diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'qemu/roms/u-boot/lib/tpm.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | qemu/roms/u-boot/lib/tpm.c | 914 |
1 files changed, 914 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/qemu/roms/u-boot/lib/tpm.c b/qemu/roms/u-boot/lib/tpm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..967c8e651 --- /dev/null +++ b/qemu/roms/u-boot/lib/tpm.c @@ -0,0 +1,914 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. + * Coypright (c) 2013 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + */ + +#include <common.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <sha1.h> +#include <tpm.h> +#include <asm/unaligned.h> + +/* Internal error of TPM command library */ +#define TPM_LIB_ERROR ((uint32_t)~0u) + +/* Useful constants */ +enum { + COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE = 256, + TPM_PUBEK_SIZE = 256, + TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH = 10, + TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH = 10, + PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH = 20, + DIGEST_LENGTH = 20, + TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH = 45, + TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH = 41, + /* some max lengths, valid for RSA keys <= 2048 bits */ + TPM_KEY12_MAX_LENGTH = 618, + TPM_PUBKEY_MAX_LENGTH = 288, +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS + +#ifndef CONFIG_SHA1 +#error "TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS require SHA1 to be configured, too" +#endif /* !CONFIG_SHA1 */ + +struct session_data { + int valid; + uint32_t handle; + uint8_t nonce_even[DIGEST_LENGTH]; + uint8_t nonce_odd[DIGEST_LENGTH]; +}; + +static struct session_data oiap_session = {0, }; + +#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS */ + +/** + * Pack data into a byte string. The data types are specified in + * the format string: 'b' means unsigned byte, 'w' unsigned word, + * 'd' unsigned double word, and 's' byte string. The data are a + * series of offsets and values (for type byte string there are also + * lengths). The data values are packed into the byte string + * sequentially, and so a latter value could over-write a former + * value. + * + * @param str output string + * @param size size of output string + * @param format format string + * @param ... data points + * @return 0 on success, non-0 on error + */ +int pack_byte_string(uint8_t *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + size_t offset = 0, length = 0; + uint8_t *data = NULL; + uint32_t value = 0; + + va_start(args, format); + for (; *format; format++) { + switch (*format) { + case 'b': + offset = va_arg(args, size_t); + value = va_arg(args, int); + length = 1; + break; + case 'w': + offset = va_arg(args, size_t); + value = va_arg(args, int); + length = 2; + break; + case 'd': + offset = va_arg(args, size_t); + value = va_arg(args, uint32_t); + length = 4; + break; + case 's': + offset = va_arg(args, size_t); + data = va_arg(args, uint8_t *); + length = va_arg(args, uint32_t); + break; + default: + debug("Couldn't recognize format string\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (offset + length > size) + return -1; + + switch (*format) { + case 'b': + str[offset] = value; + break; + case 'w': + put_unaligned_be16(value, str + offset); + break; + case 'd': + put_unaligned_be32(value, str + offset); + break; + case 's': + memcpy(str + offset, data, length); + break; + } + } + va_end(args); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Unpack data from a byte string. The data types are specified in + * the format string: 'b' means unsigned byte, 'w' unsigned word, + * 'd' unsigned double word, and 's' byte string. The data are a + * series of offsets and pointers (for type byte string there are also + * lengths). + * + * @param str output string + * @param size size of output string + * @param format format string + * @param ... data points + * @return 0 on success, non-0 on error + */ +int unpack_byte_string(const uint8_t *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + size_t offset = 0, length = 0; + uint8_t *ptr8 = NULL; + uint16_t *ptr16 = NULL; + uint32_t *ptr32 = NULL; + + va_start(args, format); + for (; *format; format++) { + switch (*format) { + case 'b': + offset = va_arg(args, size_t); + ptr8 = va_arg(args, uint8_t *); + length = 1; + break; + case 'w': + offset = va_arg(args, size_t); + ptr16 = va_arg(args, uint16_t *); + length = 2; + break; + case 'd': + offset = va_arg(args, size_t); + ptr32 = va_arg(args, uint32_t *); + length = 4; + break; + case 's': + offset = va_arg(args, size_t); + ptr8 = va_arg(args, uint8_t *); + length = va_arg(args, uint32_t); + break; + default: + debug("Couldn't recognize format string\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (offset + length > size) + return -1; + + switch (*format) { + case 'b': + *ptr8 = str[offset]; + break; + case 'w': + *ptr16 = get_unaligned_be16(str + offset); + break; + case 'd': + *ptr32 = get_unaligned_be32(str + offset); + break; + case 's': + memcpy(ptr8, str + offset, length); + break; + } + } + va_end(args); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Get TPM command size. + * + * @param command byte string of TPM command + * @return command size of the TPM command + */ +static uint32_t tpm_command_size(const void *command) +{ + const size_t command_size_offset = 2; + return get_unaligned_be32(command + command_size_offset); +} + +/** + * Get TPM response return code, which is one of TPM_RESULT values. + * + * @param response byte string of TPM response + * @return return code of the TPM response + */ +static uint32_t tpm_return_code(const void *response) +{ + const size_t return_code_offset = 6; + return get_unaligned_be32(response + return_code_offset); +} + +/** + * Send a TPM command and return response's return code, and optionally + * return response to caller. + * + * @param command byte string of TPM command + * @param response output buffer for TPM response, or NULL if the + * caller does not care about it + * @param size_ptr output buffer size (input parameter) and TPM + * response length (output parameter); this parameter + * is a bidirectional + * @return return code of the TPM response + */ +static uint32_t tpm_sendrecv_command(const void *command, + void *response, size_t *size_ptr) +{ + uint8_t response_buffer[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + size_t response_length; + uint32_t err; + + if (response) { + response_length = *size_ptr; + } else { + response = response_buffer; + response_length = sizeof(response_buffer); + } + err = tis_sendrecv(command, tpm_command_size(command), + response, &response_length); + if (err) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + if (size_ptr) + *size_ptr = response_length; + + return tpm_return_code(response); +} + +uint32_t tpm_init(void) +{ + uint32_t err; + + err = tis_init(); + if (err) + return err; + + return tis_open(); +} + +uint32_t tpm_startup(enum tpm_startup_type mode) +{ + const uint8_t command[12] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x99, 0x0, 0x0, + }; + const size_t mode_offset = 10; + uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + + if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sw", + 0, command, sizeof(command), + mode_offset, mode)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, NULL, NULL); +} + +uint32_t tpm_self_test_full(void) +{ + const uint8_t command[10] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x50, + }; + return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL); +} + +uint32_t tpm_continue_self_test(void) +{ + const uint8_t command[10] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x53, + }; + return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL); +} + +uint32_t tpm_nv_define_space(uint32_t index, uint32_t perm, uint32_t size) +{ + const uint8_t command[101] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */ + 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, /* parameter size */ + 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcc, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */ + /* TPM_NV_DATA_PUBLIC->... */ + 0x0, 0x18, /* ...->TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG */ + 0, 0, 0, 0, /* ...->TPM_NV_INDEX */ + /* TPM_NV_DATA_PUBLIC->TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT */ + 0x0, 0x3, + 0, 0, 0, + 0x1f, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + /* TPM_NV_DATA_PUBLIC->TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT */ + 0x0, 0x3, + 0, 0, 0, + 0x1f, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + /* TPM_NV_ATTRIBUTES->... */ + 0x0, 0x17, /* ...->TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG */ + 0, 0, 0, 0, /* ...->attributes */ + /* End of TPM_NV_ATTRIBUTES */ + 0, /* bReadSTClear */ + 0, /* bWriteSTClear */ + 0, /* bWriteDefine */ + 0, 0, 0, 0, /* size */ + }; + const size_t index_offset = 12; + const size_t perm_offset = 70; + const size_t size_offset = 77; + uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + + if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sddd", + 0, command, sizeof(command), + index_offset, index, + perm_offset, perm, + size_offset, size)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, NULL, NULL); +} + +uint32_t tpm_nv_read_value(uint32_t index, void *data, uint32_t count) +{ + const uint8_t command[22] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcf, + }; + const size_t index_offset = 10; + const size_t length_offset = 18; + const size_t data_size_offset = 10; + const size_t data_offset = 14; + uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + size_t response_length = sizeof(response); + uint32_t data_size; + uint32_t err; + + if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sdd", + 0, command, sizeof(command), + index_offset, index, + length_offset, count)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length); + if (err) + return err; + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d", + data_size_offset, &data_size)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + if (data_size > count) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s", + data_offset, data, data_size)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return 0; +} + +uint32_t tpm_nv_write_value(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length) +{ + const uint8_t command[256] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcd, + }; + const size_t command_size_offset = 2; + const size_t index_offset = 10; + const size_t length_offset = 18; + const size_t data_offset = 22; + const size_t write_info_size = 12; + const uint32_t total_length = + TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + write_info_size + length; + uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + size_t response_length = sizeof(response); + uint32_t err; + + if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sddds", + 0, command, sizeof(command), + command_size_offset, total_length, + index_offset, index, + length_offset, length, + data_offset, data, length)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length); + if (err) + return err; + + return 0; +} + +uint32_t tpm_extend(uint32_t index, const void *in_digest, void *out_digest) +{ + const uint8_t command[34] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x22, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x14, + }; + const size_t index_offset = 10; + const size_t in_digest_offset = 14; + const size_t out_digest_offset = 10; + uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + uint8_t response[TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + size_t response_length = sizeof(response); + uint32_t err; + + if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sds", + 0, command, sizeof(command), + index_offset, index, + in_digest_offset, in_digest, + PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length); + if (err) + return err; + + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s", + out_digest_offset, out_digest, + PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return 0; +} + +uint32_t tpm_pcr_read(uint32_t index, void *data, size_t count) +{ + const uint8_t command[14] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xe, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x15, + }; + const size_t index_offset = 10; + const size_t out_digest_offset = 10; + uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + size_t response_length = sizeof(response); + uint32_t err; + + if (count < PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sd", + 0, command, sizeof(command), + index_offset, index)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length); + if (err) + return err; + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s", + out_digest_offset, data, PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return 0; +} + +uint32_t tpm_tsc_physical_presence(uint16_t presence) +{ + const uint8_t command[12] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, + }; + const size_t presence_offset = 10; + uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + + if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sw", + 0, command, sizeof(command), + presence_offset, presence)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, NULL, NULL); +} + +uint32_t tpm_read_pubek(void *data, size_t count) +{ + const uint8_t command[30] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1e, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x7c, + }; + const size_t response_size_offset = 2; + const size_t data_offset = 10; + const size_t header_and_checksum_size = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + 20; + uint8_t response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE + TPM_PUBEK_SIZE]; + size_t response_length = sizeof(response); + uint32_t data_size; + uint32_t err; + + err = tpm_sendrecv_command(command, response, &response_length); + if (err) + return err; + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d", + response_size_offset, &data_size)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + if (data_size < header_and_checksum_size) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + data_size -= header_and_checksum_size; + if (data_size > count) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s", + data_offset, data, data_size)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return 0; +} + +uint32_t tpm_force_clear(void) +{ + const uint8_t command[10] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x5d, + }; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL); +} + +uint32_t tpm_physical_enable(void) +{ + const uint8_t command[10] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x6f, + }; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL); +} + +uint32_t tpm_physical_disable(void) +{ + const uint8_t command[10] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x70, + }; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL); +} + +uint32_t tpm_physical_set_deactivated(uint8_t state) +{ + const uint8_t command[11] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xb, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x72, + }; + const size_t state_offset = 10; + uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + + if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sb", + 0, command, sizeof(command), + state_offset, state)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, NULL, NULL); +} + +uint32_t tpm_get_capability(uint32_t cap_area, uint32_t sub_cap, + void *cap, size_t count) +{ + const uint8_t command[22] = { + 0x0, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */ + 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, /* parameter size */ + 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */ + 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, /* TPM_CAPABILITY_AREA */ + 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, /* subcap size */ + 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, /* subcap value */ + }; + const size_t cap_area_offset = 10; + const size_t sub_cap_offset = 18; + const size_t cap_offset = 14; + const size_t cap_size_offset = 10; + uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + size_t response_length = sizeof(response); + uint32_t cap_size; + uint32_t err; + + if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sdd", + 0, command, sizeof(command), + cap_area_offset, cap_area, + sub_cap_offset, sub_cap)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length); + if (err) + return err; + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d", + cap_size_offset, &cap_size)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + if (cap_size > response_length || cap_size > count) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s", + cap_offset, cap, cap_size)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS + +/** + * Fill an authentication block in a request. + * This func can create the first as well as the second auth block (for + * double authorized commands). + * + * @param request pointer to the request (w/ uninitialised auth data) + * @param request_len0 length of the request without auth data + * @param handles_len length of the handles area in request + * @param auth_session pointer to the (valid) auth session to be used + * @param request_auth pointer to the auth block of the request to be filled + * @param auth authentication data (HMAC key) + */ +static uint32_t create_request_auth(const void *request, size_t request_len0, + size_t handles_len, + struct session_data *auth_session, + void *request_auth, const void *auth) +{ + uint8_t hmac_data[DIGEST_LENGTH * 3 + 1]; + sha1_context hash_ctx; + const size_t command_code_offset = 6; + const size_t auth_nonce_odd_offset = 4; + const size_t auth_continue_offset = 24; + const size_t auth_auth_offset = 25; + + if (!auth_session || !auth_session->valid) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + sha1_starts(&hash_ctx); + sha1_update(&hash_ctx, request + command_code_offset, 4); + if (request_len0 > TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len) + sha1_update(&hash_ctx, + request + TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len, + request_len0 - TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + - handles_len); + sha1_finish(&hash_ctx, hmac_data); + + sha1_starts(&hash_ctx); + sha1_update(&hash_ctx, auth_session->nonce_odd, DIGEST_LENGTH); + sha1_update(&hash_ctx, hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data)); + sha1_finish(&hash_ctx, auth_session->nonce_odd); + + if (pack_byte_string(request_auth, TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH, "dsb", + 0, auth_session->handle, + auth_nonce_odd_offset, auth_session->nonce_odd, + DIGEST_LENGTH, + auth_continue_offset, 1)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + if (pack_byte_string(hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data), "ss", + DIGEST_LENGTH, + auth_session->nonce_even, + DIGEST_LENGTH, + 2 * DIGEST_LENGTH, + request_auth + auth_nonce_odd_offset, + DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + sha1_hmac(auth, DIGEST_LENGTH, hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data), + request_auth + auth_auth_offset); + + return TPM_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + * Verify an authentication block in a response. + * Since this func updates the nonce_even in the session data it has to be + * called when receiving a succesfull AUTH response. + * This func can verify the first as well as the second auth block (for + * double authorized commands). + * + * @param command_code command code of the request + * @param response pointer to the request (w/ uninitialised auth data) + * @param handles_len length of the handles area in response + * @param auth_session pointer to the (valid) auth session to be used + * @param response_auth pointer to the auth block of the response to be verified + * @param auth authentication data (HMAC key) + */ +static uint32_t verify_response_auth(uint32_t command_code, + const void *response, size_t response_len0, + size_t handles_len, + struct session_data *auth_session, + const void *response_auth, const void *auth) +{ + uint8_t hmac_data[DIGEST_LENGTH * 3 + 1]; + uint8_t computed_auth[DIGEST_LENGTH]; + sha1_context hash_ctx; + const size_t return_code_offset = 6; + const size_t auth_continue_offset = 20; + const size_t auth_auth_offset = 21; + uint8_t auth_continue; + + if (!auth_session || !auth_session->valid) + return TPM_AUTHFAIL; + if (pack_byte_string(hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data), "d", + 0, command_code)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + if (response_len0 < TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + sha1_starts(&hash_ctx); + sha1_update(&hash_ctx, response + return_code_offset, 4); + sha1_update(&hash_ctx, hmac_data, 4); + if (response_len0 > TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len) + sha1_update(&hash_ctx, + response + TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len, + response_len0 - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + - handles_len); + sha1_finish(&hash_ctx, hmac_data); + + memcpy(auth_session->nonce_even, response_auth, DIGEST_LENGTH); + auth_continue = ((uint8_t *)response_auth)[auth_continue_offset]; + if (pack_byte_string(hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data), "ssb", + DIGEST_LENGTH, + response_auth, + DIGEST_LENGTH, + 2 * DIGEST_LENGTH, + auth_session->nonce_odd, + DIGEST_LENGTH, + 3 * DIGEST_LENGTH, + auth_continue)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + sha1_hmac(auth, DIGEST_LENGTH, hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data), + computed_auth); + + if (memcmp(computed_auth, response_auth + auth_auth_offset, + DIGEST_LENGTH)) + return TPM_AUTHFAIL; + + return TPM_SUCCESS; +} + + +uint32_t tpm_terminate_auth_session(uint32_t auth_handle) +{ + const uint8_t command[18] = { + 0x00, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parameter size */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xba, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* TPM_HANDLE */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* TPM_RESSOURCE_TYPE */ + }; + const size_t req_handle_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH; + uint8_t request[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + + if (pack_byte_string(request, sizeof(request), "sd", + 0, command, sizeof(command), + req_handle_offset, auth_handle)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + if (oiap_session.valid && oiap_session.handle == auth_handle) + oiap_session.valid = 0; + + return tpm_sendrecv_command(request, NULL, NULL); +} + +uint32_t tpm_end_oiap(void) +{ + uint32_t err = TPM_SUCCESS; + if (oiap_session.valid) + err = tpm_terminate_auth_session(oiap_session.handle); + return err; +} + +uint32_t tpm_oiap(uint32_t *auth_handle) +{ + const uint8_t command[10] = { + 0x00, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, /* parameter size */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */ + }; + const size_t res_auth_handle_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH; + const size_t res_nonce_even_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + 4; + uint8_t response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + size_t response_length = sizeof(response); + uint32_t err; + + if (oiap_session.valid) + tpm_terminate_auth_session(oiap_session.handle); + + err = tpm_sendrecv_command(command, response, &response_length); + if (err) + return err; + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "ds", + res_auth_handle_offset, &oiap_session.handle, + res_nonce_even_offset, &oiap_session.nonce_even, + (uint32_t)DIGEST_LENGTH)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + oiap_session.valid = 1; + if (auth_handle) + *auth_handle = oiap_session.handle; + return 0; +} + +uint32_t tpm_load_key2_oiap(uint32_t parent_handle, + const void *key, size_t key_length, + const void *parent_key_usage_auth, + uint32_t *key_handle) +{ + const uint8_t command[14] = { + 0x00, 0xc2, /* TPM_TAG */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parameter size */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parent handle */ + }; + const size_t req_size_offset = 2; + const size_t req_parent_handle_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH; + const size_t req_key_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + 4; + const size_t res_handle_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH; + uint8_t request[sizeof(command) + TPM_KEY12_MAX_LENGTH + + TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH]; + uint8_t response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; + size_t response_length = sizeof(response); + uint32_t err; + + if (!oiap_session.valid) { + err = tpm_oiap(NULL); + if (err) + return err; + } + if (pack_byte_string(request, sizeof(request), "sdds", + 0, command, sizeof(command), + req_size_offset, + sizeof(command) + key_length + + TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH, + req_parent_handle_offset, parent_handle, + req_key_offset, key, key_length + )) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + + err = create_request_auth(request, sizeof(command) + key_length, 4, + &oiap_session, + request + sizeof(command) + key_length, + parent_key_usage_auth); + if (err) + return err; + err = tpm_sendrecv_command(request, response, &response_length); + if (err) { + if (err == TPM_AUTHFAIL) + oiap_session.valid = 0; + return err; + } + + err = verify_response_auth(0x00000041, response, + response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH, + 4, &oiap_session, + response + response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH, + parent_key_usage_auth); + if (err) + return err; + + if (key_handle) { + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d", + res_handle_offset, key_handle)) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + } + + return 0; +} + +uint32_t tpm_get_pub_key_oiap(uint32_t key_handle, const void *usage_auth, + void *pubkey, size_t *pubkey_len) +{ + const uint8_t command[14] = { + 0x00, 0xc2, /* TPM_TAG */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parameter size */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x21, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* key handle */ + }; + const size_t req_size_offset = 2; + const size_t req_key_handle_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH; + const size_t res_pubkey_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH; + uint8_t request[sizeof(command) + TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH]; + uint8_t response[TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + TPM_PUBKEY_MAX_LENGTH + + TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH]; + size_t response_length = sizeof(response); + uint32_t err; + + if (!oiap_session.valid) { + err = tpm_oiap(NULL); + if (err) + return err; + } + if (pack_byte_string(request, sizeof(request), "sdd", + 0, command, sizeof(command), + req_size_offset, + (uint32_t)(sizeof(command) + + TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH), + req_key_handle_offset, key_handle + )) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + err = create_request_auth(request, sizeof(command), 4, &oiap_session, + request + sizeof(command), usage_auth); + if (err) + return err; + err = tpm_sendrecv_command(request, response, &response_length); + if (err) { + if (err == TPM_AUTHFAIL) + oiap_session.valid = 0; + return err; + } + err = verify_response_auth(0x00000021, response, + response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH, + 0, &oiap_session, + response + response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH, + usage_auth); + if (err) + return err; + + if (pubkey) { + if ((response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH) > *pubkey_len) + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; + *pubkey_len = response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH; + memcpy(pubkey, response + res_pubkey_offset, + response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH); + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS */ |