir)s'), { + 'count': len(keys), + 'dir': CONF.fernet_tokens.key_repository}) + + # return the encryption_keys, sorted by key number, descending + return [keys[x] for x in sorted(keys.keys(), reverse=True)] diff --git a/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/pki.py b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/pki.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..61b42817 --- /dev/null +++ b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/pki.py @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +# Copyright 2013 OpenStack Foundation +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain +# a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the +# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations +# under the License. + +"""Keystone PKI Token Provider""" + +from keystoneclient.common import cms +from oslo_config import cfg +from oslo_log import log +from oslo_serialization import jsonutils + +from keystone.common import environment +from keystone.common import utils +from keystone import exception +from keystone.i18n import _, _LE +from keystone.token.providers import common + + +CONF = cfg.CONF + +LOG = log.getLogger(__name__) + + +class Provider(common.BaseProvider): + def _get_token_id(self, token_data): + try: + # force conversion to a string as the keystone client cms code + # produces unicode. This can be removed if the client returns + # str() + # TODO(ayoung): Make to a byte_str for Python3 + token_json = jsonutils.dumps(token_data, cls=utils.PKIEncoder) + token_id = str(cms.cms_sign_token(token_json, + CONF.signing.certfile, + CONF.signing.keyfile)) + return token_id + except environment.subprocess.CalledProcessError: + LOG.exception(_LE('Unable to sign token')) + raise exception.UnexpectedError(_( + 'Unable to sign token.')) + + def needs_persistence(self): + """Should the token be written to a backend.""" + return True diff --git a/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/pkiz.py b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/pkiz.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b6f2944d --- /dev/null +++ b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/pkiz.py @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain +# a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the +# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations +# under the License. + +"""Keystone Compressed PKI Token Provider""" + +from keystoneclient.common import cms +from oslo_config import cfg +from oslo_log import log +from oslo_serialization import jsonutils + +from keystone.common import environment +from keystone.common import utils +from keystone import exception +from keystone.i18n import _ +from keystone.token.providers import common + + +CONF = cfg.CONF + +LOG = log.getLogger(__name__) +ERROR_MESSAGE = _('Unable to sign token.') + + +class Provider(common.BaseProvider): + def _get_token_id(self, token_data): + try: + # force conversion to a string as the keystone client cms code + # produces unicode. This can be removed if the client returns + # str() + # TODO(ayoung): Make to a byte_str for Python3 + token_json = jsonutils.dumps(token_data, cls=utils.PKIEncoder) + token_id = str(cms.pkiz_sign(token_json, + CONF.signing.certfile, + CONF.signing.keyfile)) + return token_id + except environment.subprocess.CalledProcessError: + LOG.exception(ERROR_MESSAGE) + raise exception.UnexpectedError(ERROR_MESSAGE) + + def needs_persistence(self): + """Should the token be written to a backend.""" + return True diff --git a/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/uuid.py b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/uuid.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..15118d82 --- /dev/null +++ b/keystone-moon/keystone/token/providers/uuid.py @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +# Copyright 2013 OpenStack Foundation +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain +# a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the +# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations +# under the License. + +"""Keystone UUID Token Provider""" + +from __future__ import absolute_import + +import uuid + +from keystone.token.providers import common + + +class Provider(common.BaseProvider): + def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs): + super(Provider, self).__init__(*args, **kwargs) + + def _get_token_id(self, token_data): + return uuid.uuid4().hex + + def needs_persistence(self): + """Should the token be written to a backend.""" + return True |