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+== Security issues ==
+
+Potential problems for the paranoid.
+
+*Truncated hashes*
+
+For points on an elliptic curve over the base field, +element_from_hash()+
+will truncate the input hash until it can represent an x-coordinate in that
+field. (PBC then computes a corresponding y-coordinate.) Ideally the hash
+length should be smaller than size of the base field and also the size of the
+elliptic curve group.
+
+Hashing to elements in field extensions does not take advantage of the fact
+that the extension has more elements than the base field. I intend to rewrite
+the code so that for a degree n extension code, PBC splits the hash into n
+parts and determine each polynomial coefficient from one ofthe pieces. At the
+moment every coefficient is the same and depends on the whole hash.
+
+This is harmless for the base field, because all the pairing types implemented
+so far use an integer mod ring as the base field, rather than an extension of
+some low characteristic field.
+
+*Zeroed memory*
+
+Unlike OpenSSL, there are no functions to zero memory locations used in
+sensitive computations. To some extent, one can use +element_random()+ to
+overwrite data.
+
+*PRNG determinism*
+
+On platforms without `/dev/urandom` PBC falls back on a deterministic
+pseudo-random number generator, except on Windows where it attempts to
+use the Microsoft Crypto API.
+
+Also, `/dev/urandom` differs from `/dev/random`. A quote from its manpage:
+
+____
+A  read  from  the  /dev/urandom device will not block waiting for more
+entropy.  As a result, if  there  is  not  sufficient  entropy  in  the
+entropy  pool,  the  returned  values are theoretically vulnerable to a
+cryptographic attack on the algorithms used by the  driver.   Knowledge
+of how to do this is not available in the current non-classified literature,
+but it is theoretically possible that such an attack may  exist.
+If this is a concern in your application, use /dev/random instead.
+____