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Diffstat (limited to 'keystonemiddleware-moon/keystonemiddleware/auth_token/__init__.py')
| -rw-r--r-- | keystonemiddleware-moon/keystonemiddleware/auth_token/__init__.py | 1171 |
1 files changed, 1171 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/keystonemiddleware-moon/keystonemiddleware/auth_token/__init__.py b/keystonemiddleware-moon/keystonemiddleware/auth_token/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..80539714 --- /dev/null +++ b/keystonemiddleware-moon/keystonemiddleware/auth_token/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,1171 @@ +# Copyright 2010-2012 OpenStack Foundation +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or +# implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +""" +Token-based Authentication Middleware + +This WSGI component: + +* Verifies that incoming client requests have valid tokens by validating + tokens with the auth service. +* Rejects unauthenticated requests unless the auth_token middleware is in + 'delay_auth_decision' mode, which means the final decision is delegated to + the downstream WSGI component (usually the OpenStack service). +* Collects and forwards identity information based on a valid token + such as user name, tenant, etc + +Refer to: http://docs.openstack.org/developer/keystonemiddleware/\ +middlewarearchitecture.html + + +Echo test server +---------------- + +Run this module directly to start a protected echo service on port 8000:: + + $ python -m keystonemiddleware.auth_token + +When the ``auth_token`` module authenticates a request, the echo service +will respond with all the environment variables presented to it by this +module. + + +Headers +------- + +The auth_token middleware uses headers sent in by the client on the request +and sets headers and environment variables for the downstream WSGI component. + +Coming in from initial call from client or customer +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +HTTP_X_AUTH_TOKEN + The client token being passed in. + +HTTP_X_SERVICE_TOKEN + A service token being passed in. + +Used for communication between components +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +WWW-Authenticate + HTTP header returned to a user indicating which endpoint to use + to retrieve a new token + +What auth_token adds to the request for use by the OpenStack service +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +When using composite authentication (a user and service token are +present) additional service headers relating to the service user +will be added. They take the same form as the standard headers but add +'_SERVICE_'. These headers will not exist in the environment if no +service token is present. + +HTTP_X_IDENTITY_STATUS, HTTP_X_SERVICE_IDENTITY_STATUS + 'Confirmed' or 'Invalid' + The underlying service will only see a value of 'Invalid' if the Middleware + is configured to run in 'delay_auth_decision' mode. As with all such + headers, HTTP_X_SERVICE_IDENTITY_STATUS will only exist in the + environment if a service token is presented. This is different than + HTTP_X_IDENTITY_STATUS which is always set even if no user token is + presented. This allows the underlying service to determine if a + denial should use 401 or 403. + +HTTP_X_DOMAIN_ID, HTTP_X_SERVICE_DOMAIN_ID + Identity service managed unique identifier, string. Only present if + this is a domain-scoped v3 token. + +HTTP_X_DOMAIN_NAME, HTTP_X_SERVICE_DOMAIN_NAME + Unique domain name, string. Only present if this is a domain-scoped + v3 token. + +HTTP_X_PROJECT_ID, HTTP_X_SERVICE_PROJECT_ID + Identity service managed unique identifier, string. Only present if + this is a project-scoped v3 token, or a tenant-scoped v2 token. + +HTTP_X_PROJECT_NAME, HTTP_X_SERVICE_PROJECT_NAME + Project name, unique within owning domain, string. Only present if + this is a project-scoped v3 token, or a tenant-scoped v2 token. + +HTTP_X_PROJECT_DOMAIN_ID, HTTP_X_SERVICE_PROJECT_DOMAIN_ID + Identity service managed unique identifier of owning domain of + project, string. Only present if this is a project-scoped v3 token. If + this variable is set, this indicates that the PROJECT_NAME can only + be assumed to be unique within this domain. + +HTTP_X_PROJECT_DOMAIN_NAME, HTTP_X_SERVICE_PROJECT_DOMAIN_NAME + Name of owning domain of project, string. Only present if this is a + project-scoped v3 token. If this variable is set, this indicates that + the PROJECT_NAME can only be assumed to be unique within this domain. + +HTTP_X_USER_ID, HTTP_X_SERVICE_USER_ID + Identity-service managed unique identifier, string + +HTTP_X_USER_NAME, HTTP_X_SERVICE_USER_NAME + User identifier, unique within owning domain, string + +HTTP_X_USER_DOMAIN_ID, HTTP_X_SERVICE_USER_DOMAIN_ID + Identity service managed unique identifier of owning domain of + user, string. If this variable is set, this indicates that the USER_NAME + can only be assumed to be unique within this domain. + +HTTP_X_USER_DOMAIN_NAME, HTTP_X_SERVICE_USER_DOMAIN_NAME + Name of owning domain of user, string. If this variable is set, this + indicates that the USER_NAME can only be assumed to be unique within + this domain. + +HTTP_X_ROLES, HTTP_X_SERVICE_ROLES + Comma delimited list of case-sensitive role names + +HTTP_X_SERVICE_CATALOG + json encoded service catalog (optional). + For compatibility reasons this catalog will always be in the V2 catalog + format even if it is a v3 token. + + Note: This is an exception in that it contains 'SERVICE' but relates to a + user token, not a service token. The existing user's + catalog can be very large; it was decided not to present a catalog + relating to the service token to avoid using more HTTP header space. + +HTTP_X_TENANT_ID + *Deprecated* in favor of HTTP_X_PROJECT_ID + Identity service managed unique identifier, string. For v3 tokens, this + will be set to the same value as HTTP_X_PROJECT_ID + +HTTP_X_TENANT_NAME + *Deprecated* in favor of HTTP_X_PROJECT_NAME + Project identifier, unique within owning domain, string. For v3 tokens, + this will be set to the same value as HTTP_X_PROJECT_NAME + +HTTP_X_TENANT + *Deprecated* in favor of HTTP_X_TENANT_ID and HTTP_X_TENANT_NAME + identity server-assigned unique identifier, string. For v3 tokens, this + will be set to the same value as HTTP_X_PROJECT_ID + +HTTP_X_USER + *Deprecated* in favor of HTTP_X_USER_ID and HTTP_X_USER_NAME + User name, unique within owning domain, string + +HTTP_X_ROLE + *Deprecated* in favor of HTTP_X_ROLES + Will contain the same values as HTTP_X_ROLES. + +Environment Variables +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +These variables are set in the request environment for use by the downstream +WSGI component. + +keystone.token_info + Information about the token discovered in the process of validation. This + may include extended information returned by the token validation call, as + well as basic information about the tenant and user. + +keystone.token_auth + A keystoneclient auth plugin that may be used with a + :py:class:`keystoneclient.session.Session`. This plugin will load the + authentication data provided to auth_token middleware. + + +Configuration +------------- + +Middleware configuration can be in the main application's configuration file, +e.g. in ``nova.conf``: + +.. code-block:: ini + + [keystone_authtoken] + auth_plugin = password + auth_url = http://keystone:35357/ + username = nova + user_domain_id = default + password = whyarewestillusingpasswords + project_name = service + project_domain_id = default + +Configuration can also be in the ``api-paste.ini`` file with the same options, +but this is discouraged. + +Swift +----- + +When deploy Keystone auth_token middleware with Swift, user may elect to use +Swift memcache instead of the local auth_token memcache. Swift memcache is +passed in from the request environment and it's identified by the +``swift.cache`` key. However it could be different, depending on deployment. To +use Swift memcache, you must set the ``cache`` option to the environment key +where the Swift cache object is stored. + +""" + +import datetime +import logging + +from keystoneclient import access +from keystoneclient import adapter +from keystoneclient import auth +from keystoneclient.common import cms +from keystoneclient import discover +from keystoneclient import exceptions +from keystoneclient import session +from oslo_config import cfg +from oslo_serialization import jsonutils +from oslo_utils import timeutils +import six + +from keystonemiddleware.auth_token import _auth +from keystonemiddleware.auth_token import _base +from keystonemiddleware.auth_token import _cache +from keystonemiddleware.auth_token import _exceptions as exc +from keystonemiddleware.auth_token import _identity +from keystonemiddleware.auth_token import _revocations +from keystonemiddleware.auth_token import _signing_dir +from keystonemiddleware.auth_token import _user_plugin +from keystonemiddleware.auth_token import _utils +from keystonemiddleware.i18n import _, _LC, _LE, _LI, _LW + + +# NOTE(jamielennox): A number of options below are deprecated however are left +# in the list and only mentioned as deprecated in the help string. This is +# because we have to provide the same deprecation functionality for arguments +# passed in via the conf in __init__ (from paste) and there is no way to test +# that the default value was set or not in CONF. +# Also if we were to remove the options from the CONF list (as typical CONF +# deprecation works) then other projects will not be able to override the +# options via CONF. + +_OPTS = [ + cfg.StrOpt('auth_uri', + default=None, + # FIXME(dolph): should be default='http://127.0.0.1:5000/v2.0/', + # or (depending on client support) an unversioned, publicly + # accessible identity endpoint (see bug 1207517) + help='Complete public Identity API endpoint.'), + cfg.StrOpt('auth_version', + default=None, + help='API version of the admin Identity API endpoint.'), + cfg.BoolOpt('delay_auth_decision', + default=False, + help='Do not handle authorization requests within the' + ' middleware, but delegate the authorization decision to' + ' downstream WSGI components.'), + cfg.IntOpt('http_connect_timeout', + default=None, + help='Request timeout value for communicating with Identity' + ' API server.'), + cfg.IntOpt('http_request_max_retries', + default=3, + help='How many times are we trying to reconnect when' + ' communicating with Identity API Server.'), + cfg.StrOpt('cache', + default=None, + help='Env key for the swift cache.'), + cfg.StrOpt('certfile', + help='Required if identity server requires client certificate'), + cfg.StrOpt('keyfile', + help='Required if identity server requires client certificate'), + cfg.StrOpt('cafile', default=None, + help='A PEM encoded Certificate Authority to use when ' + 'verifying HTTPs connections. Defaults to system CAs.'), + cfg.BoolOpt('insecure', default=False, help='Verify HTTPS connections.'), + cfg.StrOpt('signing_dir', + help='Directory used to cache files related to PKI tokens.'), + cfg.ListOpt('memcached_servers', + deprecated_name='memcache_servers', + help='Optionally specify a list of memcached server(s) to' + ' use for caching. If left undefined, tokens will instead be' + ' cached in-process.'), + cfg.IntOpt('token_cache_time', + default=300, + help='In order to prevent excessive effort spent validating' + ' tokens, the middleware caches previously-seen tokens for a' + ' configurable duration (in seconds). Set to -1 to disable' + ' caching completely.'), + cfg.IntOpt('revocation_cache_time', + default=10, + help='Determines the frequency at which the list of revoked' + ' tokens is retrieved from the Identity service (in seconds). A' + ' high number of revocation events combined with a low cache' + ' duration may significantly reduce performance.'), + cfg.StrOpt('memcache_security_strategy', + default=None, + help='(Optional) If defined, indicate whether token data' + ' should be authenticated or authenticated and encrypted.' + ' Acceptable values are MAC or ENCRYPT. If MAC, token data is' + ' authenticated (with HMAC) in the cache. If ENCRYPT, token' + ' data is encrypted and authenticated in the cache. If the' + ' value is not one of these options or empty, auth_token will' + ' raise an exception on initialization.'), + cfg.StrOpt('memcache_secret_key', + default=None, + secret=True, + help='(Optional, mandatory if memcache_security_strategy is' + ' defined) This string is used for key derivation.'), + cfg.IntOpt('memcache_pool_dead_retry', + default=5 * 60, + help='(Optional) Number of seconds memcached server is' + ' considered dead before it is tried again.'), + cfg.IntOpt('memcache_pool_maxsize', + default=10, + help='(Optional) Maximum total number of open connections to' + ' every memcached server.'), + cfg.IntOpt('memcache_pool_socket_timeout', + default=3, + help='(Optional) Socket timeout in seconds for communicating ' + 'with a memcache server.'), + cfg.IntOpt('memcache_pool_unused_timeout', + default=60, + help='(Optional) Number of seconds a connection to memcached' + ' is held unused in the pool before it is closed.'), + cfg.IntOpt('memcache_pool_conn_get_timeout', + default=10, + help='(Optional) Number of seconds that an operation will wait ' + 'to get a memcache client connection from the pool.'), + cfg.BoolOpt('memcache_use_advanced_pool', + default=False, + help='(Optional) Use the advanced (eventlet safe) memcache ' + 'client pool. The advanced pool will only work under ' + 'python 2.x.'), + cfg.BoolOpt('include_service_catalog', + default=True, + help='(Optional) Indicate whether to set the X-Service-Catalog' + ' header. If False, middleware will not ask for service' + ' catalog on token validation and will not set the' + ' X-Service-Catalog header.'), + cfg.StrOpt('enforce_token_bind', + default='permissive', + help='Used to control the use and type of token binding. Can' + ' be set to: "disabled" to not check token binding.' + ' "permissive" (default) to validate binding information if the' + ' bind type is of a form known to the server and ignore it if' + ' not. "strict" like "permissive" but if the bind type is' + ' unknown the token will be rejected. "required" any form of' + ' token binding is needed to be allowed. Finally the name of a' + ' binding method that must be present in tokens.'), + cfg.BoolOpt('check_revocations_for_cached', default=False, + help='If true, the revocation list will be checked for cached' + ' tokens. This requires that PKI tokens are configured on the' + ' identity server.'), + cfg.ListOpt('hash_algorithms', default=['md5'], + help='Hash algorithms to use for hashing PKI tokens. This may' + ' be a single algorithm or multiple. The algorithms are those' + ' supported by Python standard hashlib.new(). The hashes will' + ' be tried in the order given, so put the preferred one first' + ' for performance. The result of the first hash will be stored' + ' in the cache. This will typically be set to multiple values' + ' only while migrating from a less secure algorithm to a more' + ' secure one. Once all the old tokens are expired this option' + ' should be set to a single value for better performance.'), +] + +CONF = cfg.CONF +CONF.register_opts(_OPTS, group=_base.AUTHTOKEN_GROUP) + +_LOG = logging.getLogger(__name__) + +_HEADER_TEMPLATE = { + 'X%s-Domain-Id': 'domain_id', + 'X%s-Domain-Name': 'domain_name', + 'X%s-Project-Id': 'project_id', + 'X%s-Project-Name': 'project_name', + 'X%s-Project-Domain-Id': 'project_domain_id', + 'X%s-Project-Domain-Name': 'project_domain_name', + 'X%s-User-Id': 'user_id', + 'X%s-User-Name': 'username', + 'X%s-User-Domain-Id': 'user_domain_id', + 'X%s-User-Domain-Name': 'user_domain_name', +} + +_DEPRECATED_HEADER_TEMPLATE = { + 'X-User': 'username', + 'X-Tenant-Id': 'project_id', + 'X-Tenant-Name': 'project_name', + 'X-Tenant': 'project_name', +} + + +class _BIND_MODE(object): + DISABLED = 'disabled' + PERMISSIVE = 'permissive' + STRICT = 'strict' + REQUIRED = 'required' + KERBEROS = 'kerberos' + + +def _token_is_v2(token_info): + return ('access' in token_info) + + +def _token_is_v3(token_info): + return ('token' in token_info) + + +def _get_token_expiration(data): + if not data: + raise exc.InvalidToken(_('Token authorization failed')) + if _token_is_v2(data): + return data['access']['token']['expires'] + elif _token_is_v3(data): + return data['token']['expires_at'] + else: + raise exc.InvalidToken(_('Token authorization failed')) + + +def _confirm_token_not_expired(expires): + expires = timeutils.parse_isotime(expires) + expires = timeutils.normalize_time(expires) + utcnow = timeutils.utcnow() + if utcnow >= expires: + raise exc.InvalidToken(_('Token authorization failed')) + + +def _v3_to_v2_catalog(catalog): + """Convert a catalog to v2 format. + + X_SERVICE_CATALOG must be specified in v2 format. If you get a token + that is in v3 convert it. + """ + v2_services = [] + for v3_service in catalog: + # first copy over the entries we allow for the service + v2_service = {'type': v3_service['type']} + try: + v2_service['name'] = v3_service['name'] + except KeyError: + pass + + # now convert the endpoints. Because in v3 we specify region per + # URL not per group we have to collect all the entries of the same + # region together before adding it to the new service. + regions = {} + for v3_endpoint in v3_service.get('endpoints', []): + region_name = v3_endpoint.get('region') + try: + region = regions[region_name] + except KeyError: + region = {'region': region_name} if region_name else {} + regions[region_name] = region + + interface_name = v3_endpoint['interface'].lower() + 'URL' + region[interface_name] = v3_endpoint['url'] + + v2_service['endpoints'] = list(regions.values()) + v2_services.append(v2_service) + + return v2_services + + +def _conf_values_type_convert(conf): + """Convert conf values into correct type.""" + if not conf: + return {} + + opt_types = {} + for o in (_OPTS + _auth.AuthTokenPlugin.get_options()): + type_dest = (getattr(o, 'type', str), o.dest) + opt_types[o.dest] = type_dest + # Also add the deprecated name with the same type and dest. + for d_o in o.deprecated_opts: + opt_types[d_o.name] = type_dest + + opts = {} + for k, v in six.iteritems(conf): + dest = k + try: + if v is not None: + type_, dest = opt_types[k] + v = type_(v) + except KeyError: + # This option is not known to auth_token. + pass + except ValueError as e: + raise exc.ConfigurationError( + _('Unable to convert the value of %(key)s option into correct ' + 'type: %(ex)s') % {'key': k, 'ex': e}) + opts[dest] = v + return opts + + +class AuthProtocol(object): + """Middleware that handles authenticating client calls.""" + + _SIGNING_CERT_FILE_NAME = 'signing_cert.pem' + _SIGNING_CA_FILE_NAME = 'cacert.pem' + + def __init__(self, app, conf): + self._LOG = logging.getLogger(conf.get('log_name', __name__)) + self._LOG.info(_LI('Starting Keystone auth_token middleware')) + # NOTE(wanghong): If options are set in paste file, all the option + # values passed into conf are string type. So, we should convert the + # conf value into correct type. + self._conf = _conf_values_type_convert(conf) + self._app = app + + # delay_auth_decision means we still allow unauthenticated requests + # through and we let the downstream service make the final decision + self._delay_auth_decision = self._conf_get('delay_auth_decision') + self._include_service_catalog = self._conf_get( + 'include_service_catalog') + + self._identity_server = self._create_identity_server() + + self._auth_uri = self._conf_get('auth_uri') + if not self._auth_uri: + self._LOG.warning( + _LW('Configuring auth_uri to point to the public identity ' + 'endpoint is required; clients may not be able to ' + 'authenticate against an admin endpoint')) + + # FIXME(dolph): drop support for this fallback behavior as + # documented in bug 1207517. + + self._auth_uri = self._identity_server.auth_uri + + self._signing_directory = _signing_dir.SigningDirectory( + directory_name=self._conf_get('signing_dir'), log=self._LOG) + + self._token_cache = self._token_cache_factory() + + revocation_cache_timeout = datetime.timedelta( + seconds=self._conf_get('revocation_cache_time')) + self._revocations = _revocations.Revocations(revocation_cache_timeout, + self._signing_directory, + self._identity_server, + self._cms_verify, + self._LOG) + + self._check_revocations_for_cached = self._conf_get( + 'check_revocations_for_cached') + self._init_auth_headers() + + def _conf_get(self, name, group=_base.AUTHTOKEN_GROUP): + # try config from paste-deploy first + if name in self._conf: + return self._conf[name] + else: + return CONF[group][name] + + def _call_app(self, env, start_response): + # NOTE(jamielennox): We wrap the given start response so that if an + # application with a 'delay_auth_decision' setting fails, or otherwise + # raises Unauthorized that we include the Authentication URL headers. + def _fake_start_response(status, response_headers, exc_info=None): + if status.startswith('401'): + response_headers.extend(self._reject_auth_headers) + + return start_response(status, response_headers, exc_info) + + return self._app(env, _fake_start_response) + + def __call__(self, env, start_response): + """Handle incoming request. + + Authenticate send downstream on success. Reject request if + we can't authenticate. + + """ + def _fmt_msg(env): + msg = ('user: user_id %s, project_id %s, roles %s ' + 'service: user_id %s, project_id %s, roles %s' % ( + env.get('HTTP_X_USER_ID'), env.get('HTTP_X_PROJECT_ID'), + env.get('HTTP_X_ROLES'), + env.get('HTTP_X_SERVICE_USER_ID'), + env.get('HTTP_X_SERVICE_PROJECT_ID'), + env.get('HTTP_X_SERVICE_ROLES'))) + return msg + + self._token_cache.initialize(env) + self._remove_auth_headers(env) + + try: + user_auth_ref = None + serv_auth_ref = None + + try: + self._LOG.debug('Authenticating user token') + user_token = self._get_user_token_from_header(env) + user_token_info = self._validate_token(user_token, env) + user_auth_ref = access.AccessInfo.factory( + body=user_token_info, + auth_token=user_token) + env['keystone.token_info'] = user_token_info + user_headers = self._build_user_headers(user_auth_ref, + user_token_info) + self._add_headers(env, user_headers) + except exc.InvalidToken: + if self._delay_auth_decision: + self._LOG.info( + _LI('Invalid user token - deferring reject ' + 'downstream')) + self._add_headers(env, {'X-Identity-Status': 'Invalid'}) + else: + self._LOG.info( + _LI('Invalid user token - rejecting request')) + return self._reject_request(env, start_response) + + try: + self._LOG.debug('Authenticating service token') + serv_token = self._get_service_token_from_header(env) + if serv_token is not None: + serv_token_info = self._validate_token( + serv_token, env) + serv_auth_ref = access.AccessInfo.factory( + body=serv_token_info, + auth_token=serv_token) + serv_headers = self._build_service_headers(serv_token_info) + self._add_headers(env, serv_headers) + except exc.InvalidToken: + if self._delay_auth_decision: + self._LOG.info( + _LI('Invalid service token - deferring reject ' + 'downstream')) + self._add_headers(env, + {'X-Service-Identity-Status': 'Invalid'}) + else: + self._LOG.info( + _LI('Invalid service token - rejecting request')) + return self._reject_request(env, start_response) + + env['keystone.token_auth'] = _user_plugin.UserAuthPlugin( + user_auth_ref, serv_auth_ref) + + except exc.ServiceError as e: + self._LOG.critical(_LC('Unable to obtain admin token: %s'), e) + return self._do_503_error(env, start_response) + + self._LOG.debug("Received request from %s", _fmt_msg(env)) + + return self._call_app(env, start_response) + + def _do_503_error(self, env, start_response): + resp = _utils.MiniResp('Service unavailable', env) + start_response('503 Service Unavailable', resp.headers) + return resp.body + + def _init_auth_headers(self): + """Initialize auth header list. + + Both user and service token headers are generated. + """ + auth_headers = ['X-Service-Catalog', + 'X-Identity-Status', + 'X-Service-Identity-Status', + 'X-Roles', + 'X-Service-Roles'] + for key in six.iterkeys(_HEADER_TEMPLATE): + auth_headers.append(key % '') + # Service headers + auth_headers.append(key % '-Service') + + # Deprecated headers + auth_headers.append('X-Role') + for key in six.iterkeys(_DEPRECATED_HEADER_TEMPLATE): + auth_headers.append(key) + + self._auth_headers = auth_headers + + def _remove_auth_headers(self, env): + """Remove headers so a user can't fake authentication. + + Both user and service token headers are removed. + + :param env: wsgi request environment + + """ + self._LOG.debug('Removing headers from request environment: %s', + ','.join(self._auth_headers)) + self._remove_headers(env, self._auth_headers) + + def _get_user_token_from_header(self, env): + """Get token id from request. + + :param env: wsgi request environment + :returns: token id + :raises exc.InvalidToken: if no token is provided in request + + """ + token = self._get_header(env, 'X-Auth-Token', + self._get_header(env, 'X-Storage-Token')) + if token: + return token + else: + if not self._delay_auth_decision: + self._LOG.warn(_LW('Unable to find authentication token' + ' in headers')) + self._LOG.debug('Headers: %s', env) + raise exc.InvalidToken(_('Unable to find token in headers')) + + def _get_service_token_from_header(self, env): + """Get service token id from request. + + :param env: wsgi request environment + :returns: service token id or None if not present + + """ + return self._get_header(env, 'X-Service-Token') + + @property + def _reject_auth_headers(self): + header_val = 'Keystone uri=\'%s\'' % self._auth_uri + return [('WWW-Authenticate', header_val)] + + def _reject_request(self, env, start_response): + """Redirect client to auth server. + + :param env: wsgi request environment + :param start_response: wsgi response callback + :returns: HTTPUnauthorized http response + + """ + resp = _utils.MiniResp('Authentication required', + env, self._reject_auth_headers) + start_response('401 Unauthorized', resp.headers) + return resp.body + + def _validate_token(self, token, env, retry=True): + """Authenticate user token + + :param token: token id + :param env: wsgi environment + :param retry: Ignored, as it is not longer relevant + :returns: uncrypted body of the token if the token is valid + :raises exc.InvalidToken: if token is rejected + + """ + token_id = None + + try: + token_ids, cached = self._token_cache.get(token) + token_id = token_ids[0] + if cached: + # Token was retrieved from the cache. In this case, there's no + # need to check that the token is expired because the cache + # fetch fails for an expired token. Also, there's no need to + # put the token in the cache because it's already in the cache. + + data = cached + + if self._check_revocations_for_cached: + # A token stored in Memcached might have been revoked + # regardless of initial mechanism used to validate it, + # and needs to be checked. + self._revocations.check(token_ids) + self._confirm_token_bind(data, env) + else: + verified = None + # Token wasn't cached. In this case, the token needs to be + # checked that it's not expired, and also put in the cache. + try: + if cms.is_pkiz(token): + verified = self._verify_pkiz_token(token, token_ids) + elif cms.is_asn1_token(token): + verified = self._verify_signed_token(token, token_ids) + except exceptions.CertificateConfigError: + self._LOG.warn(_LW('Fetch certificate config failed, ' + 'fallback to online validation.')) + except exc.RevocationListError: + self._LOG.warn(_LW('Fetch revocation list failed, ' + 'fallback to online validation.')) + + if verified is not None: + data = jsonutils.loads(verified) + expires = _get_token_expiration(data) + _confirm_token_not_expired(expires) + else: + data = self._identity_server.verify_token(token, retry) + # No need to confirm token expiration here since + # verify_token fails for expired tokens. + expires = _get_token_expiration(data) + self._confirm_token_bind(data, env) + self._token_cache.store(token_id, data, expires) + return data + except (exceptions.ConnectionRefused, exceptions.RequestTimeout): + self._LOG.debug('Token validation failure.', exc_info=True) + self._LOG.warn(_LW('Authorization failed for token')) + raise exc.InvalidToken(_('Token authorization failed')) + except exc.ServiceError: + raise + except Exception: + self._LOG.debug('Token validation failure.', exc_info=True) + if token_id: + self._token_cache.store_invalid(token_id) + self._LOG.warn(_LW('Authorization failed for token')) + raise exc.InvalidToken(_('Token authorization failed')) + + def _build_user_headers(self, auth_ref, token_info): + """Convert token object into headers. + + Build headers that represent authenticated user - see main + doc info at start of file for details of headers to be defined. + + :param token_info: token object returned by identity + server on authentication + :raises exc.InvalidToken: when unable to parse token object + + """ + roles = ','.join(auth_ref.role_names) + + if _token_is_v2(token_info) and not auth_ref.project_id: + raise exc.InvalidToken(_('Unable to determine tenancy.')) + + rval = { + 'X-Identity-Status': 'Confirmed', + 'X-Roles': roles, + } + + for header_tmplt, attr in six.iteritems(_HEADER_TEMPLATE): + rval[header_tmplt % ''] = getattr(auth_ref, attr) + + # Deprecated headers + rval['X-Role'] = roles + for header_tmplt, attr in six.iteritems(_DEPRECATED_HEADER_TEMPLATE): + rval[header_tmplt] = getattr(auth_ref, attr) + + if self._include_service_catalog and auth_ref.has_service_catalog(): + catalog = auth_ref.service_catalog.get_data() + if _token_is_v3(token_info): + catalog = _v3_to_v2_catalog(catalog) + rval['X-Service-Catalog'] = jsonutils.dumps(catalog) + + return rval + + def _build_service_headers(self, token_info): + """Convert token object into service headers. + + Build headers that represent authenticated user - see main + doc info at start of file for details of headers to be defined. + + :param token_info: token object returned by identity + server on authentication + :raises exc.InvalidToken: when unable to parse token object + + """ + auth_ref = access.AccessInfo.factory(body=token_info) + + if _token_is_v2(token_info) and not auth_ref.project_id: + raise exc.InvalidToken(_('Unable to determine service tenancy.')) + + roles = ','.join(auth_ref.role_names) + rval = { + 'X-Service-Identity-Status': 'Confirmed', + 'X-Service-Roles': roles, + } + + header_type = '-Service' + for header_tmplt, attr in six.iteritems(_HEADER_TEMPLATE): + rval[header_tmplt % header_type] = getattr(auth_ref, attr) + + return rval + + def _header_to_env_var(self, key): + """Convert header to wsgi env variable. + + :param key: http header name (ex. 'X-Auth-Token') + :returns: wsgi env variable name (ex. 'HTTP_X_AUTH_TOKEN') + + """ + return 'HTTP_%s' % key.replace('-', '_').upper() + + def _add_headers(self, env, headers): + """Add http headers to environment.""" + for (k, v) in six.iteritems(headers): + env_key = self._header_to_env_var(k) + env[env_key] = v + + def _remove_headers(self, env, keys): + """Remove http headers from environment.""" + for k in keys: + env_key = self._header_to_env_var(k) + try: + del env[env_key] + except KeyError: + pass + + def _get_header(self, env, key, default=None): + """Get http header from environment.""" + env_key = self._header_to_env_var(key) + return env.get(env_key, default) + + def _invalid_user_token(self, msg=False): + # NOTE(jamielennox): use False as the default so that None is valid + if msg is False: + msg = _('Token authorization failed') + + raise exc.InvalidToken(msg) + + def _confirm_token_bind(self, data, env): + bind_mode = self._conf_get('enforce_token_bind') + + if bind_mode == _BIND_MODE.DISABLED: + return + + try: + if _token_is_v2(data): + bind = data['access']['token']['bind'] + elif _token_is_v3(data): + bind = data['token']['bind'] + else: + self._invalid_user_token() + except KeyError: + bind = {} + + # permissive and strict modes don't require there to be a bind + permissive = bind_mode in (_BIND_MODE.PERMISSIVE, _BIND_MODE.STRICT) + + if not bind: + if permissive: + # no bind provided and none required + return + else: + self._LOG.info(_LI('No bind information present in token.')) + self._invalid_user_token() + + # get the named mode if bind_mode is not one of the predefined + if permissive or bind_mode == _BIND_MODE.REQUIRED: + name = None + else: + name = bind_mode + + if name and name not in bind: + self._LOG.info(_LI('Named bind mode %s not in bind information'), + name) + self._invalid_user_token() + + for bind_type, identifier in six.iteritems(bind): + if bind_type == _BIND_MODE.KERBEROS: + if not env.get('AUTH_TYPE', '').lower() == 'negotiate': + self._LOG.info(_LI('Kerberos credentials required and ' + 'not present.')) + self._invalid_user_token() + + if not env.get('REMOTE_USER') == identifier: + self._LOG.info(_LI('Kerberos credentials do not match ' + 'those in bind.')) + self._invalid_user_token() + + self._LOG.debug('Kerberos bind authentication successful.') + + elif bind_mode == _BIND_MODE.PERMISSIVE: + self._LOG.debug('Ignoring Unknown bind for permissive mode: ' + '%(bind_type)s: %(identifier)s.', + {'bind_type': bind_type, + 'identifier': identifier}) + + else: + self._LOG.info( + _LI('Couldn`t verify unknown bind: %(bind_type)s: ' + '%(identifier)s.'), + {'bind_type': bind_type, 'identifier': identifier}) + self._invalid_user_token() + + def _cms_verify(self, data, inform=cms.PKI_ASN1_FORM): + """Verifies the signature of the provided data's IAW CMS syntax. + + If either of the certificate files might be missing, fetch them and + retry. + """ + def verify(): + try: + signing_cert_path = self._signing_directory.calc_path( + self._SIGNING_CERT_FILE_NAME) + signing_ca_path = self._signing_directory.calc_path( + self._SIGNING_CA_FILE_NAME) + return cms.cms_verify(data, signing_cert_path, + signing_ca_path, + inform=inform).decode('utf-8') + except cms.subprocess.CalledProcessError as err: + self._LOG.warning(_LW('Verify error: %s'), err) + raise + + try: + return verify() + except exceptions.CertificateConfigError: + # the certs might be missing; unconditionally fetch to avoid racing + self._fetch_signing_cert() + self._fetch_ca_cert() + + try: + # retry with certs in place + return verify() + except exceptions.CertificateConfigError as err: + # if this is still occurring, something else is wrong and we + # need err.output to identify the problem + self._LOG.error(_LE('CMS Verify output: %s'), err.output) + raise + + def _verify_signed_token(self, signed_text, token_ids): + """Check that the token is unrevoked and has a valid signature.""" + self._revocations.check(token_ids) + formatted = cms.token_to_cms(signed_text) + verified = self._cms_verify(formatted) + return verified + + def _verify_pkiz_token(self, signed_text, token_ids): + self._revocations.check(token_ids) + try: + uncompressed = cms.pkiz_uncompress(signed_text) + verified = self._cms_verify(uncompressed, inform=cms.PKIZ_CMS_FORM) + return verified + # TypeError If the signed_text is not zlib compressed + except TypeError: + raise exc.InvalidToken(signed_text) + + def _fetch_signing_cert(self): + self._signing_directory.write_file( + self._SIGNING_CERT_FILE_NAME, + self._identity_server.fetch_signing_cert()) + + def _fetch_ca_cert(self): + self._signing_directory.write_file( + self._SIGNING_CA_FILE_NAME, + self._identity_server.fetch_ca_cert()) + + def _get_auth_plugin(self): + # NOTE(jamielennox): Ideally this would use get_from_conf_options + # however that is not possible because we have to support the override + # pattern we use in _conf_get. There is a somewhat replacement for this + # in keystoneclient in load_from_options_getter which should be used + # when available. Until then this is essentially a copy and paste of + # the ksc load_from_conf_options code because we need to get a fix out + # for this quickly. + + # FIXME(jamielennox): update to use load_from_options_getter when + # https://review.openstack.org/162529 merges. + + # !!! - UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES COPY ANY OF THIS CODE - !!! + + group = self._conf_get('auth_section') or _base.AUTHTOKEN_GROUP + plugin_name = self._conf_get('auth_plugin', group=group) + plugin_kwargs = dict() + + if plugin_name: + plugin_class = auth.get_plugin_class(plugin_name) + else: + plugin_class = _auth.AuthTokenPlugin + # logger object is a required parameter of the default plugin + plugin_kwargs['log'] = self._LOG + + plugin_opts = plugin_class.get_options() + CONF.register_opts(plugin_opts, group=group) + + for opt in plugin_opts: + val = self._conf_get(opt.dest, group=group) + if val is not None: + val = opt.type(val) + plugin_kwargs[opt.dest] = val + + return plugin_class.load_from_options(**plugin_kwargs) + + def _create_identity_server(self): + # NOTE(jamielennox): Loading Session here should be exactly the + # same as calling Session.load_from_conf_options(CONF, GROUP) + # however we can't do that because we have to use _conf_get to + # support the paste.ini options. + sess = session.Session.construct(dict( + cert=self._conf_get('certfile'), + key=self._conf_get('keyfile'), + cacert=self._conf_get('cafile'), + insecure=self._conf_get('insecure'), + timeout=self._conf_get('http_connect_timeout') + )) + + auth_plugin = self._get_auth_plugin() + + adap = adapter.Adapter( + sess, + auth=auth_plugin, + service_type='identity', + interface='admin', + connect_retries=self._conf_get('http_request_max_retries')) + + auth_version = self._conf_get('auth_version') + if auth_version is not None: + auth_version = discover.normalize_version_number(auth_version) + return _identity.IdentityServer( + self._LOG, + adap, + include_service_catalog=self._include_service_catalog, + requested_auth_version=auth_version) + + def _token_cache_factory(self): + security_strategy = self._conf_get('memcache_security_strategy') + + cache_kwargs = dict( + cache_time=int(self._conf_get('token_cache_time')), + hash_algorithms=self._conf_get('hash_algorithms'), + env_cache_name=self._conf_get('cache'), + memcached_servers=self._conf_get('memcached_servers'), + use_advanced_pool=self._conf_get('memcache_use_advanced_pool'), + memcache_pool_dead_retry=self._conf_get( + 'memcache_pool_dead_retry'), + memcache_pool_maxsize=self._conf_get('memcache_pool_maxsize'), + memcache_pool_unused_timeout=self._conf_get( + 'memcache_pool_unused_timeout'), + memcache_pool_conn_get_timeout=self._conf_get( + 'memcache_pool_conn_get_timeout'), + memcache_pool_socket_timeout=self._conf_get( + 'memcache_pool_socket_timeout'), + ) + + if security_strategy: + secret_key = self._conf_get('memcache_secret_key') + return _cache.SecureTokenCache(self._LOG, + security_strategy, + secret_key, + **cache_kwargs) + else: + return _cache.TokenCache(self._LOG, **cache_kwargs) + + +def filter_factory(global_conf, **local_conf): + """Returns a WSGI filter app for use with paste.deploy.""" + conf = global_conf.copy() + conf.update(local_conf) + + def auth_filter(app): + return AuthProtocol(app, conf) + return auth_filter + + +def app_factory(global_conf, **local_conf): + conf = global_conf.copy() + conf.update(local_conf) + return AuthProtocol(None, conf) + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + def echo_app(environ, start_response): + """A WSGI application that echoes the CGI environment to the user.""" + start_response('200 OK', [('Content-Type', 'application/json')]) + environment = dict((k, v) for k, v in six.iteritems(environ) + if k.startswith('HTTP_X_')) + yield jsonutils.dumps(environment) + + from wsgiref import simple_server + + # hardcode any non-default configuration here + conf = {'auth_protocol': 'http', 'admin_token': 'ADMIN'} + app = AuthProtocol(echo_app, conf) + server = simple_server.make_server('', 8000, app) + print('Serving on port 8000 (Ctrl+C to end)...') + server.serve_forever() + + +# NOTE(jamielennox): Maintained here for public API compatibility. +InvalidToken = exc.InvalidToken +ServiceError = exc.ServiceError +ConfigurationError = exc.ConfigurationError +RevocationListError = exc.RevocationListError |