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Diffstat (limited to 'framework/src/audit/contrib/stig.rules')
| -rw-r--r-- | framework/src/audit/contrib/stig.rules | 193 |
1 files changed, 193 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/framework/src/audit/contrib/stig.rules b/framework/src/audit/contrib/stig.rules new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5a51d7f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/framework/src/audit/contrib/stig.rules @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +## This file contains the auditctl rules that are loaded +## whenever the audit daemon is started via the initscripts. +## The rules are simply the parameters that would be passed +## to auditctl. +## +## First rule - delete all +-D + +## Increase the buffers to survive stress events. +## Make this bigger for busy systems +-b 8192 + +## Set failure mode to panic +-f 2 + +## Make the loginuid immutable. This prevents tampering with the auid. +--loginuid-immutable + +## NOTE: +## 1) if this is being used on a 32 bit machine, comment out the b64 lines +## 2) These rules assume that login under the root account is not allowed. +## 3) It is also assumed that 500 represents the first usable user account. To +## be sure, look at UID_MIN in /etc/login.defs. +## 4) If these rules generate too much spurious data for your tastes, limit the +## the syscall file rules with a directory, like -F dir=/etc +## 5) You can search for the results on the key fields in the rules +## +## +## (GEN002880: CAT II) The IAO will ensure the auditing software can +## record the following for each audit event: +##- Date and time of the event +##- Userid that initiated the event +##- Type of event +##- Success or failure of the event +##- For I&A events, the origin of the request (e.g., terminal ID) +##- For events that introduce an object into a user’s address space, and +## for object deletion events, the name of the object, and in MLS +## systems, the object’s security level. +## +## Things that could affect time +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex,settimeofday,stime -F key=time-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex,settimeofday -F key=time-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change +# Introduced in 2.6.39, commented out because it can make false positives +#-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_adjtime -F key=time-change +#-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_adjtime -F key=time-change +-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k time-change + +## Things that affect identity +-w /etc/group -p wa -k identity +-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k identity +-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k identity +-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k identity +-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k identity + +## Things that could affect system locale +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S sethostname,setdomainname -F key=system-locale +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S sethostname,setdomainname -F key=system-locale +-w /etc/issue -p wa -k system-locale +-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k system-locale +-w /etc/hosts -p wa -k system-locale +-w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k system-locale +-a always,exit -F dir=/etc/NetworkManager/ -F perm=wa -F key=system-locale + +## Things that could affect MAC policy +-a always,exit -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F key=MAC-policy + + +## (GEN002900: CAT III) The IAO will ensure audit files are retained at +## least one year; systems containing SAMI will be retained for five years. +## +## Site action - no action in config files + +## (GEN002920: CAT III) The IAO will ensure audit files are backed up +## no less than weekly onto a different system than the system being +## audited or backup media. +## +## Can be done with cron script + +## (GEN002700: CAT I) (Previously – G095) The SA will ensure audit data +## files have permissions of 640, or more restrictive. +## +## Done automatically by auditd + +## (GEN002720-GEN002840: CAT II) (Previously – G100-G106) The SA will +## configure the auditing system to audit the following events for all +## users and root: +## +## - Logon (unsuccessful and successful) and logout (successful) +## +## Handled by pam, sshd, login, and gdm +## Might also want to watch these files if needing extra information +#-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins +#-w /var/run/faillock/ -p wa -k logins +#-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins + + +##- Process and session initiation (unsuccessful and successful) +## +## The session initiation is audited by pam without any rules needed. +## Might also want to watch this file if needing extra information +#-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session +#-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session +#-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session + +##- Discretionary access control permission modification (unsuccessful +## and successful use of chown/chmod) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown,fchown,lchown,fchownat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=perm_mod + +##- Unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,truncate,ftruncate,creat,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,truncate,ftruncate,creat,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=access + +##- Use of privileged commands (unsuccessful and successful) +## use find /bin -type f -perm -04000 2>/dev/null and put all those files in a rule like this +-a always,exit -F path=/bin/ping -F perm=x -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=privileged + +##- Use of print command (unsuccessful and successful) + +##- Export to media (successful) +## You have to mount media before using it. You must disable all automounting +## so that its done manually in order to get the correct user requesting the +## export +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S mount -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=export +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=export + +##- System startup and shutdown (unsuccessful and successful) + +##- Files and programs deleted by the user (successful and unsuccessful) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=delete + +##- All system administration actions +##- All security personnel actions +## +## Look for pam_tty_audit and add it to your login entry point's pam configs. +## If that is not found, use sudo which should be patched to record its +## commands to the audit system. Do not allow unrestricted root shells or +## sudo cannot record the action. +-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions +-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions + +## (GEN002860: CAT II) (Previously – G674) The SA and/or IAO will +##ensure old audit logs are closed and new audit logs are started daily. +## +## Site action. Can be assisted by a cron job + +## Not specifically required by the STIG; but common sense items +## Optional - could indicate someone trying to do something bad or +## just debugging +#-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ptrace -F key=tracing +#-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F key=tracing +#-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ptrace -F a0=0x4 -F key=code-injection +#-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x4 -F key=code-injection +#-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ptrace -F a0=0x5 -F key=data-injection +#-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x5 -F key=data-injection +#-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ptrace -F a0=0x6 -F key=register-injection +#-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x6 -F key=register-injection + +## Optional - might want to watch module insertion +#-w /sbin/insmod -p x -k modules +#-w /sbin/rmmod -p x -k modules +#-w /sbin/modprobe -p x -k modules +#-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load +#-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load +#-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload +#-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload + +## Optional - admin may be abusing power by looking in user's home dir +#-a always,exit -F dir=/home -F uid=0 -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -C auid!=obj_uid -F key=power-abuse + +## Optional - log container creation +#-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clone -F a0&0x7C020000 -F key=container-create +#-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clone -F a0&0x7C020000 -F key=container-create + +## Optional - watch for containers that may change their configuration +#-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unshare,setns -F key=container-config +#-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare,setns -F key=container-config + +## Put your own watches after this point +# -w /your-file -p rwxa -k mykey + +## Make the configuration immutable - reboot is required to change audit rules +-e 2 + |