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diff --git a/odl-aaa-moon/aaa-authn-api/src/main/docs/sssd_configuration.rst b/odl-aaa-moon/aaa-authn-api/src/main/docs/sssd_configuration.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f912d94 --- /dev/null +++ b/odl-aaa-moon/aaa-authn-api/src/main/docs/sssd_configuration.rst @@ -0,0 +1,1687 @@ +################################################ +Federated Authentication Utilizing Apache & SSSD +################################################ + +:Author: John Dennis +:Email: jdennis@redhat.com + +.. contents:: Table of Contents + +************ +Introduction +************ + +Applications should not need to handle the burden of authentication +and authorization. These are complex technologies further complicated +by the existence of a wide variety of authentication +mechanisms. Likewise there are numerous identity providers (IdP) which +one may wish to utilize, perhaps in a federated manner. The potential +to make critical mistakes are high while consuming significant +engineering resources. Ideally an application should "outsource" it's +authentication to an "expert" and avoid unnecessary development costs. + +For web based applications (both conventional HTML and REST API) there +has been a trend to embed a simple HTTP server in the application or +application server which handles the HTTP requests eschewing the use +of a traditional web server such as Apache. + +.. figure:: sssd_01.png + :align: center + + _`Figure 1.` + +But traditional web servers have a lot of advantages. They often come +with extensive support for technologies you might wish to utilize in +your application. It would require signification software engineering +to add support for those technologies in your application. The problem +is compounded by the fact many of these technologies demand domain +expertise which is unlikely to be available in the application +development team. Another problem is the libraries needed to utilize +the technology may not even be available in the programming language +the application is being developed in. Fundamentally an application +developer should focus on developing their application instead of +investing resources into implementing complex code for the ancillary +technologies the application may wish to utilize. + +Therefore fronting your application with a web server such as Apache +makes a lot of sense. One should allow Apache to handle complex tasks +such as multiple authentication mechanisms talking to multiple +IdP's. Suppose you want your application to handle Single Sign-On +(SSO) via Kerberos or authentication based on X509 certificates +(i.e. PKI). Apache already has extensions to handle these which have +been field proven, it would be silly to try and support these in your +application. Apache also comes with other useful extensions such as +``mod_identity_lookup`` which can extract metadata about an +authenticated user from multiple sources such as LDAP, +Active Directory, NIS, etc. + +By fronting your application with Apache and allowing Apache to handle +the complex task of authentication, identity lookups etc. you've +greatly increased the features of your application while at the same +time reducing application development time along with increasing +application security and robustness. + +.. figure:: sssd_02.png + :align: center + + _`Figure 2.` + +When Apache fronts your application you will be passed the results of +authentication and identity lookups. Your application only needs a +simple mechanism to accept these values. There are a variety of ways +the values can be passed from Apache to your application which will be +discussed in later sections. + +Authentication & Identity Properties +==================================== + +Authentication is proving that a user is who they claim to be, in +other words after authentication the user has a proven identity. In +security parlance the authenticated entity is call a +principal. Principals may be humans, machines or +services. Authorization is distinct from authentication. Authorization +declares what actions an authenticated principal may perform. For +example, does a principal have permission to read a certain file, run +a specific command, etc. Identity metadata is typically bound to the +principal to provide extra information. Examples include the users +full name, their organization, the groups they are members of, etc. + +Apache can provide both authentication and identity metadata to an +application freeing the application of this task. Authorization +usually will remain the province of the application. A typical +design pattern is to assign roles to a principal based on identity +properties. As the application executes on behalf of a principal the +application will check if the principal has the necessary role needed +to perform the operation. + +Apache ships with a wide variety of authentication modules. After an +Apache authentication module successfully authenticates a principal, it +sets internal variables identifying the principal and the +authentication method used to authenticate the principal. These are +exported as the CGI variables REMOTE_USER and AUTH_TYPE respectively +(see `CGI Export Issues`_ for further information). + +Identity Properties +------------------- + +Most Apache authentication modules do not have access to any of the +identity properties bound to the authenticated principal. Those +identity properties must be provided by some other mechanism. Typical +mechanisms include lookups in LDAP, Active Directory, NIS, POSIX +passwd/gecos and SQL. Managing these lookups can be difficult +especially in a networked environment where services may be +temporarily unavailable and/or in a enterprise deployment where +identity sources must be multiplexed across a variety of services +according to enterprise wide policy. + +`SSSD`_ (System Security Services Daemon) is designed to alleviate many +of the problems surrounding authentication and identity property +lookup. SSSD can provide identity properties via D-Bus using it's +InfoPipe (IFP) feature. The `mod_identity_lookup`_ Apache module is +given the name of the authenticated principal and makes available +identity properties via Apache environment variables (see `Configure +SSSD IFP`_ for details). + +Exporting & Consuming Identity Metadata +======================================= + +The authenticated principal (REMOTE_USER), the mechanism used to +authenticate the principal (AUTH_TYPE) and identity properties +(supplied by SSSD IFP) are exported to the application which trusts +this metadata to be valid. + +How is this identity metadata exported from Apache and then be +consumed by a Java EE Servlet? + +The architectural design inside Apache tries to capitalize on the +existing CGI standard (`CGI RFC`_) as much as possible. CGI defines +these relevant environment variables: + + * REMOTE_USER + * AUTH_TYPE + * REMOTE_ADDR + * REMOTE_HOST + + +Transporting Identity Metadata from Apache to a Java EE Servlet +=============================================================== + +In following figure we can see that the user connects to Apache +instead of the servlet container. Apache authenticates the user, looks +up the principal's identity information and then proxies the request +to the servlet container. The additional identity metadata must be +included in the proxy request in order for the servlet to extract it. + +.. figure:: sssd_03.png + :align: center + + _`Figure 3.` + +The Java EE Servlet API is designed with the HTTP protocol in mind +however the servlet never directly accesses the HTTP protocol stream. +Instead it uses the servlet API to get access to HTTP request +data. The responsibility for HTTP communication rests with the +container's ``Connector`` objects. When the servlet API needs +information it works in conjunction with the ``Connector`` to supply +it. For example the ``HttpServletRequest.getRemoteHost()`` method +interrogates information the ``Connector`` placed on the internal +request object. Analogously ``HttpServletRequest.getRemoteUser()`` +interrogates information placed on the internal request object by an +authentication filter. + +But what happens when a HTTP request is proxied to a servlet container +by Apache and ``getRemoteHost()`` or ``getRemoteUser()`` is called? Most +``Connector`` objects do not understand the proxy scenario, to them +a request from a proxy looks just like a request sent directly to the +servlet container. Therefore ``getRemoteHost()`` or ``getRemoteUser()`` +ends up returning information relative to the proxy instead of the +user who connected to the proxy because it's the proxy who connected +to the servlet container and not the end user. There are 2 fundamental +approaches which allow the servlet API to return data supplied by the +proxy: + + 1. Proxy uses special protocol (e.g. AJP) to embed metadata. + 2. Metadata is embedded in an HTTP extension by the proxy (i.e. headers) + +Proxy With AJP Protocol +----------------------- + +The AJP_ protocol was designed as a protocol to exchange HTTP requests +and responses between Apache and a Java EE Servlet Container. One of +its design goals was to improve performance by translating common text +values appearing in HTTP requests to a more compact binary form. At +the same time AJP provided a mechanism to supply metadata about the +request to the servlet container. That metadata is encoded in an AJP +attribute (a name/value pair). The Apache AJP Proxy module looks up +information in the internal Apache request object (e.g. remote user, +remote address, etc.) and encodes that metadata in AJP attributes. On +the servlet container side a AJP ``Connector`` object is aware of these +metadata attributes, extracts them from the protocol and supplies +their values to the upper layers of the servlet API. Thus a call to +``HttpServletRequest.getRemoteUser()`` made by a servlet will receive +the value set by Apache prior to the proxy. This is the desired and +expected behavior. A servlet should be ignorant of the consequences of +proxies; the servlet API should behave the same regardless of the +presence of a proxy. + +The AJP protocol also has a general purpose attribute mechanism whereby +any arbitrary name/value pair can be passed. This proxy metadata can +be retrieved by a servlet by calling ``ServletRequest.getAttribute()`` +[1]_ When Apache mod_proxy_ajp is being used the authentication +metadata for the remote user and auth type are are automatically +inserted into the AJP protocol and the AJP ``Connector`` object on +the servlet receiving end supplies those values to +``HttpServletRequest.getRemoteHost()`` and +``HttpServletRequest.getRemoteUser()`` respectively. But the identity +metadata supplied by ``mod_identity_lookup`` needs to be explicitly +encoded into an AJP attribute (see `Configure SSSD IFP`_ for details) +that can later be retrieved by ``ServletRequest.getAttribute()``. + +Proxy With HTTP Protocol +------------------------ + +Although the AJP protocol offers a number of nice advantages sometimes +it's not an option. Not all servlet containers support AJP or there +may be some other deployment constraint that precludes its use. In this +case option 2 from above needs to be used. Option 2 requires only the +defined HTTP protocol be used without any "out of band" metadata. The +conventional way to attach extension metadata to a HTTP request is to +add extension HTTP headers. + +One problem with using extension HTTP headers to pass metadata to a +servlet is the expectation the servlet API will have the same +behavior. In other words the value returned by +``HttpServletRequest.getRemoteUser()`` should not depend on whether the +proxy request was exchanged with the AJP protocol or the HTTP +protocol. The solution to this is to wrap the ``HttpServletRequest`` +object in a servlet filter. The wrapper overrides certain request +methods (e.g. ``getRemoteUser()``). The override method looks to see if +the metadata is in the extension HTTP headers, if so it returns the +value found in the extension HTTP header otherwise it defers to the +existing servlet implementation. The ``ServletRequest.getAttribute()`` is +overridden in an analogous manner in the wrapper filter. Any call to +``ServletRequest.getAttribute()`` is first checked to see if the value +exists in the extension HTTP header first. + +Metadata supplied by Apache that is **not** part of the normal Java +EE Servlet API **always** appears to the servlet via the +``ServletRequest.getAttribute()`` method regardless of the proxy +transport mechanism. The consequence of this is a servlet +continues to utilize the existing Java EE Servlet API without concern +for intermediary proxies, *and* any other metadata supplied by a proxy +is *always* retrieved via ``ServletRequest.getAttribute()`` (see the +caveat about ``ServletRequest.getAttributeNames()`` [1]_). + +******************* +Configuration Guide +******************* + +Although Apache authentication and SSSD identity lookup can operate +with a variety of authentication mechanisms, IdP's and identity +metadata providers we will demonstrate a configuration example which +utilizes the FreeIPA_ IdP. FreeIPA excels at Kerberos SSO authentication, +Active Directory integration, LDAP based identity metadata storage and +lookup, DNS services, host based RBAC, SSH key management, certificate +management, friendly web based console, command line tools and many +other advanced IdP features. + +The following configuration steps will need to be performed: + +1. Install FreeIPA_ by following the installation guides in the FreeIPA_ + documentation area. When you install FreeIPA_ you will need to select a + realm (a.k.a domain) in which your users and hosts will exist. In + our example we will use the ``EXAMPLE.COM`` realm. + +2. Install and configure the Apache HTTP web server. The + recommendation is to install and run the Apache HTTP web server on + the same system the Java EE Container running AAA is installed on. + +3. Configure the proxy connector in the Java EE Container and set the + ``secureProxyPorts``. + +We will also illustrate the operation of the system by adding an +example user named ``testuser`` who will be a member of the +``odl_users`` and ``odl_admin`` groups. + +Add Example User and Groups to FreeIPA +====================================== + +After installing FreeIPA you will need to populate FreeIPA with your users, +groups and other data. Refer to the documentation in FreeIPA_ for the +variety of ways this task can be performed; it runs the gamut from web +based console to command line utilities. For simplicity we will use +the command line utilities. + +Identify yourself to FreeIPA as an administrator; this will give you the +necessary privileges needed to create and modify data in FreeIPA. You do +this by obtaining a Kerberos ticket for the ``admin`` user (or any +other user in FreeIPA with administrator privileges. + +:: + + % kinit admin@EXAMPLE.COM + +Create the example ``odl_users`` and `odl_admin`` groups. + +:: + + % ipa group-add odl_users --desc 'OpenDaylight Users' + % ipa group-add odl_admin --desc 'OpenDaylight Administrators' + +Create the example user ``testuser`` with the first name "Test" and a +last name of "User" and an email address of "test.user@example.com" + +:: + + % ipa user-add testuser --first Test --last User --email test.user@example.com + +Now add ``testuser`` to the ``odl_users`` and ``odl_admin`` groups. + +:: + + % ipa group-add-member odl_users --user testuser + % ipa group-add-member odl_admin --user testuser + +Configure Apache +================ + +A number of Apache configuration directives will need to be specified +to implement the Apache to application binding. Although these +configuration directives can be located in any number of different +Apache configuration files the most sensible approach is to co-locate +them in a single application configuration file. This greatly +simplifies the deployment of your application and isolates your +application configuration from other applications and services sharing +the Apache installation. In the examples that follow our application +will be named ``my_app`` and the Apache application configuration file +will be named ``my_app.conf`` which should be located in Apache's +``conf.d/`` directory. The web resource we are protecting and +supplying identity metadata for will be named ``my_resource``. + + +Configure Apache for Kerberos +----------------------------- + +When FreeIPA is deployed Kerberos is the preferred authentication mechanism +for Single Sign-On (SSO). FreeIPA also provides identity metadata via +Apache ``mod_identity_lookup``. To protect your ``my_resource`` resource +with Kerberos authentication identify your resource as requiring +Kerberos authentication in your ``my_app.conf`` Apache +configuration. For example: + +:: + + <Location my_resource> + AuthType Kerberos + AuthName "Kerberos Login" + KrbMethodNegotiate On + KrbMethodK5Passwd Off + KrbAuthRealms EXAMPLE.COM + Krb5KeyTab /etc/http.keytab + require valid-user + </Location> + +You will need to replace EXAMPLE.COM in the KrbAuthRealms declaration +with the Kerberos realm for your deployment. + + +Configure SSSD IFP +------------------ + +To use the Apache ``mod_identity_lookup`` module to supply identity +metadata you need to do the following in ``my_app.conf``: + +1. Enable the module + + :: + + LoadModule lookup_identity_module modules/mod_lookup_identity.so + +2. Apply the identity metadata lookup to specific URL's + (e.g. ``my_resource``) via an Apache location directive. In this + example we look up the "mail" attribute and assign it to the + REMOTE_USER_EMAIL environment variable. + + :: + + <LocationMatch "my_resource"> + LookupUserAttr mail REMOTE_USER_EMAIL + </LocationMatch> + +3. Export the environment variable via the desired proxy protocol, see + `Exporting Environment Variables to the Proxy`_ + +Exporting Environment Variables to the Proxy +-------------------------------------------- + +First you need to decide which proxy protocol you're going to use, AJP +or HTTP and then determine the target address and port to proxy to. The +recommended configuration is to run both the Apache server and the +servlet container on the same host and to proxy requests over the +local loopback interface (see `Declaring the Connector Ports for +Authentication Proxies`_). In our examples we'll use port 8383. Thus +in ``my_app.conf`` add a proxy declaration. + +For HTTP Proxy + +:: + + ProxyPass / http://localhost:8383/ + ProxyPassReverse / http://localhost:8383/ + +For AJP Proxy + +:: + + ProxyPass / ajp://localhost:8383/ + ProxyPassReverse / ajp://localhost:8383/ + +AJP Exports +^^^^^^^^^^^ + +AJP automatically forwards REMOTE_USER and AUTH_TYPE making them +available to the ``HttpServletRequest`` API, thus you do not need to +explicitly forward these in the proxy configuration. However all other +``mod_identity_lookup`` metadata must be explicitly forwarded as an AJP +attribute. These AJP attributes become visible in the +``ServletRequest.getAttribute()`` method [1]_. + +The Apache ``mod_proxy_ajp`` module automatically sends any Apache +environment variable prefixed with "AJP\_" as an AJP attribute which +can be retrieved with ``ServletRequest.getAttribute()``. Therefore the +``mod_identity_lookup`` directives which specify the Apache environment +variable to set with the result of a lookup must be prefixed with +"AJP\_". Using the above example of looking up the principal's email +address we modify the environment variable to include the "AJP\_" +prefix. Thusly: + + :: + + <LocationMatch "my_resource"> + LookupUserAttr mail AJP_REMOTE_USER_EMAIL + </LocationMatch> + +The sequence of events is as follows: + + 1. When the URL matches "my_resource". + + 2. ``mod_identity_lookup`` retrieves the mail attribute for the + principal. + + 3. ``mod_identity_lookup`` assigns the value of the mail attribute + lookup to the AJP_REMOTE_USER_EMAIL Apache environment variable. + + 4. ``mod_proxy_ajp`` encodes AJP_REMOTE_USER_EMAIL environment + variable into an AJP attribute in the AJP protocol because the + environment variable is prefixed with "AJP\_". The name of the + attribute is stripped of it's "AJP\_" prefix thus the + AJP_REMOTE_USER_EMAIL environment variable is transferred as the + AJP attribute REMOTE_USER_EMAIL. + + 5. The request is forwarded (i.e. proxied) to servlet container + using the AJP protocol. + + 6. The servlet container's AJP ``Connector`` object is assigned each AJP + attribute to the set of attributes on the ``ServletRequest`` + attribute list. Thus a call to + ``ServletRequest.getAttribute("REMOTE_USER_EMAIL")`` yields the + value set by ``mod_identity_lookup``. + + +HTTP Exports +^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +When HTTP proxy is used there are no automatic or implicit metadata +transfers; every metadata attribute must be explicitly handled on both +ends of the proxy connection. All identity metadata attributes are +transferred as extension HTTP headers, by convention those headers are +prefixed with "X-SSSD-". + +Using the original example of looking up the principal's email +address we must now perform two independent actions: + + 1. Lookup the value via ``mod_identity_lookup`` and assign to an + Apache environment variable. + + 2. Export the environment variable in the request header with the + "X-SSSD-" prefix. + + :: + + <LocationMatch "my_resource"> + LookupUserAttr mail REMOTE_USER_EMAIL + RequestHeader set X-SSSD-REMOTE_USER_EMAIL %{REMOTE_USER_EMAIL}e + </LocationMatch> + +The sequence of events is as follows: + + 1. When the URL matches "my_resource". + + 2. ``mod_identity_lookup`` retrieves the mail attribute for the + principal. + + 3. ``mod_identity_lookup`` assigns the value of the mail attribute + lookup to the REMOTE_USER_EMAIL Apache environment variable. + + 4. Apache's RequestHeader directive executes just prior to the + request being forwarded (i.e. in the Apache fixup stage). It adds + the header X-SSSD-REMOTE_USER_EMAIL and assigns the value for + REMOTE_USER_EMAIL found in the set of environment variables. It + does this because the syntax %{XXX} is a variable reference for + the name XXX and the 'e' appended after the closing brace + indicates the lookup is to be performed in the set of environment + variables. + + 5. The request is forwarded (i.e. proxied) to the servlet container + using the HTTP protocol. + + 6. When ``ServletRequest.getAttribute()`` is called the ``SssdFilter`` + wrapper intercepts the ``getAttribute()`` method. It looks for an + HTTP header of the same name with "X-SSSD-" prefixed to it. In + this case ``getAttribute("REMOTE_USER_EMAIL")`` causes the lookup of + "X-SSSD-REMOTE_USER_EMAIL" in the HTTP headers, if found that + value is returned. + +AJP Proxy Example Configuration +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +If you are using AJP proxy to the Java EE Container on port 8383 your +``my_app.conf`` Apache configuration file will probably look like +this: + +:: + + <LocationMatch "my_resource"> + + ProxyPass / ajp://localhost:8383/ + ProxyPassReverse / ajp://localhost:8383/ + + LookupUserAttr mail AJP_REMOTE_USER_EMAIL " " + LookupUserAttr givenname AJP_REMOTE_USER_FIRSTNAME + LookupUserAttr sn AJP_REMOTE_USER_LASTNAME + LookupUserGroups AJP_REMOTE_USER_GROUPS ":" + + </LocationMatch> + +Note the specification of the colon separator for the +``LookupUserGroups`` operation. [3]_ + +HTTP Proxy Example Configuration +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +If you are using a conventional HTTP proxy to the Java EE Container on +port 8383 your ``my_app.conf`` Apache configuration file will probably +look like this: + +:: + + <LocationMatch "my_resource"> + + ProxyPass / http://localhost:8383/ + ProxyPassReverse / http://localhost:8383/ + + RequestHeader set X-SSSD-REMOTE_USER expr=%{REMOTE_USER} + RequestHeader set X-SSSD-AUTH_TYPE expr=%{AUTH_TYPE} + RequestHeader set X-SSSD-REMOTE_HOST expr=%{REMOTE_HOST} + RequestHeader set X-SSSD-REMOTE_ADDR expr=%{REMOTE_ADDR} + + LookupUserAttr mail REMOTE_USER_EMAIL + RequestHeader set X-SSSD-REMOTE_USER_EMAIL %{REMOTE_USER_EMAIL}e + + LookupUserAttr givenname REMOTE_USER_FIRSTNAME + RequestHeader set X-SSSD-REMOTE_USER_FIRSTNAME %{REMOTE_USER_FIRSTNAME}e + + LookupUserAttr sn REMOTE_USER_LASTNAME + RequestHeader set X-SSSD-REMOTE_USER_LASTNAME %{REMOTE_USER_LASTNAME}e + + LookupUserGroups REMOTE_USER_GROUPS ":" + RequestHeader set X-SSSD-REMOTE_USER_GROUPS %{REMOTE_USER_GROUPS}e + + </LocationMatch> + +Note the specification of the colon separator for the +``LookupUserGroups`` operation. [3]_ + + +Configure Java EE Container Proxy Connector +=========================================== + +The Java EE Container must be configured to listen for connections +from the Apache web server. A Java EE Container specifies connections +via a ``Connector`` object. A ``Connector`` **must** be dedicated +**exclusively** for handling authenticated requests from the Apache +web server. The reason for this is explained in `The Proxy +Problem`_. In addition ``ClaimAuthFilter`` needs to validate that any +request it processes originated from the trusted Apache instance. This +is accomplished by dedicating one or more ports exclusively for use by +the trusted Apache server and enumerating them in the +``secureProxyPorts`` configuration as explained in `Locking Down the +Apache to Java EE Container Channel`_ and `Declaring the Connector +Ports for Authentication Proxies`_. + +Configure Tomcat Proxy Connector +-------------------------------- + +The Tomcat Java EE Container defines Connectors in its ``server.xml`` +configuration file. + +:: + + <Connector + address="127.0.0.1" + port="8383" + protocol="HTTP/1.1" + tomcatAuthentication="false" + connectionTimeout="20000" + redirectPort="8443" + /> + + +:address: + This should be the loopback address as explained `Locking Down the + Apache to Java EE Container Channel`_. + +:port: + In our examples we've been using port 8383 as the proxy port. The + exact port is not important but it must be consistent with the + Apache proxy port, the ``Connector`` declaration, and the port value + in ``secureProxyPorts``. + +:protocol: + As explained in `Transporting Identity Metadata from Apache to a + Java EE Servlet`_ you will need to decide if you are using HTTP or + AJP as the proxy protocol. In the example above the protocol is set + for HTTP, if you use AJP instead the protocol should instead be + "AJP/1.3". + +:tomcatAuthentication: + This boolean flag tells Tomcat whether Tomcat should perform + authentication on the incoming requests or not. Since authentication + is performed by Apache we do not want Tomcat to perform + authentication therefore this flag must be set to false. + +The AAA system needs to know which port(s) the trusted Apache proxy +will be sending requests on so it can trust the request authentication +metadata. See `Declaring the Connector Ports for Authentication +Proxies`_ for more information). Set ``secureProxyPorts`` in the +FederationConfiguration. + +:: + + secureProxyPorts=8383 + + +Configure Jetty Proxy Connector +------------------------------- + +The Jetty Java EE Container defines Connectors in its ``jetty.xml`` +configuration file. + +:: + + <!-- Trusted Authentication Federation proxy connection --> + <Call name="addConnector"> + <Arg> + <New class="org.eclipse.jetty.server.nio.SelectChannelConnector"> + <Set name="host">127.0.0.1</Set> + <Set name="port">8383</Set> + <Set name="maxIdleTime">300000</Set> + <Set name="Acceptors">2</Set> + <Set name="statsOn">false</Set> + <Set name="confidentialPort">8445</Set> + <Set name="name">federationConn</Set> + <Set name="lowResourcesConnections">20000</Set> + <Set name="lowResourcesMaxIdleTime">5000</Set> + </New> + </Arg> + </Call> + +:host: + This should be the loopback address as explained `Locking Down the + Apache to Java EE Container Channel`_. + +:port: + In our examples we've been using port 8383 as the proxy port. The + exact port is not important but it must be consistent with the + Apache proxy port, the ``Connector`` declaration, and the port value + in ``secureProxyPorts``. + + +Note, values in Jetty XML can also be parameterized so that they may +be passed from property files or set on the command line. Thus +typically the port is set within Jetty XML, but uses the Property +element to be customizable. Thus the above ``host`` and ``port`` +properties could be specificed this way: + +:: + + <Set name="host"> + <Property name="jetty.host" default="127.0.0.1"/> + </Set> + <Set name="port"> + <Property name="jetty.port" default="8383"/> + </Set> + + +The AAA system needs to know which port(s) the trusted Apache proxy +will be sending requests on so it can trust the request authentication +metadata. See `Declaring the Connector Ports for Authentication +Proxies`_ for more information). Set ``secureProxyPorts`` in the +FederationConfiguration. + +************************************************ +How Apache Identity Metadata is Processed in AAA +************************************************ + +`Figure 2.`_ and `Figure 3.`_ illustrates the fact the first stage in +processing a request from a user begins with Apache where the user is +authenticated and SSSD supplies additional metadata about the +user. The original request along with the metadata are subsequently +forwarded by Apache to the Java EE Container. `Figure 4.`_ illustrates +the processing inside the Java EE Container once it receives the +request on one of its secure connectors. + + +.. figure:: sssd_04.png + :align: center + + _`Figure 4.` + +:Step 1: + One or more Connectors have been configured to listen for requests + being forwarded from a trusted Apache instance. The Connector is + configured to communicate using either the HTTP or AJP protocols. + See `Exporting Environment Variables to the Proxy`_ for more + information on selecting a proxy transport protocol. + +:Step 2: + The identity metadata bound to the request needs to be extracted + differently depending upon whether HTTP or AJP is the transport + protocol. To allow later stages in the pipeline to be ignorant of + the transport protocol semantics the ``SssdFilter`` servlet filter + is introduced. The ``SssdFilter`` wraps the ``HttpServletRequest`` + class and intercepts calls which might return the identity + metadata. The wrapper in the filter looks in protocol specific + locations for the metadata. In this manner users of the + ``HttpServletRequest`` are isolated from protocol differences. + + +:Step 3: + + The ``ClaimAuthFilter`` is responsible for determining if identity + metadata is bound to the request. If so all identity metadata is + packaged into an assertion which is then handed off to + ``SssdClaimAuth`` which will transform the identity metadata in the + assertion into a AAA Claim which is the authorizing token for the user. + +:Step 4: + The ``SssdClaimAuth`` object is responsible for transforming the + external federated identity metadata provided by Apache and SSSD into + a AAA claim. The AAA claim is an authorization token which includes + information about the user plus a set of roles. These roles provide the + authorization to perform AAA tasks. Although how roles are assigned is + flexible the expectation is domain and/or group membership will be the + primary criteria for role assignment. Because deciding how to handle + external federated identity metadata is site and deployment specific + we need a loadable policy mechanism. This is accomplished by a set of + transformation rules which transforms the incoming IdP identity + metadata into a AAA claim. For greater clarity this important step is + broken down into smaller units in the shaded box in `Figure 4.`_. + +:Step 4.1: + `The Mapping Rule Processor`_ is designed to accept a JSON object + (set of key/value pairs) as input and emit a different JSON object + as output effectively operating as a transformation engine on + key/value pairs. + +:Step 4.2: + The input assertion is rewritten as a JSON object in the format + required by the Mapping Rule Processor. The JSON assertion is then + passed into the Mapping Rule Processor. + +:Step 4.3: + `The Mapping Rule Processor`_ identified as ``IdPMapper`` evaluates + the input JSON assertion in the context of the mapping rules defined + for the site deployment. If ``IdPMapper`` is able to successfully + transform the input it will return a JSON object which we called the + *mapped* result. If the input JSON assertion is not compatible with + the site specific rules loaded into the ``IdPMapper`` then NULL is + returned by the ``IdPMapper``. + +:Step 4.4: + If a mapped JSON object is returned by the ``IdPMapper`` the mapping + was successful. The values in the mapped result are re-written into + an AAA Claim token. + +How Apache Identity Metadata is Mapped to AAA Values +==================================================== + +A federated IdP supplies metadata in a form unique to the IdP. This is +called an assertion. That assertion must be transformed into a format +and data understood by AAA. More importantly that assertion needs to +yield *authorization roles specific to AAA*. In `Figure 4.`_ Step 4.3 +the ``IdPMapper`` provides the transformation from an external IdP +assertion to an AAA specific claim. It does this via a Mapping Rule +Processor which reads a site specific set of transformation +rules. These mapping rules define how to transform an external IdP +assertion into a AAA claim. The mapping rules also are responsible for +validating the external IdP claim to make sure it is consistent with +the site specific requirements. The operation of the Mapping Rule +Processor and the syntax of the mapping rules are defined in `The +Mapping Rule Processor`_. + +Below is an example mapping rule which might be loaded into the +Mapping Rule Processor. It is assumed there are two AAA roles which +may be assigned [4]_: + +``user`` + A role granting standard permissions for normal ODL users. + +``admin`` + A special role granting full administrative permissions. + +In this example assigning the ``user`` and ``admin`` roles +will be based on group membership in the following groups: + +``odl_users`` + Members of this group are normal ODL users with restricted permissions. + +``odl_admin`` + Members of this group are ODL administrators with permission to + perform all operations. + +Granting of the ``user`` and/or ``admin`` roles based on +membership in the ``odl_users`` and ``odl_admin`` is illustrated in +the follow mapping rule example which also extracts the user principal +and domain information in the preferred format for the site +(e.g. usernames are lowercase without domain suffixes and the domain +is uppercase and supplied separately). + +_`Mapping Rule Example 1.` + +:: + + 1 [ + 2 {"mapping": {"ClientId": "$client_id", + 3 "UserId": "$user_id", + 4 "User": "$username", + 5 "Domain": "$domain", + 6 "roles": "$roles", + 7 }, + 8 "statement_blocks": [ + 9 [ + 10 ["set", "$groups", []], + 11 ["set", "$roles", []] + 12 ], + 13 [ + 14 ["in", "REMOTE_USER", "$assertion"], + 15 ["exit", "rule_fails", "if_not_success"], + 16 ["regexp", "$assertion[REMOTE_USER]", "(?<username>\\w+)@(?<domain>.+)"], + 17 ["exit", "rule_fails", "if_not_success"], + 18 ["lower", "$username", "$regexp_map[username]"], + 19 ["upper", "$domain", "$regexp_map[domain]"], + 20 ], + 21 [ + 22 ["in", "REMOTE_USER_GROUPS", "$assertion"], + 23 ["exit", "rule_fails", "if_not_success"], + 24 ["split", "$groups", "$assertion[REMOTE_USER_GROUPS]", ":"], + 25 ], + 26 [ + 27 ["in", "odl_users", "$groups"], + 28 ["continue", "if_not_success"], + 29 ["append", "$roles", "user"], + 30 ], + 31 [ + 32 ["in", "odl_admin", "$groups"], + 33 ["continue", "if_not_success"], + 34 ["append", "$roles", "admin"] + 35 ], + 36 [ + 37 ["unique", "$roles", "$roles"], + 38 ["length", "$n_roles", "$roles"], + 39 ["compare", "$n_roles", ">", 0], + 40 ["exit", "rule_fails", "if_not_success"], + 41 ], + 42 ] + 43 } + 44 ] + +:Line 1: + Starts a list of rules. In this example only 1 rule is defined. Each + rule is a JSON object containing a ``mapping`` and a required list + of ``statement_blocks``. The ``mapping`` may either be specified + inside a rule as it is here or may be referenced by name in a table + of mappings (this is easier to manage if you have a large number of + rules and small number of mappings). + +:Lines 2-7: + Defines the JSON mapped result. Each key maps to AAA claim. The + value is a rule variable whose value will be substituted if the rule + succeeds. Thus for example the AAA claim value ``User`` will be + assigned the value from the ``$username`` rule variable. +:Line 8: + Begins the list of statement blocks. A statement must be contained + inside a block. +:Lines 9-12: + The first block usually initializes variables that will be + referenced later. Here we initialize ``$groups`` and ``$roles`` to + empty arrays. These arrays may be appended to in later blocks and + may be referenced in the final ``mapping`` output. +:Lines 13-20: + This block sets the user and domain information based on + ``REMOTE_USER`` and exits the rule if ``REMOTE_USER`` is not defined. +:Lines 14-15: + This test is critical, it assures ``REMOTE_USER`` is defined in the + assertion, if not the rule is skipped because we depend on + ``REMOTE_USER``. +:Lines 16-17: + Performs a regular expression match against ``REMOTE_USER`` to split + the username from the domain. The regular expression uses named + groups, in this instance ``username`` and ``domain``. If the regular + expression does not match the rule is skipped. +:Lines 18-19: + These lines reference the previous result of the regular expression + match which are stored in the special variable ``$regexp_map``. The + username is converted to lower case and stored in ``$username`` and + the domain is converted to upper case and stored in ``$domain``. The + choice of case is purely by convention and site requirements. +:Lines 21-35: + These 3 blocks assign roles based on group membership. +:Lines 21-25: + Assures ``REMOTE_USER_GROUPS`` is defined in the assertion; if not, the + rule is skipped. ``REMOTE_USER_GROUPS`` is colon separated list of group + names. In order to operate on the individual group names appearing + in ``REMOTE_USER_GROUPS`` line 24 splits the string on the colon + separator and stores the result in the ``$groups`` array. +:Lines 27-30: + This block assigns the ``user`` role if the user is a member of the + ``odl_users`` group. +:Lines 31-35: + This block assigns the ``admin`` role if the user is a + member of the ``odl_admin`` group. +:Lines 36-41: + This block performs final clean up actions for the rule. First it + assures there are no duplicates in the ``$roles`` array by calling + the ``unique`` function. Then it gets a count of how many items are + in the ``$roles`` array and tests to see if it's empty. If there are + no roles assigned the rule is skipped. +:Line 43: + This is the end of the rule. If we reach the end of the rule it + succeeds. When a rule succeeds the mapping associated with the rule + is looked up. Any rule variable appearing in the mapping is + substituted with its value. + +Using the rules in `Mapping Rule Example 1.`_ and following example assertion +in JSON format: + +_`Assertion Example 1.` + +:: + + { + "REMOTE_USER": "TestUser@example.com", + "REMOTE_AUTH_TYPE": "Negotiate", + "REMOTE_USER_GROUPS": "odl_users:odl_admin", + "REMOTE_USER_EMAIL": "test.user@example.com", + "REMOTE_USER_FIRSTNAME": "Test", + "REMOTE_USER_LASTNAME": "User" + } + +Then the mapper will return the following mapped JSON document. This +is the ``mapping`` defined on line 2 of `Mapping Rule Example 1.`_ with the +variables substituted after the rule successfully executed. Note any +valid JSON data type can be returned, in this example the ``null`` +value is returned for ``ClientId`` and ``UserId``, normal strings for +``User`` and ``Domain`` and an array of strings for the ``roles`` value. + +_`Mapped Result Example 1.` + +:: + + { + "ClientId": null, + "UserId": null, + "User": "testuser", + "Domain": "EXAMPLE.COM", + "roles": ["user", "admin"] + } + + +************************** +The Mapping Rule Processor +************************** + +The Mapping Rule Processor is designed to be as flexible and generic +as possible. It accepts a JSON object as input and returns a JSON +object as output. JSON was chosen because virtually all data can be +represented in JSON, JSON has extensive support and JSON is human +readable. The rules loaded into the Mapping Rule Processor are also +expressed in JSON. One advantage of this is it makes it easy for a +site administrator to define hardcoded values which are always +returned and/or static tables of white and black listed users or users +who are always mapped into certain roles. + +.. include:: mapping.rst + +*********************** +Security Considerations +*********************** + +Attack Vectors +============== + +A Java EE Container fronted by Apache has by definition 2 major +components: + +* Apache +* Java EE Container + +Each of these needs to be secure in its own right. There is extensive +documentation on securing each of these components and the reader is +encouraged to review this material. For the purpose of this discussion +we are most interested in how Apache and the Java EE +Container cooperate to form an integrated security system. Because +Apache is performing authentication on behalf of the Java EE Container, +it views Apache as a trusted partner. Our primary concern is the +communication channel between Apache and the Java EE Container. We +must assure the Java EE Container knows who it's trusted partner is +and that it only accepts security sensitive data from that partner, +this can best be described as `The Proxy Problem`_. + +Forged REMOTE_USER +------------------ + +HTTP request handling is often implemented as a processing pipeline +where individual handlers are passed the request, they may then attach +additional metadata to the request or transform it in some manner +before handing it off to the next stage in the pipeline. A request +handler may also short circuit the request processing pipeline and +cause a response to be generated. Authentication is typically +implemented an as early stage request handler. If a request gets past +an authentication handler later stage handlers can safely assume the +request belongs to an authenticated user. Authorization metadata may +also have been attached to the request. Later stage handlers use the +authentication/authorization metadata to make decisions as to whether +the operations in the request can be satisfied. + +When a request is fielded by a traditional web server with CGI (Common +Gateway Interface, RFC 3875) the request metadata is passed via CGI +meta-variables. CGI meta-variables are often implemented as environment +variables, but in practical terms CGI metadata is really just a set of +name/value pairs a later stage (i.e. CGI script, servlet, etc.) can +reference to learn information about the request. + +The CGI meta-variables REMOTE_USER and AUTH_TYPE relate to +authentication. REMOTE_USER is the identity of the authenticated user +and AUTH_TYPE is the authentication mechanism that was used to +authenticate the user. + +**If a later stage request handler sees REMOTE_USER and AUTH_TYPE as +non-null values it assumes the user is fully authenticated! Therefore +is it essential REMOTE_USER and AUTH_TYPE can only enter the request +pipeline via a trusted source.** + +The Proxy Problem +================= + +In a traditional monolithic web server the CGI meta-variables are +created and managed by the web server, which then passes them to CGI +scripts and executables in a very controlled environment where they +execute in the context of the web server. Forgery of CGI +meta-variables is generally not possible unless the web server has +been compromised in some fashion. + +However in our configuration the Apache web server acts as an identity +processor, which then forwards (i.e. proxies) the request to the Java +EE container (i.e Tomcat, Jetty, etc.). One could think of the Java +EE container as just another CGI script which receives CGI +meta-variables provided by the Apache web server. Where this analogy +breaks down is how Apache invokes the CGI script. Instead of forking a +child process where the child's environment and input/output pipes are +carefully controlled by Apache the request along with its additional +metadata is forwarded over a transport (typically TCP/IP) to another +process, the proxy, which listens on socket. + +The proxy (in this case the Java EE container) reads the request and +the attached metadata and acts upon it. If the request read by the +proxy contains the REMOTE_USER and AUTH_TYPE CGI meta-variables the +proxy will consider the request **fully authenticated!**. Therefore +when the Java EE container is configured as a proxy it is +**essential** it only reads requests from a **trusted** Apache web +server. If any other client aside from the trusted Apache web server +is permitted to connect to the Java EE container that client could +present forged REMOTE_USER and AUTH_TYPE meta-variables, which would be +automatically accepted as valid thus opening a huge security hole. + + +Possible Approaches to Lock Down a Proxy Channel +================================================ + +Tomcat Valves +------------- + +You can use a `Tomcat Remote Address Valve`_ valve to filter by IP or +hostname to only allow a subset of machines to connect. This can be +configured at the Engine, Host, or Context level in the +conf/server.xml by adding something like the following: + +:: + + <!-- allow only LAN IPs to connect --> + <Valve className="org.apache.catalina.valves.RemoteAddrValve" + allow="192.168.1.*"> + </Valve> + +The problem with valves is they are a Tomcat only concept, the +``RemoteAddrValve`` only checks addresses, not port numbers (although +it should be easy to add port checking) and they don't offer anything +better than what is described in `Locking Down the Apache to Java EE +Container Channel`_, which is not container specific. Servlet filters +are always available regardless of the container the servlet is +running in. A filter can check both the address and port number and +refuse to operate on the request if the address and port are not known to +be a trusted authentication proxy. Also note that if the Java EE +Container is configured to accept connections other than from the +trusted HTTP proxy server (a very likely scenario) then filtering at +the connector level is not sufficient because a servlet which trusts +``REMOTE_USER`` must be assured the request arrived only on a +trusted HTTP proxy server connection, not one of the other possible +connections. + +SSL/TLS with client auth +------------------------ + +SSL with client authentication is the ultimate way to lock down a HTTP +Server to Java EE Container proxy connection. SSL with client +authentication provides authenticity, integrity, and +confidentiality. However those desirable attributes come at a +performance cost which may be excessive. Unless a persistent TCP +connection is established between the HTTP server and the Java EE +Container a SSL handshake will need to occur on each request being +proxied, SSL handshakes are expensive. Given that the HTTP server and +the Java EE Container will likely be deployed on the same compute node +(or at a minimum on a secure subnet) the advantage of SSL for proxy +connections may not be warranted because other options are available +for these configuration scenarios; see `Locking Down the Apache to Java EE +Container Channel`_. Also note that if the Java EE +Container is configured to accept connections other than from the +trusted HTTP proxy server (a very likely scenario), then filtering at +the connector level is not sufficient because a servlet which trusts +``REMOTE_USER`` must be assured that the request arrived only on a +trusted HTTP proxy server connection, not one of the other possible +connections. + + +Java Security Manager Permissions +--------------------------------- + +The Java Security Manager allows you define permissions which are +checked at run time before code executes. +``java.net.SocketPermission`` and ``java.net.NetPermission`` would +appear to offer solutions for restricting which host and port a +request containing ``REMOTE_USER`` will be trusted. However security +permissions are applied *after* a request is accepted by a +connector. They are also more geared towards what connections code can +subsequently utilize as opposed to what connection a request was +presented on. Therefore security manager permissions seem to offer little +value for our purpose. One can simply test to see which host sent the +proxy request and on what port it arrived on by looking at the +connection information in the request. Restricting which proxies can +submit trusted requests is better handled at the level of the +connector, which unfortunately is a container implementation +issue. Tomcat and Jetty have different ways of handling connector +specifications. + +AJP requiredSecret +------------------ + +The AJP protocol includes an attribute called ``requiredSecret``, which +can be used to secure the connection between AJP endpoints. When an +HTTP server sends an AJP proxy request to a Java EE Container it +embeds in the protocol transmission a string (``requiredSecret``) +known only to the HTTP server and the Java EE Container. The AJP +connector on the Java EE Container is configured with the +``requiredSecret`` value and will reject as unauthorized any AJP +requests whose ``requiredSecret`` does not match. + +There are two problems with `requiredSecret``. First of all it's not +particularly secure. In fact, it's fundamentally no different than +sending a cleartext password. If the AJP request is not encrypted it +means the ``requiredSecret`` will be sent in the clear which is +probably one of the most egregious security mistakes. If the AJP +request is transmitted in a manner where the traffic can be sniffed, it +would be trivial to recover the ``requiredSecret`` and forge a request +with it. On the other hand encrypting the communication channel +between the HTTP server and the Java EE Container means using SSL +which is fairly heavyweight. But more to the point, if one is using +SSL to encrypt the channel there is a *far better* mechanism to ensure +the HTTP server is who it claims to be than embedding +``requiredSecret``. If one is using SSL you might as well use SSL +client authentication where the HTTP identifies itself via a client +certificate. SSL client authentication is a very robust authentication +mechanism. But doing SSL client authentication, or for that matter +just SSL encryption, for *every* AJP protocol request is prohibitively +expensive from a performance standpoint. + +The second problem with ``requiredSecret`` is that despite being documented +in a number of places it's not actually implemented in Apache +``mod_proxy_ajp``. This is detailed in `bug 53098`_. You can set +``requiredSecret`` in the ``mod_proxy_ajp`` configuration, but it won't +be included in the wire protocol. There is a patch to implement +``requiredSecret`` but, it hasn't made it into any shipping version of +Apache yet. But even if ``requiredSecret`` was implemented it's not +useful. Also one could construct the equivalent of ``requiredSecret`` +from other AJP attributes and/or an HTTP extension header but those +would suffer from the same security issues ``requiredSecret`` has, +therefore it's mostly pointless. + +Java EE Container Issues +======================== + +Jetty Issues +------------ + +Jetty is a Java EE Container which can be used +as alternative to Tomcat. Jetty is an Eclipse project. Recent versions +of Jetty have dropped support for AJP; this is described in the +`Jetty AJP Configuration Guide`_ which states: + + Configuring AJP13 Using mod_jk or mod_proxy_ajp. Support for this + feature has been dropped with Jetty 9. If you feel this should be + brought back please file a bug. + +Eclipse `Bug 387928`_ *Retire jetty-ajp* was opened to track the +removal of AJP in Jetty and is now closed. + +Tomcat Issues +------------- + +You should refer the `Tomcat Security How-To`_ for a full discussion +of Tomcat security issues. + +The tomcatAuthentication attribute is used with the AJP connectors to +determine if Tomcat should authenticate the user or if authentication +can be delegated to the reverse proxy that will then pass the +authenticated username to Tomcat as part of the AJP protocol. + +The requiredSecret attribute in AJP connectors configures a shared +secret between Tomcat and the reverse proxy in front of Tomcat. It is used +to prevent unauthorized connections over AJP protocol. + +Locking Down the Apache to Java EE Container Channel +==================================================== + +The recommended approach to lock down the proxy channel is: + + * Run both Apache and the servlet container on the same host. + + * Configure Apache to forward the proxy request on the loopback + interface (e.g. 127.0.0.1 also known as ``localhost``). This + prohibits any external IP address from connecting, only processes + running on the locked down host can communicate over + ``localhost``. + + * Reserve one or more ports for communication **exclusively** for + proxy communication between Apache and the servlet container. The + servlet container may listen on other ports for non-critical + non-authenticated requests. + + * The ``ClaimAuthFilter`` that reads the identity metadata **must** + assure that requests have arrived only on a **trusted port**. To + achieve this the ``FederationConfiguration`` defines the + ``secureProxyPorts`` configuration option. ``secureProxyPorts`` is + a space delimited list of ports which during deployment the + administrator has configured such that they are **exclusively** + dedicated for use by the Apache server(s) providing authentication + and identity information. These ports are set in the servlet + container's ``Connector`` declarations. See `Declaring the + Connector Ports for Authentication Proxies`_ for more + information). + + * When the ``ClaimAuthFilter`` receives a request, the first thing + it does is check the ``ServletRequest.getLocalPort()`` value and + verifies it is a member of the ``secureProxyPorts`` configuration + option. If the port is a member of ``secureProxyPorts``, it will + trust every identity assertion found in the request. If the local + port is not a member of ``secureProxyPorts``, a HTTP 401 + (unauthorized) error status will be returned for the request. A + warning message will be logged the first time this occurs. + + +Declaring the Connector Ports for Authentication Proxies +-------------------------------------------------------- + +As described in `The Proxy Problem`_ the AAA authentication system +**must** confirm the request it is processing originated from a *trusted +HTTP proxy server*. This is accomplished with port isolation. + +The administrator deploying a federated AAA solution with SSSD +identity lookups must declare in the AAA federation configuration +which ports the proxy requests from the trusted HTTP server will +arrive on by setting the ``secureProxyPorts`` configuration +item. These ports **must** only be used for the trusted HTTP proxy +server. The AAA federation software will not perform authentication +for any request arriving on a port other than those listed in +``secureProxyPorts``. + +.. figure:: sssd_05.png + :align: center + + _`Figure 5.` + +``secureProxyPorts`` configuration option is set either in the +``federation.cfg`` file or in the +``org.opendaylight.aaa.federation.secureProxyPorts`` bundle +configuration. ``secureProxyPorts`` is a space-delimited list of port +numbers on which a trusted HTTP proxy performing authentication +forwards pre-authenticated requests. For example: + +:: + + secureProxyPorts=8383 + +Means a request which arrived on port 8383 is from a trusted HTTP +proxy server and the value of ``REMOTE_USER`` and other authentication +metadata in request can be trusted. + +######## +Appendix +######## + +***************** +CGI Export Issues +***************** + +Apache processes requests as a series of steps in a pipeline +fashion. The ordering of these steps is important. Core Apache is +fairly minimal, most of Apache's features are supplied by loadable +modules. When a module is loaded it registers a set of *hooks* +(function pointers) which are to be run at specific stages in the +Apache request processing pipeline. Thus a module can execute code at +any of a number of stages in the request pipeline. + +The user metadata supplied by Apache is initialized in two distinct +parts of Apache. + + 1. an authentication module (e.g. mod_auth_kerb) + 2. the ``mod_lookup_identity`` module. + +After successful authentication the authentication module will set the +name of the user principal and the mechanism used for authentication +in the request structure. + + * ``request->user`` + * ``request->ap_auth_type`` + +Authentication hooks run early in the request pipeline for the obvious +reason a request should not be processed if not authenticated. The +specific authentication module that runs is defined by ``Location`` +directive in the Apache configuration which binds specific +authentication to specific URL's. The ``mod_lookup_identity`` module +must run *after* authentication module runs because it depends on +knowing who the authenticated principal is so it can lookup the data +on that principal. + +When reading ``mod_lookup_identity`` documentation one often sees +references to the ``REMOTE_USER`` CGI environment variable with the +implication ``REMOTE_USER`` is how one accesses the name of the +authenticated principal. This is a bit misleading, ``REMOTE_USER`` is +a CGI environment variable. CGI environment variables are only set by +Apache when it believes the request is going to be processed by a CGI +implementation. In this case ``REMOTE_USER`` is initialized from the +``request->user`` value. + +How is the authenticated principal actually forwarded to our proxy? +=================================================================== + +If we are using the AJP proxy protocol the ``mod_proxy_ajp`` module +when preparing the proxy request will read the value of +``request->user`` and insert it into the ``SC_A_REMOTE_USER`` AJP +attribute. On the receiving end ``SC_A_REMOTE_USER`` will be extracted +from the AJP request and used to populate the value returned +by``HttpServletRequest.getRemoteUser()``. The exchange of the +authenticated principal when using AJP is transparent to both the +sender and receiver, nothing special needs to be done. See +`Transporting Identity Metadata from Apache to a Java EE Servlet`_ +for details on how metadata can be exchanged with the proxy. + +However, if AJP is not being used to proxy the request the +authenticated principal must be passed through some other mechanism, +an HTTP extension header is the obvious solution. The Apache +``mod_headers`` module can be used to add HTTP request headers to the +proxy request, for example: + +:: + + RequestHeader set MY_HEADER MY_VALUE + +Where does the value MY_VALUE come from? It can be hardcoded into the +``RequestHeader`` statement or it can reference an existing +environment variable like this: + +:: + + RequestHeader set MY_HEADER %{FOOBAR}e + +where the notation ``%{FOOBAR}e`` is the contents of the environment +variable FOOBAR. Thus we might expect we could do this: + +:: + + RequestHeader set REMOTE_USER %{REMOTE_USER}e + +The conundrum is the presumption the ``REMOTE_USER`` environment +variable has already been set at the time ``mod_headers`` executes the +``RequestHeader`` statement. Unfortunately this often is not the +case. + +The Apache environment variables ``REMOTE_USER`` and ``AUTH_TYPE`` are +set by the Apache function ``ap_add_common_vars()`` defined in +server/util_script.c. ``ap_add_common_vars()`` and is called by the +following modules: + + * mod_authnz_fcgi + * mod_proxy_fcgi + * mod_proxy_scgi + * mod_isapi + * mod_ext_filter + * mod_include + * mod_cgi + * mod_cgid + +Apache variables +================ + +Apache modules provide access to variables which can be referenced by +configuration directives. Unfortunately there isn't a lot of +uniformity to what the variables are and how they're referenced; it +mostly depends on how a given Apache module was implemented. As you +might imagine a bit of inconsistent historical cruft has accumulated +over the years, it can be confusing. The Apache Foundation is trying +to clean some of this up bringing uniformity to modules by utilizing +the common ``expr`` (expression) module `ap_expr`_. The idea being modules will +forgo their home grown expression syntax with its numerous quirks and +instead expose the common ``expr`` language. However this is a work in +progress and at the time of this writing only a few modules have acquired +``expr`` expression support. + +Among the existing Apache modules there currently are three different +sets of variables. + + 1. Server variables. + 2. Environment variables. + 3. SSL variables. + +Server variables (item 1) are names given to internal values. The set +of names for server variables and what they map to are defined by the +module implementing the server variable lookup. For example +``mod_rewrite`` has its own variable lookup implementation. + +Environment variables (item 2) are variables *exported* to a +subprocess. Internally they are stored in +``request->subprocess_env``. The most common use of environment +variables exported to a subprocess are the CGI variables. + +SSL variables are connection specific values describing the SSL +connection. The lookup is implemented by ``ssl_var_lookup()``, which +given a variable name looks in a variety of internal data structures to +find the matching value. + +The important thing to remember is **server variables != environment +variables**. This can be confusing because they often share the same +name. For example, there is the server variable ``REMOTE_USER`` and +there is the environment variable ``REMOTE_USER``. The environment +variable ``REMOTE_USER`` only exists if some module has called +``ap_add_common_vars()``. To complicate matters, some modules allow you +to access *server variables*, other modules allow you to access +*environment variables* and some modules provide access to both +*server variables* and *environment variables*. + +Coming back to our goal of setting an HTTP extension header to the +value of ``REMOTE_USER``, we observe that ``mod_headers`` provides the +needed ``RequestHeader`` operation to set a HTTP header in the +request. Looking at the documentation for ``RequestHeader`` we see a +value can be specified with one of the following lookups: + +%{VARNAME}e + The contents of the environment variable VARNAME. + +%{VARNAME}s + The contents of the SSL environment variable VARNAME, if mod_ssl is enabled. + +But wait! This only gives us access to *environment variables* and the +``REMOTE_USER`` environment variable is only set if +``ap_add_common_vars()`` is called by a module **after** an +authentication module runs! ``ap_add_common_vars()`` is usually only +invoked if the request is going to be passed to a CGI script. But +we're not doing CGI; instead we're proxying the request. The +likelihood the ``REMOTE_USER`` environment variable will be set is +quite low. See `Setting the REMOTE_USER environment variable`_. + +``mod_headers`` is the only way to set a HTTP extension header and +``mod_headers`` only gives you access to environment variables and the +``REMOTE_USER`` environment variable is not set. Therefore if we're +not using AJP and must depend on setting a HTTP extension header for +``REMOTE_USER``, we have a **serious problem**. + +But there is a solution; you can either try the machinations described +in `Setting the REMOTE_USER environment variable`_ or assure you're +running at least Apache version 2.4.10. In Apache 2.4.10 the +``mod_headers`` module added support for `ap_expr`_. `ap_expr`_ +provides access to *server variables* by using the ``%{VARIABLE}`` +notation. `ap_expr`_ also can lookup subprocess environment variables +and operating system environment variables using its ``reqenv()`` and +``osenv()`` functions respectively. + +Thus the simple solution for exporting the ``REMOTE_USER`` HTTP +extension header if you're running Apache 2.4.10 or later is: + +:: + + RequestHeader set X-SSSD-REMOTE_USER expr=%{REMOTE_USER} + +The ``expr=%{REMOTE_USER}`` in the above statement says pass +``%{REMOTE_USER}`` as an expression to `ap_expr`_, evaluate the +expression and return the value. In this case the expression +``%{REMOTE_USER}`` is very simple, just the value of the server +variables ``REMOTE_USER``. Because ``RequestHeader`` runs after +authentication ``request->user`` will have been set. + +Setting the REMOTE_USER environment variable +============================================ + +If you do a web search on how to export ``REMOTE_USER`` in a HTTP +extension header for a proxy you will discover this is a common +problem that has frustrated a lot of people [2]_. The usual advice seems to +be to use ``mod_rewrite`` with a look-ahead. In fact this is even +documented in the `mod_rewrite documentation for REMOTE_USER`_ which says: + + %{LA-U:variable} can be used for look-aheads which perform an + internal (URL-based) sub-request to determine the final value of + variable. This can be used to access variable for rewriting which is + not available at the current stage, but will be set in a later + phase. + + For instance, to rewrite according to the REMOTE_USER variable from + within the per-server context (httpd.conf file) you must use + %{LA-U:REMOTE_USER} - this variable is set by the authorization + phases, which come after the URL translation phase (during which + mod_rewrite operates). + +One suggested solution is this: + +:: + + RewriteCond %{LA-U:REMOTE_USER} (.+) + RewriteRule .* - [E=RU:%1] + RequestHeader set X_REMOTE_USER %{RU}e + +1. The RewriteCond with the %{LA-U:} construct performs an internal + redirect to obtain the value of ``REMOTE_USER`` *server variable*, + if that value is non-empty because the (.+) regular expression + matched the rewrite condition succeeds and the following + RewriteRule executes. + +2. The RewriteRule executes, the first parameter is a pattern, the + second parameter is the replacement which can be followed by + optional flags inside brackets. The .* pattern is a regular + expression that matches anything, the - replacement is a special + value which indicates no replacement is to be performed. In other + words the pattern and replacement are no-ops and the RewriteRule is + just being used for it's side effect defined in the flags. The + E=NAME:VALUE notation says set the NAME environment variable to + VALUE. In this case the environment variable is RU and the value is + %1. The documentation for RewriteRule tells us that %N are + back-references to the last matched RewriteCond pattern, in this + case it's the value of ``REMOTE_USER``. + +3. Finally ``RequestHeader`` sets the request header + ``X_REMOTE_USER`` to the value of the ``RU`` environment variable. + +Another suggested solution is this: + +:: + + RewriteRule .* - [E=REMOTE_USER:%{LA-U:REMOTE_USER}] + +The Problem with mod_rewrite lookahead +-------------------------------------- + +I **do not recommend** using mod_rewrite's lookahead to gain access to +authentication data values. Although the above suggestions will work +to get access to ``REMOTE_USER`` it is *extremely inefficient* because +it causes Apache to reprocess the request with an internal +redirect. The documentation suggests a lookahead reference will cause +one internal redirect. However from examining Apache debug logs the +``mod_rewite`` lookahead caused ``mod_lookup_identity`` to be invoked +**11 times** while handling one request. If the ``mod_rewrite`` +lookahead is removed and another technique is used to get access to +``REMOTE_USER`` then ``mod_lookup_identity`` is invoked exactly once +as expected. + +But it's not just ``REMOTE_USER`` which we need access to, we also need +to reference ``AUTH_TYPE`` which has the identical issues associated +with ``REMOTE_USER``. If an equivalent ``mod_rewrite`` block is added +to the configuration for ``AUTH_TYPE`` so that both ``REMOTE_USER`` +and ``auth_type`` are resolved using a lookahead Apache appears to go +into an infinite loop and the request stalls. + +I tried to debug what was occurring when Apache was configured this way +and why it seemed to be executing the same code over and over but I +was not able to figure it out. My conclusion is **using mod_rewrite +lookahead's is not a viable solution!** Other web posts also make +reference to the inefficiency but they seem to be unaware of just how +bad it is. + +.. [1] + Tomcat has a bug/feature, not all attributes are enumerated by + getAttributeNames() therefore getAttributeNames() cannot be used to + obtain the full set of attributes. However if you know the name of + the attribute a priori you can call getAttribute() and obtain the + value. Therefore we maintain a list of attribute names + (httpAttributes) which will be used to call getAttribute() with so we + don't miss essential attributes. + + This is the Tomcat bug, note it is marked WONTFIX. Bug 25363 - + request.getAttributeNames() not working properly Status: RESOLVED + WONTFIX https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25363 + + The solution adopted by Tomcat is to document the behavior in the + "The Apache Tomcat Connector - Reference Guide" under the JkEnvVar + property where is says: + + You can retrieve the variables on Tomcat as request attributes via + request.getAttribute(attributeName). Note that the variables send via + JkEnvVar will not be listed in request.getAttributeNames(). + +.. [2] + Some examples of posts concerning the export of ``REMOTE_USER`` include: + http://www.jaddog.org/2010/03/22/how-to-proxy-pass-remote_user/ and + http://serverfault.com/questions/23273/apache-proxy-passing-on-remote-user-to-backend-server/ + +.. [3] + The ``mod_lookup_identity`` ``LookupUserGroups`` option accepts an + optional parameter to specify the separator used to separate group + names. By convention this is normally the colon (:) character. In + our examples we explicitly specify the colon separator because the + mapping rules split the value found in ``REMOTE_USER_GROUPS`` on + the colon character. + +.. [4] + The example of using the `The Mapping Rule Processor`_ to establish + the set of roles assigned to a user based on group membership is + for illustrative purposes in order to show features of the + federated IdP and mapping mechanism. Role assignment in AAA may be + done in other ways. For example an unscoped token without roles can + be used to acquire a scoped token with roles by presenting it to + the appropriate REST API endpoint. In actual deployments this may + be preferable because it places the responsibility of deciding who + has what role/permission on what part of the controller/network + resources more in the hands of the SDN controller administrator + than the IdP administrator. + +.. _FreeIPA: http://www.freeipa.org/ + +.. _SSSD: https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ + +.. _mod_identity_lookup: http://www.adelton.com/apache/mod_lookup_identity/ + +.. _AJP: http://tomcat.apache.org/connectors-doc/ajp/ajpv13a.html + +.. _Tomcat Security How-To: http://tomcat.apache.org/tomcat-7.0-doc/security-howto.html + +.. _The Apache Tomcat Connector - Generic HowTo: http://tomcat.apache.org/connectors-doc/generic_howto/printer/proxy.html + +.. _CGI RFC: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3875 + +.. _ap_expr: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/current/expr.html + +.. _mod_rewrite documentation for REMOTE_USER: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/current/mod/mod_rewrite.html#rewritecond + +.. _bug 53098: https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=53098 + +.. _Jetty AJP Configuration Guide: http://wiki.eclipse.org/Jetty/Howto/Configure_AJP13 + +.. _Bug 387928: https://bugs.eclipse.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=387928 + +.. _Tomcat Remote Address Valve: http://tomcat.apache.org/tomcat-7.0-doc/config/valve.html#Remote_Address_Filter |