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2018-04-17Create Stable Branch Jobs for opnfvdocsjenkins-ci2-1/+8
Change-Id: I820572906b65082d3a0dc06486d5bf92f0d0269c Signed-off-by: jenkins-ci <jenkins-opnfv-ci@opnfv.org> Signed-off-by: Trevor Bramwell <tbramwell@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-17Merge "[daisy] Fix the scenario in build-name"Trevor Bramwell1-1/+3
2018-04-17[daisy] Fix the scenario in build-nameAlex Yang1-1/+3
The build-name is always *nosdn-nofeature* even in odl jobs. Change-Id: Icb5707e2d33ed19e9172227c53f153c453538aff Signed-off-by: Alex Yang <yangyang1@zte.com.cn>
2018-04-17[daisy] Run fraser jobs on zte-pod3Alex Yang3-7/+63
Change-Id: I4b879b6af9b4633a8444db988b3fbe7aa1690ee8 Signed-off-by: Alex Yang <yangyang1@zte.com.cn>
2018-04-17Merge "container4nfv: add fraser branch in arm jobs"mei mei1-11/+35
2018-04-16Merge "jjb: xci: bifrost-verify-jobs: Disable OPNFV bifrost jobs"Markos Chandras1-3/+3
2018-04-13Merge "Remove euphrates jobs"Aric Gardner1-4/+0
2018-04-13Merge "Report Fuel Deployments to Testapi Dashboard"Trevor Bramwell2-0/+6
2018-04-13Apex: remove non-released scenarios for FraserTim Rozet1-3/+0
We will not support RT KVM and IPv6 scenario. Change-Id: Iabd52f3ff803488e1ac68e8946001a7c04f5ca7f Signed-off-by: Tim Rozet <trozet@redhat.com>
2018-04-13APEX: Fix missing bash command in verify jobFeng Pan1-1/+1
Change-Id: I055ec261368b341c5dd9f2ab5082c8ced15ad6e5 Signed-off-by: Feng Pan <fpan@redhat.com>
2018-04-13Merge "Create CI job for network testing"Serena Feng1-3/+3
2018-04-13[qtip] enable fraser ci jobszhihui wu1-0/+15
Change-Id: Ic9bf36c63592eac60406d362bedf1c6bd352ab9c Signed-off-by: zhihui wu <wu.zhihui1@zte.com.cn>
2018-04-13Merge "bugfix: run doctor tests parallelly"Serena Feng1-17/+1
2018-04-13Merge "Doctor job bugfix: fix the scenario"Serena Feng1-4/+9
2018-04-13Merge "Enable all yardstick tasks on baremetal for daisy"Serena Feng2-3/+5
2018-04-13Merge "[daisy] Move more CI resource to Fraser branch"Serena Feng1-4/+4
2018-04-13Enable all yardstick tasks on baremetal for daisyJulien2-3/+5
currently only master job is enabled. Change-Id: I7da6a1a3a8e8faf08cde34d9a20219346070151b Signed-off-by: Julien <zhang.jun3g@zte.com.cn>
2018-04-12APEX: Fix gate check scenario detectionFeng Pan3-39/+11
- Change scenario parsing to allow k8s scenarios in gate jobs. - Remove scenario detection in shell scripts. Also changes network setting file for fd.io scenarios as we don't use separate config files any more. Change-Id: Icbcc6cb7b6b66c7cc43f5d6c58dd97730e41ea5f Signed-off-by: Feng Pan <fpan@redhat.com>
2018-04-12Merge "Remove euphrates jobs"Aric Gardner1-4/+0
2018-04-12Merge "Remove euphrates jobs"Aric Gardner1-4/+0
2018-04-12Merge "Remove euphrates jobs"Aric Gardner1-4/+0
2018-04-12Merge "Remove euphrates from domino"Aric Gardner1-4/+0
2018-04-12Report Fuel Deployments to Testapi DashboardTrevor Bramwell2-0/+6
Using these macros for deployment jobs will report the deployment results of Fuel to the testresults database[1]. [1] http://testresults.opnfv.org/test/#/deployresults Change-Id: I353631f073578b4a2da0f08ffba4042931e65dca Signed-off-by: Trevor Bramwell <tbramwell@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12Merge "Move DEPLOY_SCENARIO out of testapi-parameters"Trevor Bramwell3-4/+38
2018-04-12Merge "Remove euphrates jobs"Aric Gardner1-4/+0
2018-04-12Merge "Remove euphrates jobs"Aric Gardner1-3/+0
2018-04-12Merge "Remove euphrates jobs"Aric Gardner1-5/+0
2018-04-12Merge "Remove Euphrates jobs"Aric Gardner1-4/+0
2018-04-12jjb: xci: xci-run-functest: Escape the 'var' variableMarkos Chandras1-1/+1
Commit 33073c5a3426c1867411db446bc9e5d84d2a7747 ("jjb: xci: xci-run-functest.sh: Ensure env vars are quoted during reload") added support for reloading the OPNFV host environment in a safe way but that didn't work because the internal '$var' variable was not escaped so it was evaluated on the local host instead of the remote one. This fixes the problem by properly escaping the variable. Change-Id: I7c90ae18f77aca076579f70c7c0e9a72aaaad7c8 Signed-off-by: Markos Chandras <mchandras@suse.de>
2018-04-12jjb: xci: xci-run-functest.sh: Ensure env vars are quoted during reloadMarkos Chandras1-1/+1
The output of the 'env' command does not use quotes when printing the env variables so trying to source the xci.env file will lead to problems like the following one: /home/devuser/releng-xci/.cache/xci.env: line 17: PROFILEREAD: readonly variable /home/devuser/releng-xci/.cache/xci.env: line 20: 50340: command not found /home/devuser/releng-xci/.cache/xci.env: line 40: controller00: command not found /home/devuser/releng-xci/.cache/xci.env: line 48: on: command not found /home/devuser/releng-xci/.cache/xci.env: line 55: Francisco/O=IT/CN=xci.releng.opnfv.org: No such file or directory /home/devuser/releng-xci/.cache/xci.env: line 75: a: command not found /home/devuser/releng-xci/.cache/xci.env: line 88: -I: command not found /home/devuser/releng-xci/.cache/xci.env: line 90: 50340: command not found /home/devuser/releng-xci/.cache/xci.env: line 92: -e: command not found /home/devuser/releng-xci/.cache/xci.env: line 95: fg: no job control /home/devuser/releng-xci/.cache/xci.env: line 101: fg: no job control As such, we need to ensure that variables are properly quoted when exported. Change-Id: Ie98d8c921bae849d6bffd3858f67708f417b1d0f Signed-off-by: Markos Chandras <mchandras@suse.de>
2018-04-12Merge "Stop maintaining Euphrates (EOL)"Fatih Degirmenci4-24/+7
2018-04-12Merge "Create Xtesting Fraser jjobs"Fatih Degirmenci2-1/+4
2018-04-12Merge "xci: Log functest-kubernetes.log to console"Fatih Degirmenci1-1/+15
2018-04-12[daisy] Move more CI resource to Fraser branchZhijiang Hu1-4/+4
Temporary disable master branch job on zte-pod2 to make room for Fraser branch job. Change-Id: I9f2eea0e1c85eab741f80e6db6b773eec71c39f1 Signed-off-by: Zhijiang Hu <hu.zhijiang@zte.com.cn>
2018-04-12jjb: xci: bifrost-verify-jobs: Disable OPNFV bifrost jobsMarkos Chandras1-3/+3
The jobs are unmaintained and broken for months. Upstream already has jobs for all 3 distributions so there is little value to test a similar scenario on the OPNFV side. As such, lets disable them and save some hardware resources for XCI. Change-Id: I0ab7d51f44bdeb6f630671e8d05dd2baf67d756c Signed-off-by: Markos Chandras <mchandras@suse.de>
2018-04-12Doctor job bugfix: fix the scenariodongwenjuan1-4/+9
Use these scenario which can trigger doctor jobs running in functest Change-Id: I66df099c3923b9c47aab9f9f8685052bd33331f7 Signed-off-by: dongwenjuan <dong.wenjuan@zte.com.cn>
2018-04-12jjb: xci: xci-set-scenario.sh: Fix conditional for default scenarioMarkos Chandras1-1/+1
We only set default scenario if there is not one set already so we need to check if the array is empty. Change-Id: Ic5019fb68349adaf52d669aed43574bc5eaeddc3 Signed-off-by: Markos Chandras <mchandras@suse.de>
2018-04-12xci: Log functest-kubernetes.log to consoleFatih Degirmenci1-1/+15
Change-Id: I9576417cd2c47fd10153d841dddb334cb47c666e Signed-off-by: Fatih Degirmenci <fdegir@gmail.com>
2018-04-12bugfix: run doctor tests parallellydongwenjuan1-17/+1
Currently doctor job uses multiple 'multijob' in builders to virify tests in different installers, these multijobs run in sequentially which will cost a long time. These jobs are not related to each other in different installer. Change-Id: Idce03920ec6244a9ce288c940a24d0707af1a694 Signed-off-by: dongwenjuan <dong.wenjuan@zte.com.cn>
2018-04-12container4nfv: add fraser branch in arm jobsYibo Cai1-11/+35
Change-Id: If5b4dfaef431570f65a321209a4fa4c94292d89f Signed-off-by: Yibo Cai <yibo.cai@arm.com>
2018-04-12Stop maintaining Euphrates (EOL)agardner4-24/+7
Change-Id: Ibd6a523aa9da3aa6c2622a5f183102ffdbc3ccb8 Signed-off-by: agardner <agardner@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-11Remove euphrates jobsagardner1-4/+0
Change-Id: I167bbea911fb3aee6fa21b7ff28b18d7fae61bb9 Signed-off-by: agardner <agardner@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-11Remove euphrates jobsagardner1-4/+0
Change-Id: I0a5a6d584b3740d88dc4f342ffc1d107962762e6 Signed-off-by: agardner <agardner@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-11Remove euphrates jobsagardner1-4/+0
Change-Id: Icf57ec3e65e391207333bb8780ea215bcf4434a4 Signed-off-by: agardner <agardner@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-11Remove euphrates jobsagardner1-4/+0
Change-Id: I21c5ab27243bd50dee76d8b10c10ae0fb8aa5f1d Signed-off-by: agardner <agardner@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-11Merge "jjb: xci: Set XCI_PATH for bifrost jobs"Fatih Degirmenci1-0/+3
2018-04-11Merge "jjb: xci: Only set default scenario if no scenario is set"Fatih Degirmenci1-7/+11
2018-04-11Remove euphrates from dominoagardner1-4/+0
Domino is not in the fraser release. This is part of a cleanup to remove euphrates jobs Change-Id: Ica789accd0148cf847c3498d151bd8ae0b59e8bd Signed-off-by: agardner <agardner@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-11Remove euphrates jobsagardner1-4/+0
Change-Id: I63fdf2826d2077465f264f082dc1a15eafc2b05a Signed-off-by: agardner <agardner@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-11Remove euphrates jobsagardner1-3/+0
Change-Id: I5e5f66b1226291934fecca6fcf83dd649fb82f0e Signed-off-by: agardner <agardner@linuxfoundation.org>
used in network packets. ipv6host This interface allows specific IPv6 internet addresses to be treated as single label hosts. Packets are sent to single label hosts only from processes that have Smack write access to the host label. All packets received from single label hosts are given the specified label. The format accepted on write is: "%h:%h:%h:%h:%h:%h:%h:%h label" or "%h:%h:%h:%h:%h:%h:%h:%h/%d label". The "::" address shortcut is not supported. If label is "-DELETE" a matched entry will be deleted. load Provided for backward compatibility. The load2 interface is preferred and should be used instead. This interface allows access control rules in addition to the system defined rules to be specified. The format accepted on write is: "%24s%24s%5s" where the first string is the subject label, the second the object label, and the third the requested access. The access string may contain only the characters "rwxat-", and specifies which sort of access is allowed. The "-" is a placeholder for permissions that are not allowed. The string "r-x--" would specify read and execute access. Labels are limited to 23 characters in length. load2 This interface allows access control rules in addition to the system defined rules to be specified. The format accepted on write is: "%s %s %s" where the first string is the subject label, the second the object label, and the third the requested access. The access string may contain only the characters "rwxat-", and specifies which sort of access is allowed. The "-" is a placeholder for permissions that are not allowed. The string "r-x--" would specify read and execute access. load-self Provided for backward compatibility. The load-self2 interface is preferred and should be used instead. This interface allows process specific access rules to be defined. These rules are only consulted if access would otherwise be permitted, and are intended to provide additional restrictions on the process. The format is the same as for the load interface. load-self2 This interface allows process specific access rules to be defined. These rules are only consulted if access would otherwise be permitted, and are intended to provide additional restrictions on the process. The format is the same as for the load2 interface. logging This contains the Smack logging state. mapped This contains the CIPSO level used for Smack mapped label representation in network packets. netlabel This interface allows specific internet addresses to be treated as single label hosts. Packets are sent to single label hosts without CIPSO headers, but only from processes that have Smack write access to the host label. All packets received from single label hosts are given the specified label. The format accepted on write is: "%d.%d.%d.%d label" or "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d label". If the label specified is "-CIPSO" the address is treated as a host that supports CIPSO headers. onlycap This contains labels processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to be effective. If this file is empty these capabilities are effective at for processes with any label. The values are set by writing the desired labels, separated by spaces, to the file or cleared by writing "-" to the file. ptrace This is used to define the current ptrace policy 0 - default: this is the policy that relies on Smack access rules. For the PTRACE_READ a subject needs to have a read access on object. For the PTRACE_ATTACH a read-write access is required. 1 - exact: this is the policy that limits PTRACE_ATTACH. Attach is only allowed when subject's and object's labels are equal. PTRACE_READ is not affected. Can be overridden with CAP_SYS_PTRACE. 2 - draconian: this policy behaves like the 'exact' above with an exception that it can't be overridden with CAP_SYS_PTRACE. revoke-subject Writing a Smack label here sets the access to '-' for all access rules with that subject label. unconfined If the kernel is configured with CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP a process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN can write a label into this interface. Thereafter, accesses that involve that label will be logged and the access permitted if it wouldn't be otherwise. Note that this is dangerous and can ruin the proper labeling of your system. It should never be used in production. relabel-self This interface contains a list of labels to which the process can transition to, by writing to /proc/self/attr/current. Normally a process can change its own label to any legal value, but only if it has CAP_MAC_ADMIN. This interface allows a process without CAP_MAC_ADMIN to relabel itself to one of labels from predefined list. A process without CAP_MAC_ADMIN can change its label only once. When it does, this list will be cleared. The values are set by writing the desired labels, separated by spaces, to the file or cleared by writing "-" to the file. If you are using the smackload utility you can add access rules in /etc/smack/accesses. They take the form: subjectlabel objectlabel access access is a combination of the letters rwxatb which specify the kind of access permitted a subject with subjectlabel on an object with objectlabel. If there is no rule no access is allowed. Look for additional programs on http://schaufler-ca.com From the Smack Whitepaper: The Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler casey@schaufler-ca.com Mandatory Access Control Computer systems employ a variety of schemes to constrain how information is shared among the people and services using the machine. Some of these schemes allow the program or user to decide what other programs or users are allowed access to pieces of data. These schemes are called discretionary access control mechanisms because the access control is specified at the discretion of the user. Other schemes do not leave the decision regarding what a user or program can access up to users or programs. These schemes are called mandatory access control mechanisms because you don't have a choice regarding the users or programs that have access to pieces of data. Bell & LaPadula From the middle of the 1980's until the turn of the century Mandatory Access Control (MAC) was very closely associated with the Bell & LaPadula security model, a mathematical description of the United States Department of Defense policy for marking paper documents. MAC in this form enjoyed a following within the Capital Beltway and Scandinavian supercomputer centers but was often sited as failing to address general needs. Domain Type Enforcement Around the turn of the century Domain Type Enforcement (DTE) became popular. This scheme organizes users, programs, and data into domains that are protected from each other. This scheme has been widely deployed as a component of popular Linux distributions. The administrative overhead required to maintain this scheme and the detailed understanding of the whole system necessary to provide a secure domain mapping leads to the scheme being disabled or used in limited ways in the majority of cases. Smack Smack is a Mandatory Access Control mechanism designed to provide useful MAC while avoiding the pitfalls of its predecessors. The limitations of Bell & LaPadula are addressed by providing a scheme whereby access can be controlled according to the requirements of the system and its purpose rather than those imposed by an arcane government policy. The complexity of Domain Type Enforcement and avoided by defining access controls in terms of the access modes already in use. Smack Terminology The jargon used to talk about Smack will be familiar to those who have dealt with other MAC systems and shouldn't be too difficult for the uninitiated to pick up. There are four terms that are used in a specific way and that are especially important: Subject: A subject is an active entity on the computer system. On Smack a subject is a task, which is in turn the basic unit of execution. Object: An object is a passive entity on the computer system. On Smack files of all types, IPC, and tasks can be objects. Access: Any attempt by a subject to put information into or get information from an object is an access. Label: Data that identifies the Mandatory Access Control characteristics of a subject or an object. These definitions are consistent with the traditional use in the security community. There are also some terms from Linux that are likely to crop up: Capability: A task that possesses a capability has permission to violate an aspect of the system security policy, as identified by the specific capability. A task that possesses one or more capabilities is a privileged task, whereas a task with no capabilities is an unprivileged task. Privilege: A task that is allowed to violate the system security policy is said to have privilege. As of this writing a task can have privilege either by possessing capabilities or by having an effective user of root. Smack Basics Smack is an extension to a Linux system. It enforces additional restrictions on what subjects can access which objects, based on the labels attached to each of the subject and the object. Labels Smack labels are ASCII character strings. They can be up to 255 characters long, but keeping them to twenty-three characters is recommended. Single character labels using special characters, that being anything other than a letter or digit, are reserved for use by the Smack development team. Smack labels are unstructured, case sensitive, and the only operation ever performed on them is comparison for equality. Smack labels cannot contain unprintable characters, the "/" (slash), the "\" (backslash), the "'" (quote) and '"' (double-quote) characters. Smack labels cannot begin with a '-'. This is reserved for special options. There are some predefined labels: _ Pronounced "floor", a single underscore character. ^ Pronounced "hat", a single circumflex character. * Pronounced "star", a single asterisk character. ? Pronounced "huh", a single question mark character. @ Pronounced "web", a single at sign character. Every task on a Smack system is assigned a label. The Smack label of a process will usually be assigned by the system initialization mechanism. Access Rules Smack uses the traditional access modes of Linux. These modes are read, execute, write, and occasionally append. There are a few cases where the access mode may not be obvious. These include: Signals: A signal is a write operation from the subject task to the object task. Internet Domain IPC: Transmission of a packet is considered a write operation from the source task to the destination task. Smack restricts access based on the label attached to a subject and the label attached to the object it is trying to access. The rules enforced are, in order: 1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied. 2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^" is permitted. 3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_" is permitted. 4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted. 5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same label is permitted. 6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded rule set is permitted. 7. Any other access is denied. Smack Access Rules With the isolation provided by Smack access separation is simple. There are many interesting cases where limited access by subjects to objects with different labels is desired. One example is the familiar spy model of sensitivity, where a scientist working on a highly classified project would be able to read documents of lower classifications and anything she writes will be "born" highly classified. To accommodate such schemes Smack includes a mechanism for specifying rules allowing access between labels. Access Rule Format The format of an access rule is: subject-label object-label access Where subject-label is the Smack label of the task, object-label is the Smack label of the thing being accessed, and access is a string specifying the sort of access allowed. The access specification is searched for letters that describe access modes: a: indicates that append access should be granted. r: indicates that read access should be granted. w: indicates that write access should be granted. x: indicates that execute access should be granted. t: indicates that the rule requests transmutation. b: indicates that the rule should be reported for bring-up. Uppercase values for the specification letters are allowed as well. Access mode specifications can be in any order. Examples of acceptable rules are: TopSecret Secret rx Secret Unclass R Manager Game x User HR w Snap Crackle rwxatb New Old rRrRr Closed Off - Examples of unacceptable rules are: Top Secret Secret rx Ace Ace r Odd spells waxbeans Spaces are not allowed in labels. Since a subject always has access to files with the same label specifying a rule for that case is pointless. Only valid letters (rwxatbRWXATB) and the dash ('-') character are allowed in access specifications. The dash is a placeholder, so "a-r" is the same as "ar". A lone dash is used to specify that no access should be allowed. Applying Access Rules The developers of Linux rarely define new sorts of things, usually importing schemes and concepts from other systems. Most often, the other systems are variants of Unix. Unix has many endearing properties, but consistency of access control models is not one of them. Smack strives to treat accesses as uniformly as is sensible while keeping with the spirit of the underlying mechanism. File system objects including files, directories, named pipes, symbolic links, and devices require access permissions that closely match those used by mode bit access. To open a file for reading read access is required on the file. To search a directory requires execute access. Creating a file with write access requires both read and write access on the containing directory. Deleting a file requires read and write access to the file and to the containing directory. It is possible that a user may be able to see that a file exists but not any of its attributes by the circumstance of having read access to the containing directory but not to the differently labeled file. This is an artifact of the file name being data in the directory, not a part of the file. If a directory is marked as transmuting (SMACK64TRANSMUTE=TRUE) and the access rule that allows a process to create an object in that directory includes 't' access the label assigned to the new object will be that of the directory, not the creating process. This makes it much easier for two processes with different labels to share data without granting access to all of their files. IPC objects, message queues, semaphore sets, and memory segments exist in flat namespaces and access requests are only required to match the object in question. Process objects reflect tasks on the system and the Smack label used to access them is the same Smack label that the task would use for its own access attempts. Sending a signal via the kill() system call is a write operation from the signaler to the recipient. Debugging a process requires both reading and writing. Creating a new task is an internal operation that results in two tasks with identical Smack labels and requires no access checks. Sockets are data structures attached to processes and sending a packet from one process to another requires that the sender have write access to the receiver. The receiver is not required to have read access to the sender. Setting Access Rules The configuration file /etc/smack/accesses contains the rules to be set at system startup. The contents are written to the special file /sys/fs/smackfs/load2. Rules can be added at any time and take effect immediately. For any pair of subject and object labels there can be only one rule, with the most recently specified overriding any earlier specification. Task Attribute The Smack label of a process can be read from /proc/<pid>/attr/current. A process can read its own Smack label from /proc/self/attr/current. A privileged process can change its own Smack label by writing to /proc/self/attr/current but not the label of another process. File Attribute The Smack label of a filesystem object is stored as an extended attribute named SMACK64 on the file. This attribute is in the security namespace. It can only be changed by a process with privilege. Privilege A process with CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE or CAP_MAC_ADMIN is privileged. CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE allows the process access to objects it would be denied otherwise. CAP_MAC_ADMIN allows a process to change Smack data, including rules and attributes. Smack Networking As mentioned before, Smack enforces access control on network protocol transmissions. Every packet sent by a Smack process is tagged with its Smack label. This is done by adding a CIPSO tag to the header of the IP packet. Each packet received is expected to have a CIPSO tag that identifies the label and if it lacks such a tag the network ambient label is assumed. Before the packet is delivered a check is made to determine that a subject with the label on the packet has write access to the receiving process and if that is not the case the packet is dropped. CIPSO Configuration It is normally unnecessary to specify the CIPSO configuration. The default values used by the system handle all internal cases. Smack will compose CIPSO label values to match the Smack labels being used without administrative intervention. Unlabeled packets that come into the system will be given the ambient label. Smack requires configuration in the case where packets from a system that is not Smack that speaks CIPSO may be encountered. Usually this will be a Trusted Solaris system, but there are other, less widely deployed systems out there. CIPSO provides 3 important values, a Domain Of Interpretation (DOI), a level, and a category set with each packet. The DOI is intended to identify a group of systems that use compatible labeling schemes, and the DOI specified on the Smack system must match that of the remote system or packets will be discarded. The DOI is 3 by default. The value can be read from /sys/fs/smackfs/doi and can be changed by writing to /sys/fs/smackfs/doi. The label and category set are mapped to a Smack label as defined in /etc/smack/cipso. A Smack/CIPSO mapping has the form: smack level [category [category]*] Smack does not expect the level or category sets to be related in any particular way and does not assume or assign accesses based on them. Some examples of mappings: TopSecret 7 TS:A,B 7 1 2 SecBDE 5 2 4 6 RAFTERS 7 12 26 The ":" and "," characters are permitted in a Smack label but have no special meaning. The mapping of Smack labels to CIPSO values is defined by writing to /sys/fs/smackfs/cipso2. In addition to explicit mappings Smack supports direct CIPSO mappings. One CIPSO level is used to indicate that the category set passed in the packet is in fact an encoding of the Smack label. The level used is 250 by default. The value can be read from /sys/fs/smackfs/direct and changed by writing to /sys/fs/smackfs/direct. Socket Attributes There are two attributes that are associated with sockets. These attributes can only be set by privileged tasks, but any task can read them for their own sockets. SMACK64IPIN: The Smack label of the task object. A privileged program that will enforce policy may set this to the star label. SMACK64IPOUT: The Smack label transmitted with outgoing packets. A privileged program may set this to match the label of another task with which it hopes to communicate. Smack Netlabel Exceptions You will often find that your labeled application has to talk to the outside, unlabeled world. To do this there's a special file /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel where you can add some exceptions in the form of : @IP1 LABEL1 or @IP2/MASK LABEL2 It means that your application will have unlabeled access to @IP1 if it has write access on LABEL1, and access to the subnet @IP2/MASK if it has write access on LABEL2. Entries in the /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel file are matched by longest mask first, like in classless IPv4 routing. A special label '@' and an option '-CIPSO' can be used there : @ means Internet, any application with any label has access to it -CIPSO means standard CIPSO networking If you don't know what CIPSO is and don't plan to use it, you can just do : echo 127.0.0.1 -CIPSO > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel echo 0.0.0.0/0 @ > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel If you use CIPSO on your 192.168.0.0/16 local network and need also unlabeled Internet access, you can have : echo 127.0.0.1 -CIPSO > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel echo 192.168.0.0/16 -CIPSO > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel echo 0.0.0.0/0 @ > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel Writing Applications for Smack There are three sorts of applications that will run on a Smack system. How an application interacts with Smack will determine what it will have to do to work properly under Smack. Smack Ignorant Applications By far the majority of applications have no reason whatever to care about the unique properties of Smack. Since invoking a program has no impact on the Smack label associated with the process the only concern likely to arise is whether the process has execute access to the program. Smack Relevant Applications Some programs can be improved by teaching them about Smack, but do not make any security decisions themselves. The utility ls(1) is one example of such a program. Smack Enforcing Applications These are special programs that not only know about Smack, but participate in the enforcement of system policy. In most cases these are the programs that set up user sessions. There are also network services that provide information to processes running with various labels. File System Interfaces Smack maintains labels on file system objects using extended attributes. The Smack label of a file, directory, or other file system object can be obtained using getxattr(2). len = getxattr("/", "security.SMACK64", value, sizeof (value)); will put the Smack label of the root directory into value. A privileged process can set the Smack label of a file system object with setxattr(2). len = strlen("Rubble"); rc = setxattr("/foo", "security.SMACK64", "Rubble", len, 0); will set the Smack label of /foo to "Rubble" if the program has appropriate privilege. Socket Interfaces The socket attributes can be read using fgetxattr(2). A privileged process can set the Smack label of outgoing packets with fsetxattr(2). len = strlen("Rubble"); rc = fsetxattr(fd, "security.SMACK64IPOUT", "Rubble", len, 0); will set the Smack label "Rubble" on packets going out from the socket if the program has appropriate privilege. rc = fsetxattr(fd, "security.SMACK64IPIN, "*", strlen("*"), 0); will set the Smack label "*" as the object label against which incoming packets will be checked if the program has appropriate privilege. Administration Smack supports some mount options: smackfsdef=label: specifies the label to give files that lack the Smack label extended attribute. smackfsroot=label: specifies the label to assign the root of the file system if it lacks the Smack extended attribute. smackfshat=label: specifies a label that must have read access to all labels set on the filesystem. Not yet enforced. smackfsfloor=label: specifies a label to which all labels set on the filesystem must have read access. Not yet enforced. These mount options apply to all file system types. Smack auditing If you want Smack auditing of security events, you need to set CONFIG_AUDIT in your kernel configuration. By default, all denied events will be audited. You can change this behavior by writing a single character to the /sys/fs/smackfs/logging file : 0 : no logging 1 : log denied (default) 2 : log accepted 3 : log denied & accepted Events are logged as 'key=value' pairs, for each event you at least will get the subject, the object, the rights requested, the action, the kernel function that triggered the event, plus other pairs depending on the type of event audited. Bringup Mode Bringup mode provides logging features that can make application configuration and system bringup easier. Configure the kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP to enable these features. When bringup mode is enabled accesses that succeed due to rules marked with the "b" access mode will logged. When a new label is introduced for processes rules can be added aggressively, marked with the "b". The logging allows tracking of which rules actual get used for that label. Another feature of bringup mode is the "unconfined" option. Writing a label to /sys/fs/smackfs/unconfined makes subjects with that label able to access any object, and objects with that label accessible to all subjects. Any access that is granted because a label is unconfined is logged. This feature is dangerous, as files and directories may be created in places they couldn't if the policy were being enforced.