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diff --git a/docs/opnfvsecguide/introduction/background.rst b/docs/opnfvsecguide/introduction/background.rst deleted file mode 100644 index bd7e44d01..000000000 --- a/docs/opnfvsecguide/introduction/background.rst +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -Background ----------- - -Pre-virtualization security protection was largely centered on the network. -Malicious attacks from hostile machines, would seek to exploit network based -operating systems and applications, with the goal of compromising their -target node. - -Physical security had always been a much simpler business, with most focus on -the secure access of the data center hardware. -In-turn security was built up in layers (defense in depth) where machines -would be -daisy chained with network cables via security appliances to provide -controlled segmentation and isolation. -This form of security was built upon the principle of an 'air gap' -being present, -whereby machines were separate physical units, joined largely by the -network stack. - -With the advent of virtualization (namely the hypervisor), new attack -vectors have -surfaced as the 'air-gap' is no longer key design aspect for security. -Further to this elements orchestation nodes and network controllers -lead to an even wider attack surface: - -* Guests breaking isolation of the hypervisor. - -* Unauthorized access and control of supporting orchestration nodes. - -* Unauthorized access and control of supporting overlay network control systems. - -The hypervisor and the overlay network have now become the 'Achilles heel' -whereby all tenant data isolation is enforced within the hypervisor and its -abstraction -of hardware and the virtualized overlay network. - -This guide has been formulated, in order to assist users of the OPNFV platform -in securing an Telco NFV / SDN environment. |