Adjusted the docs repo structure for D release work

Change-Id: I9befe06c424c726e17d754bc480413b2430549ba
Signed-off-by: Sofia Wallin <sofia.wallin@ericsson.com>

15 files changed, 427 insertions, 0 deletions

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diff --git a/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/audit.rst b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/audit.rst
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+Audit
+----------------
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 2
+
+   audit/audit_reqs
+   audit/configuring
+
diff --git a/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/audit/audit_reqs.rst b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/audit/audit_reqs.rst
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+Requirements references related to OPNFV Audit
+
+------------------
+Source information
+------------------
+
+http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/NFV-INF/001_099/003/01.01.01_60/gs_NFV-INF003v010101p.pdf
+http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/NFV-INF/001_099/004/01.01.01_60/gs_NFV-INF004v010101p.pdf
+
+* ETSI GS NFV-SEC 003 V1.1.1 (2014-12)
+
+  - Network Functions Virtualisation NFV);
+  - NFV Security; Security and Trust Guidance
+  - NFV-SEC-003_.
+
+
+.. _NFV-SEC-003: http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/NFV-SEC/001_099/003/01.01.01_60/gs_NFV-SEC003v010101p.pdf
+* ETSI GS NFV 004 V1.1.1 (2013-10)
+
+  - Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV);
+  - Virtualisation Requirements
+  - NFV-SEC-004_.
+
+.. _NFV-SEC-004: http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/NFV/001_099/004/01.01.01_60/gs_NFV004v010101p.pdf
+
+Requirements on Auditing framework
+----------------------------------
+
+Audit records shall be maintained within protected binary logs so that the record of
+malicious actions cannot be deleted from the logs.
+
+Necessary auditable events
+--------------------------
+
+* access control management
+
+  - Adding a user account
+  - Modifying user account
+  - Deleting a user account
+  - login event
+  - logout event
+  - IP whitelisting update
+  - IP blacklisting update
+
+* VNFC Creation
+
+  - The instantiation of a newly-defined VNFC
+  - The instantiation of a VNFC with pre-configured state
+  - The cloning of an existing VNFC
+
+* VNFC Deletion
+
+  - The deletion of VNFC and of all of its instances (e.g. snapshots, backups, archives, cloned images)
+
+* Software management
+
+  - patching e.g. opreating system, drivers, VM components
+  - dynamic updates to the configuration e.g. DNS, DHCP
+  - application software updates
+  - software component updates
+
+* Data management
+
+  - Root level access to NFVI file system
+  - User level access to NFVI file system
+  - Secured wipe, disk and memory
+  - Verified destruction
+  - Certificate revocation
+
+* VNFC Migration
+
+  - VNFC original host identity
+  - VNFC target host identity
+  - high availability
+  - recovery
+  - data-in-motion changes
+
+* Other VNFC Operational State Changes
+
+  - Hibernation, sleep, resumption, abort, restore, suspension
+  - Power-on and power-off (either physical or virtual)
+  - Integrity verification failure, crash and OS compromise
+
+* VNFC Topology Changes
+
+  - Network IP address and VLAN updates
+  - Service chaining
+  - Failover and disaster recovery
+
+* traffic inspection
+
+  - enabling virtual port mirroring
+  - enabling hypervisor introspection
+  - enabling in-line traffic inspection
+  - application insertion
+
+* initial provisioning of a public/private key pair
+
+  - Self-generation of key pairs for later validation by an external party:
+
+     - Certificate Authority
+     - VNFM
+
+  - Provision by trusted party
+
+     - network
+     - storage
+
+  - Injection by hypervisor
+
diff --git a/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/compute.rst b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/compute.rst
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+Compute Security
+----------------
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 2
+
+   compute/dacmaccontrols.rst
+   compute/trust.rst
diff --git a/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/compute/dacmaccontrols.rst b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/compute/dacmaccontrols.rst
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+DAC & MAC Controls
+------------------
+
diff --git a/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/compute/trust.rst b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/compute/trust.rst
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+Trusted Compute
+---------------
+
+Trusted compute is centered on insuring the complete lifecycle of a VM, and
+the VM's underlying infrastructure is of a 'trustful' state.
+
+**Trusted computing in a cloud environment**
+
+To ensure overall security in an OPNFV deployment, both the launch and the
+operation of virtualized resources need to be secure. To build a trusted
+computing in a cloud environment the following core features are essential:
+
+* boot integrity - the hardware platform can guarantee a trustworthy RoT for the overall cloud environment
+* secure management of VMs – to secure the launch and migration of VMs in the cloud environment
+
+In this section we will cover some aspects of what is considered compute
+security, such as secure/trusted boot, although of course these can be
+extended to other actors such as neutron networking nodes.
+
+Secure Boot
+###########
+
+Secure boot, a UEFI-based feature that has become controversial lately,
+ensures that nodes in an OPNFV deployment boot only software that is trusted
+by the admin or end user.
+
+In order to understand the secure boot procedure, we need to explain the related technology
+and specification.
+
+**Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI)**
+
+UEFI is a specification intended to be the replacement and improvement on the
+old BIOS (Basic Input/Output System).
+
+One UEFI-based feature that has become controversial lately is the secure boot feature.
+
+The UEFI specification is a standard that’s handled by a non-profit organization
+with representatives of Intel, AMD, Microsoft, Apple, Dell, HP, IBM and others,
+called the Unified EFI Forum.
+
+UEFI supports 32 and 64 bit processors and can be used with Itanium, x86,
+x64 and ARM processors.
+
+**Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) vs Trusted Platform Mobile (TPM)**
+
+Two main components of platform security:
+
+* Trusted Execution Environment
+* Trusted Platform Module
+
+These are not designed as a replacement of the other. TEE is the bulletproof
+safe, while TPM is the 128-digit combination lock for the safe. Both are
+needed to ensure the safe is protected.
+
+TPM is a dependency of TEE but not the other way around.
+
+The TPM is where TEE will store the measurements - hash of components - of the platform.
+
+If TEE is not supported by a platform but a TPM is still present you still have
+all these features:
+
+* Integrity measurement – securely measure the platform's components (hashes stored within the TPM)
+
+* Authenticated boot – a process by which a platform's state (the sum of its
+  components) is reliably measured and stored
+
+* SRTM - Static Root of Trust for Measurements
+
+* Sealed Storage - encrypt data based on the current state of the platform
+  or in other words, what has been measured (the PCR hash values stored in the
+  TPM) - seal operation
+
+* Attestation - securely report to other parties the state of the platform
+
+
+Trusted Compute Pools
+#####################
+
+**Trusted Boot**
+
+Trusted boot (tboot) is an open source, pre- kernel/VMM module that uses
+Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT) to perform a measured
+and verified launch of an OS kernel/VMM. The root of trust is in the hardware
+and a TPM is required. Compute nodes in an OPNFV deployment boot with Intel
+TXT technology enabled.
+
+Read more about `Trusted Boot <http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/trusted_boot>`_ and
+`Trusted Computing. <http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/trusted_computing>`_
+
+**Trusted Execution Environments (TEE)**
+
+The Trusted Execution Environment is an isolated execution environment which
+provides higher level of security such as isolated execution, integrity of
+Trusted Applications along with confidentiality of their assets.
+
+**Goals of a Trusted Execution Environments:**
+
+* Isolated Execution
+* Secure Storage
+* Remote Attestation
+* Secure Provisioning
+* Trusted Path
+
+**TEE platforms/implementations**
+
+* Intel’s TXT (Trusted Execution Technology)
+* AMD Secure Execution Environment
+* ARM TrustZone
+
+All three of these TEE implementations provide a virtualized Execution
+Environment for the secure OS and applications.
+
+To switch between the secure world and the normal world, Intel provides SMX
+Instructions, while ARM uses SMC. Programmatically, they all achieve very
+similar results.
+
+Read more about Trusted Execution Environments `here. <http://www.openvirtualization.org/open-source-arm-trustzone.html>`_
+
+`NIST SP800-147 <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-147/NIST-SP800-147-April2011.pdf>`_
+, is a  guidelines for firmware security, to ensure that the firmware itself is secure.
+
+Read more about "Trusted compute pools", in the
+`OpenStack Security Guide. <http://docs.openstack.org/admin-guide-cloud/compute-security.html>`_
+
diff --git a/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/contribution.rst b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/contribution.rst
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+How to Contribute
+-----------------
+
+Anyone is welcome to make additions, raise bugs, and fix issues within this Documentation.
+To do so, you will however need to first get an enviroment set up.
+
+Development Environment
+#######################
+
+All project data such as formatting guidelines, and upstream mapping is documented via sphinx
+which uses reStructuredText
+
+It is recommended that you use a python virtualenv to keep things clean and contained.
+
+VirtualEnv
+**********
+
+Use of a virtual environment is recommended, as not only is it a quick easy form of
+getting the needed modules in place, it isolates the module versions to a project.
+
+From within your inspector directory, set up a new virtualenv::
+
+    virtualenv venv
+
+Activate the new virtual environment::
+
+    source venv/bin/activate
+
+Install requirements::
+
+    pip install -r requirements.txt
+
+Sphinx Basics
+*************
+
+To get started with sphinx, visit the main tutorial which will provide a primer `http://sphinx-doc.org/tutorial.html`
+
+Hack your changes into opnfv-security-guide/source
+
+To compile changes:
+
+    make html
+
+From here you can run a basic python web server or just navigate to the
+file:///<repo>/opnfv-security-guide/build/html/index.html in your browser
diff --git a/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/getting_started.rst b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/getting_started.rst
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+Getting Started
+---------------
+
+Development Environment
+#######################
+
+All project data such as formatting guidelines, and upstream mapping is documented via sphinx
+which uses reStructuredText
+
+VirtualEnv
+**********
+
+Use of a virtual environment is recommended, as not only is it a quick easy form of
+getting the needed modules in place, it isolates the module versions to a project.
+
+From within your inspector directory, set up a new virtualenv::
+
+    virtualenv venv
+
+Activate the new virtual environment::
+
+    source venv/bin/activate
+
+Install requirements::
+
+    pip install -r requirements.txt
+
+Sphinx Basics
+*************
+
+To get started with sphinx, visit the main tutorial which will provide a primer
+`http://sphinx-doc.org/tutorial.html`
+
+Hack your changes into opnfv-security-guide/source
+
+To compile changes:
+
+    make html
+
+From here you can run a basic python web server or just navigate to the
+file:///<repo>/opnfv-security-guide/build/html/index.html in your browser
diff --git a/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/index.rst b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/index.rst
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+.. OPNFV Security Guide documentation master file, created by
+   sphinx-quickstart on Tue Oct 27 19:30:29 2015.
+   You can adapt this file completely to your liking, but it should at least
+   contain the root `toctree` directive.
+
+Welcome to OPNFV Security Guide
+================================================
+
+This guide seeks to inform operators who to secure and maintain the security of the OPNFV Platform and its components.
+
+Contents:
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 2
+
+   introduction
+   compute
+   network
+   contribution
+   audit
+
diff --git a/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/introduction.rst b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/introduction.rst
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+Introduction
+---------------
+
+The OPNFV Security Guide is the collaborative work of many individuals,
+involved in both the OPNFV Security Group and the wider OPNFV community.
+
+The purpose of this guide is to provide the best practice security guidelines for
+deploying the OPNFV platfornm. It is a living document that is updated as
+new changes are merged into it's repository.
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 2
+
+   introduction/background
+   introduction/acknowledgements
diff --git a/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/introduction/acknowledgements.rst b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/introduction/acknowledgements.rst
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+Acknowledgements
+----------------
+
diff --git a/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/introduction/background.rst b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/introduction/background.rst
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+Background
+----------
+
+Pre-virtualization security protection was largely centered on the network.
+Malicious attacks from hostile machines, would seek to exploit network based
+operating systems and applications, with the goal of compromising their
+target node.
+
+Physical security had always been a much simpler business, with most focus on
+the secure access of the data center hardware.
+In-turn security was built up in layers (defense in depth) where machines
+would be
+daisy chained with network cables via  security appliances to provide
+controlled segmentation and isolation.
+This form of security was built upon the principle of an 'air gap'
+being present,
+whereby machines were separate physical units, joined largely by the
+network stack.
+
+With the advent of virtualization (namely the hypervisor), new attack
+vectors have
+surfaced as the 'air-gap' is no longer key design aspect for security.
+Further to this elements orchestation nodes and network controllers
+lead to an even wider attack surface:
+
+* Guests breaking isolation of the hypervisor.
+
+* Unauthorized access and control of supporting orchestration nodes.
+
+* Unauthorized access and control of supporting overlay network control systems.
+
+The hypervisor and the overlay network have now become the 'Achilles heel'
+whereby all tenant data isolation is enforced within the hypervisor and its
+abstraction
+of hardware and the virtualized overlay network.
+
+This guide has been formulated, in order to assist users of the OPNFV platform
+in securing an Telco NFV / SDN environment.
diff --git a/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/network.rst b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/network.rst
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+Network Security
+----------------
+
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 2
+
+   network/neutron
diff --git a/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/network/neutron.rst b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/network/neutron.rst
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Neutron Security
+----------------