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Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/include/linux/security.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/include/linux/security.h | 3253 |
1 files changed, 3253 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/include/linux/security.h b/kernel/include/linux/security.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..18264ea9e --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/include/linux/security.h @@ -0,0 +1,3253 @@ +/* + * Linux Security plug + * + * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com> + * Copyright (C) 2001 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> + * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com> + * Copyright (C) 2001 James Morris <jmorris@intercode.com.au> + * Copyright (C) 2001 Silicon Graphics, Inc. (Trust Technology Group) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * Due to this file being licensed under the GPL there is controversy over + * whether this permits you to write a module that #includes this file + * without placing your module under the GPL. Please consult a lawyer for + * advice before doing this. + * + */ + +#ifndef __LINUX_SECURITY_H +#define __LINUX_SECURITY_H + +#include <linux/key.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +struct linux_binprm; +struct cred; +struct rlimit; +struct siginfo; +struct sem_array; +struct sembuf; +struct kern_ipc_perm; +struct audit_context; +struct super_block; +struct inode; +struct dentry; +struct file; +struct vfsmount; +struct path; +struct qstr; +struct nameidata; +struct iattr; +struct fown_struct; +struct file_operations; +struct shmid_kernel; +struct msg_msg; +struct msg_queue; +struct xattr; +struct xfrm_sec_ctx; +struct mm_struct; + +/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */ +#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10 + +/* If capable should audit the security request */ +#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0 +#define SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT 1 + +/* LSM Agnostic defines for sb_set_mnt_opts */ +#define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS 1 + +struct ctl_table; +struct audit_krule; +struct user_namespace; +struct timezone; + +/* + * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used + * as the default capabilities functions + */ +extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, int audit); +extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz); +extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode); +extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent); +extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted); +extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + const kernel_cap_t *effective, + const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + const kernel_cap_t *permitted); +extern int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +extern int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags); +extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); +extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry); +extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry); +extern int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr); +extern int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags); +extern int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags); +extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); +extern int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p); +extern int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); +extern int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice); +extern int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages); + +struct msghdr; +struct sk_buff; +struct sock; +struct sockaddr; +struct socket; +struct flowi; +struct dst_entry; +struct xfrm_selector; +struct xfrm_policy; +struct xfrm_state; +struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx; +struct seq_file; + +extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); + +void reset_security_ops(void); + +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU +extern unsigned long mmap_min_addr; +extern unsigned long dac_mmap_min_addr; +#else +#define mmap_min_addr 0UL +#define dac_mmap_min_addr 0UL +#endif + +/* + * Values used in the task_security_ops calls + */ +/* setuid or setgid, id0 == uid or gid */ +#define LSM_SETID_ID 1 + +/* setreuid or setregid, id0 == real, id1 == eff */ +#define LSM_SETID_RE 2 + +/* setresuid or setresgid, id0 == real, id1 == eff, uid2 == saved */ +#define LSM_SETID_RES 4 + +/* setfsuid or setfsgid, id0 == fsuid or fsgid */ +#define LSM_SETID_FS 8 + +/* forward declares to avoid warnings */ +struct sched_param; +struct request_sock; + +/* bprm->unsafe reasons */ +#define LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE 1 +#define LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE 2 +#define LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP 4 +#define LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS 8 + +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU +extern int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); +#endif + +/* security_inode_init_security callback function to write xattrs */ +typedef int (*initxattrs) (struct inode *inode, + const struct xattr *xattr_array, void *fs_data); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + +struct security_mnt_opts { + char **mnt_opts; + int *mnt_opts_flags; + int num_mnt_opts; +}; + +static inline void security_init_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) +{ + opts->mnt_opts = NULL; + opts->mnt_opts_flags = NULL; + opts->num_mnt_opts = 0; +} + +static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) +{ + int i; + if (opts->mnt_opts) + for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) + kfree(opts->mnt_opts[i]); + kfree(opts->mnt_opts); + opts->mnt_opts = NULL; + kfree(opts->mnt_opts_flags); + opts->mnt_opts_flags = NULL; + opts->num_mnt_opts = 0; +} + +/** + * struct security_operations - main security structure + * + * Security module identifier. + * + * @name: + * A string that acts as a unique identifier for the LSM with max number + * of characters = SECURITY_NAME_MAX. + * + * Security hooks for program execution operations. + * + * @bprm_set_creds: + * Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based + * on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the apply_creds + * hook. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for + * transitions between security domains). + * This hook may be called multiple times during a single execve, e.g. for + * interpreters. The hook can tell whether it has already been called by + * checking to see if @bprm->security is non-NULL. If so, then the hook + * may decide either to retain the security information saved earlier or + * to replace it. + * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. + * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. + * @bprm_check_security: + * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will + * begin. It allows a check the @bprm->security value which is set in the + * preceding set_creds call. The primary difference from set_creds is + * that the argv list and envp list are reliably available in @bprm. This + * hook may be called multiple times during a single execve; and in each + * pass set_creds is called first. + * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. + * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. + * @bprm_committing_creds: + * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being + * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials + * pointed to by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by + * the bprm_set_creds hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. + * This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such + * as closing open file descriptors to which access will no longer be + * granted when the attributes are changed. This is called immediately + * before commit_creds(). + * @bprm_committed_creds: + * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a + * process being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials + * have, by this point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the + * linux_binprm structure. This hook is a good place to perform state + * changes on the process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal + * state. This is called immediately after commit_creds(). + * @bprm_secureexec: + * Return a boolean value (0 or 1) indicating whether a "secure exec" + * is required. The flag is passed in the auxiliary table + * on the initial stack to the ELF interpreter to indicate whether libc + * should enable secure mode. + * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. + * + * Security hooks for filesystem operations. + * + * @sb_alloc_security: + * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field. + * The s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is + * allocated. + * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. + * Return 0 if operation was successful. + * @sb_free_security: + * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field. + * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. + * @sb_statfs: + * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt + * mountpoint. + * @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @sb_mount: + * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on + * the mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name + * identifies a device if the file system type requires a device. For a + * remount (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a + * loopback/bind mount (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the + * pathname of the object being mounted. + * @dev_name contains the name for object being mounted. + * @path contains the path for mount point object. + * @type contains the filesystem type. + * @flags contains the mount flags. + * @data contains the filesystem-specific data. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @sb_copy_data: + * Allow mount option data to be copied prior to parsing by the filesystem, + * so that the security module can extract security-specific mount + * options cleanly (a filesystem may modify the data e.g. with strsep()). + * This also allows the original mount data to be stripped of security- + * specific options to avoid having to make filesystems aware of them. + * @type the type of filesystem being mounted. + * @orig the original mount data copied from userspace. + * @copy copied data which will be passed to the security module. + * Returns 0 if the copy was successful. + * @sb_remount: + * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes + * are being made to those options. + * @sb superblock being remounted + * @data contains the filesystem-specific data. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @sb_umount: + * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted. + * @mnt contains the mounted file system. + * @flags contains the unmount flags, e.g. MNT_FORCE. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @sb_pivotroot: + * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem. + * @old_path contains the path for the new location of the current root (put_old). + * @new_path contains the path for the new root (new_root). + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @sb_set_mnt_opts: + * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock + * @sb the superblock to set security mount options for + * @opts binary data structure containing all lsm mount data + * @sb_clone_mnt_opts: + * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another + * @oldsb old superblock which contain information to clone + * @newsb new superblock which needs filled in + * @sb_parse_opts_str: + * Parse a string of security data filling in the opts structure + * @options string containing all mount options known by the LSM + * @opts binary data structure usable by the LSM + * @dentry_init_security: + * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available + * since NFSv4 has no label backed by an EA anyway. + * @dentry dentry to use in calculating the context. + * @mode mode used to determine resource type. + * @name name of the last path component used to create file + * @ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in. + * @ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context. + * + * + * Security hooks for inode operations. + * + * @inode_alloc_security: + * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The + * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is + * allocated. + * @inode contains the inode structure. + * Return 0 if operation was successful. + * @inode_free_security: + * @inode contains the inode structure. + * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to + * NULL. + * @inode_init_security: + * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly + * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. + * This hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation + * transaction and provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike + * the post_create/mkdir/... hooks called by the VFS. The hook function + * is expected to allocate the name and value via kmalloc, with the caller + * being responsible for calling kfree after using them. + * If the security module does not use security attributes or does + * not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode, + * then it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. + * @inode contains the inode structure of the newly created inode. + * @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory. + * @qstr contains the last path component of the new object + * @name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux). + * @value will be set to the allocated attribute value. + * @len will be set to the length of the value. + * Returns 0 if @name and @value have been successfully set, + * -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is needed, or + * -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure. + * @inode_create: + * Check permission to create a regular file. + * @dir contains inode structure of the parent of the new file. + * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file to be created. + * @mode contains the file mode of the file to be created. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_link: + * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. + * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link to the file. + * @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory of the new link. + * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @path_link: + * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. + * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link + * to the file. + * @new_dir contains the path structure of the parent directory of + * the new link. + * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_unlink: + * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. + * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the file. + * @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @path_unlink: + * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. + * @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of the file. + * @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_symlink: + * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. + * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the symbolic link. + * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link. + * @old_name contains the pathname of file. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @path_symlink: + * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. + * @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of + * the symbolic link. + * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link. + * @old_name contains the pathname of file. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_mkdir: + * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory + * associated with inode structure @dir. + * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory to be created. + * @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory. + * @mode contains the mode of new directory. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @path_mkdir: + * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory + * associated with path structure @path. + * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory + * to be created. + * @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory. + * @mode contains the mode of new directory. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_rmdir: + * Check the permission to remove a directory. + * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory to be removed. + * @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @path_rmdir: + * Check the permission to remove a directory. + * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory to be + * removed. + * @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_mknod: + * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo + * file created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation + * is being done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called + * and not this hook. + * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the new file. + * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file. + * @mode contains the mode of the new file. + * @dev contains the device number. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @path_mknod: + * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called + * even if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. + * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the new file. + * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file. + * @mode contains the mode of the new file. + * @dev contains the undecoded device number. Use new_decode_dev() to get + * the decoded device number. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_rename: + * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. + * @old_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the old link. + * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link. + * @new_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the new link. + * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @path_rename: + * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. + * @old_dir contains the path structure for parent of the old link. + * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link. + * @new_dir contains the path structure for parent of the new link. + * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @path_chmod: + * Check for permission to change DAC's permission of a file or directory. + * @dentry contains the dentry structure. + * @mnt contains the vfsmnt structure. + * @mode contains DAC's mode. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @path_chown: + * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory. + * @path contains the path structure. + * @uid contains new owner's ID. + * @gid contains new group's ID. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @path_chroot: + * Check for permission to change root directory. + * @path contains the path structure. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_readlink: + * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. + * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_follow_link: + * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname. + * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the link. + * @nd contains the nameidata structure for the parent directory. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_permission: + * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the + * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to + * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks. + * Notice that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many + * other operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is + * called when the actual read/write operations are performed. + * @inode contains the inode structure to check. + * @mask contains the permission mask. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_setattr: + * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel + * call to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever + * file attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod + * operations, transferring disk quotas, etc). + * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file. + * @attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @path_truncate: + * Check permission before truncating a file. + * @path contains the path structure for the file. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_getattr: + * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. + * @mnt is the vfsmount where the dentry was looked up + * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_setxattr: + * Check permission before setting the extended attributes + * @value identified by @name for @dentry. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_post_setxattr: + * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation. + * @value identified by @name for @dentry. + * @inode_getxattr: + * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes + * identified by @name for @dentry. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_listxattr: + * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute + * names for @dentry. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_removexattr: + * Check permission before removing the extended attribute + * identified by @name for @dentry. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_getsecurity: + * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the + * security label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that + * @name is the remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix + * has been removed. @alloc is used to specify of the call should return a + * value via the buffer or just the value length Return size of buffer on + * success. + * @inode_setsecurity: + * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the + * extended attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the + * @value in bytes. @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0. + * Note that @name is the remainder of the attribute name after the + * security. prefix has been removed. + * Return 0 on success. + * @inode_listsecurity: + * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels + * associated with @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer + * is specified by @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request + * the size of the buffer required. + * Returns number of bytes used/required on success. + * @inode_need_killpriv: + * Called when an inode has been changed. + * @dentry is the dentry being changed. + * Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation. + * Return 0 if inode_killpriv does not need to be called. + * Return >0 if inode_killpriv does need to be called. + * @inode_killpriv: + * The setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels. + * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held. + * @dentry is the dentry being changed. + * Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation + * causing setuid bit removal is failed. + * @inode_getsecid: + * Get the secid associated with the node. + * @inode contains a pointer to the inode. + * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved. + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. + * + * Security hooks for file operations + * + * @file_permission: + * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is + * called by various operations that read or write files. A security + * module can use this hook to perform additional checking on these + * operations, e.g. to revalidate permissions on use to support privilege + * bracketing or policy changes. Notice that this hook is used when the + * actual read/write operations are performed, whereas the + * inode_security_ops hook is called when a file is opened (as well as + * many other operations). + * Caveat: Although this hook can be used to revalidate permissions for + * various system call operations that read or write files, it does not + * address the revalidation of permissions for memory-mapped files. + * Security modules must handle this separately if they need such + * revalidation. + * @file contains the file structure being accessed. + * @mask contains the requested permissions. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @file_alloc_security: + * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field. + * The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first + * created. + * @file contains the file structure to secure. + * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. + * @file_free_security: + * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security. + * @file contains the file structure being modified. + * @file_ioctl: + * @file contains the file structure. + * @cmd contains the operation to perform. + * @arg contains the operational arguments. + * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg + * sometimes represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a + * simple integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it + * should never be used by the security module. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @mmap_addr : + * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr. + * @addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @mmap_file : + * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. + * if mapping anonymous memory. + * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL). + * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. + * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. + * @flags contains the operational flags. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @file_mprotect: + * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions. + * @vma contains the memory region to modify. + * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. + * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @file_lock: + * Check permission before performing file locking operations. + * Note: this hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks. + * @file contains the file structure. + * @cmd contains the posix-translated lock operation to perform + * (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK). + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @file_fcntl: + * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd + * from being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes + * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple + * integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should + * never be used by the security module. + * @file contains the file structure. + * @cmd contains the operation to be performed. + * @arg contains the operational arguments. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @file_set_fowner: + * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in + * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook. + * @file contains the file structure to update. + * Return 0 on success. + * @file_send_sigiotask: + * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the + * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt. + * Note that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a + * struct file, so the file structure (and associated security information) + * can always be obtained: + * container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner) + * @tsk contains the structure of task receiving signal. + * @fown contains the file owner information. + * @sig is the signal that will be sent. When 0, kernel sends SIGIO. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @file_receive: + * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process + * to receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC. + * @file contains the file structure being received. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @file_open + * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon + * file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed + * since inode_permission. + * + * Security hooks for task operations. + * + * @task_create: + * Check permission before creating a child process. See the clone(2) + * manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags. + * @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_free: + * @task task being freed + * Handle release of task-related resources. (Note that this can be called + * from interrupt context.) + * @cred_alloc_blank: + * @cred points to the credentials. + * @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations. + * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that + * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM. + * @cred_free: + * @cred points to the credentials. + * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials. + * @cred_prepare: + * @new points to the new credentials. + * @old points to the original credentials. + * @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations. + * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set. + * @cred_transfer: + * @new points to the new credentials. + * @old points to the original credentials. + * Transfer data from original creds to new creds + * @kernel_act_as: + * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). + * @new points to the credentials to be modified. + * @secid specifies the security ID to be set + * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid. + * Return 0 if successful. + * @kernel_create_files_as: + * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as + * the objective context of the specified inode. + * @new points to the credentials to be modified. + * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference. + * The current task must be the one that nominated @inode. + * Return 0 if successful. + * @kernel_fw_from_file: + * Load firmware from userspace (not called for built-in firmware). + * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing + * the firmware to load. This argument will be NULL if the firmware + * was loaded via the uevent-triggered blob-based interface exposed + * by CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER. + * @buf pointer to buffer containing firmware contents. + * @size length of the firmware contents. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @kernel_module_request: + * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for + * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. + * @kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel + * Return 0 if successful. + * @kernel_module_from_file: + * Load a kernel module from userspace. + * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing + * the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob, + * this argument will be NULL. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_fix_setuid: + * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user + * identity attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter + * indicates which of the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If + * @new is the set of credentials that will be installed. Modifications + * should be made to this rather than to @current->cred. + * @old is the set of credentials that are being replaces + * @flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values. + * Return 0 on success. + * @task_setpgid: + * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the + * process @p to @pgid. + * @p contains the task_struct for process being modified. + * @pgid contains the new pgid. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_getpgid: + * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the + * process @p. + * @p contains the task_struct for the process. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_getsid: + * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process + * @p. + * @p contains the task_struct for the process. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_getsecid: + * Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p. + * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid. + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. + * + * @task_setnice: + * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice. + * @p contains the task_struct of process. + * @nice contains the new nice value. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_setioprio + * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio. + * @p contains the task_struct of process. + * @ioprio contains the new ioprio value + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_getioprio + * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p. + * @p contains the task_struct of process. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_setrlimit: + * Check permission before setting the resource limits of the current + * process for @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can + * be examined by dereferencing (current->signal->rlim + resource). + * @resource contains the resource whose limit is being set. + * @new_rlim contains the new limits for @resource. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_setscheduler: + * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of + * process @p based on @policy and @lp. + * @p contains the task_struct for process. + * @policy contains the scheduling policy. + * @lp contains the scheduling parameters. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_getscheduler: + * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process + * @p. + * @p contains the task_struct for process. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_movememory + * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p. + * @p contains the task_struct for process. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_kill: + * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL, + * the constant 1, or a pointer to a siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or + * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming + * from the kernel and should typically be permitted. + * SIGIO signals are handled separately by the send_sigiotask hook in + * file_security_ops. + * @p contains the task_struct for process. + * @info contains the signal information. + * @sig contains the signal value. + * @secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_wait: + * Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p + * and collect its status information. + * @p contains the task_struct for process. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_prctl: + * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the + * current process. + * @option contains the operation. + * @arg2 contains a argument. + * @arg3 contains a argument. + * @arg4 contains a argument. + * @arg5 contains a argument. + * Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value to + * cause prctl() to return immediately with that value. + * @task_to_inode: + * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's + * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes. + * @p contains the task_struct for the task. + * @inode contains the inode structure for the inode. + * + * Security hooks for Netlink messaging. + * + * @netlink_send: + * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission + * checking can be performed when the message is processed. The security + * information can be saved using the eff_cap field of the + * netlink_skb_parms structure. Also may be used to provide fine + * grained control over message transmission. + * @sk associated sock of task sending the message. + * @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message. + * Return 0 if the information was successfully saved and message + * is allowed to be transmitted. + * + * Security hooks for Unix domain networking. + * + * @unix_stream_connect: + * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection + * between @sock and @other. + * @sock contains the sock structure. + * @other contains the peer sock structure. + * @newsk contains the new sock structure. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @unix_may_send: + * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to + * @other. + * @sock contains the socket structure. + * @other contains the peer socket structure. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * + * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because + * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix + * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name + * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod + * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to + * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient + * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible + * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target + * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. + * + * Security hooks for socket operations. + * + * @socket_create: + * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket. + * @family contains the requested protocol family. + * @type contains the requested communications type. + * @protocol contains the requested protocol. + * @kern set to 1 if a kernel socket. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @socket_post_create: + * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security + * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the + * socket structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored + * in the associated inode. Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will + * allocate and and attach security information to + * sock->inode->i_security. This hook may be used to update the + * sock->inode->i_security field with additional information that wasn't + * available when the inode was allocated. + * @sock contains the newly created socket structure. + * @family contains the requested protocol family. + * @type contains the requested communications type. + * @protocol contains the requested protocol. + * @kern set to 1 if a kernel socket. + * @socket_bind: + * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is + * performed and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the + * @address parameter. + * @sock contains the socket structure. + * @address contains the address to bind to. + * @addrlen contains the length of address. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @socket_connect: + * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation + * attempts to connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address. + * @sock contains the socket structure. + * @address contains the address of remote endpoint. + * @addrlen contains the length of address. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @socket_listen: + * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation. + * @sock contains the socket structure. + * @backlog contains the maximum length for the pending connection queue. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @socket_accept: + * Check permission before accepting a new connection. Note that the new + * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it, + * but the accept operation has not actually been performed. + * @sock contains the listening socket structure. + * @newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @socket_sendmsg: + * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket. + * @sock contains the socket structure. + * @msg contains the message to be transmitted. + * @size contains the size of message. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @socket_recvmsg: + * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket. + * @sock contains the socket structure. + * @msg contains the message structure. + * @size contains the size of message structure. + * @flags contains the operational flags. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @socket_getsockname: + * Check permission before the local address (name) of the socket object + * @sock is retrieved. + * @sock contains the socket structure. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @socket_getpeername: + * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object + * @sock is retrieved. + * @sock contains the socket structure. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @socket_getsockopt: + * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket + * @sock. + * @sock contains the socket structure. + * @level contains the protocol level to retrieve option from. + * @optname contains the name of option to retrieve. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @socket_setsockopt: + * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket + * @sock. + * @sock contains the socket structure. + * @level contains the protocol level to set options for. + * @optname contains the name of the option to set. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @socket_shutdown: + * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket + * @sock is shut down. + * @sock contains the socket structure. + * @how contains the flag indicating how future sends and receives are handled. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @socket_sock_rcv_skb: + * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct + * from Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the + * incoming sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk. + * Must not sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks. + * @sk contains the sock (not socket) associated with the incoming sk_buff. + * @skb contains the incoming network data. + * @socket_getpeersec_stream: + * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security + * state for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt + * SO_GETPEERSEC. For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the + * socket is associated with an ipsec SA. + * @sock is the local socket. + * @optval userspace memory where the security state is to be copied. + * @optlen userspace int where the module should copy the actual length + * of the security state. + * @len as input is the maximum length to copy to userspace provided + * by the caller. + * Return 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return + * values. + * @socket_getpeersec_dgram: + * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security + * state for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via + * getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated + * the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the + * security state returned by this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY + * ancillary message type. + * @skb is the skbuff for the packet being queried + * @secdata is a pointer to a buffer in which to copy the security data + * @seclen is the maximum length for @secdata + * Return 0 on success, error on failure. + * @sk_alloc_security: + * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field, + * which is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets. + * @sk_free_security: + * Deallocate security structure. + * @sk_clone_security: + * Clone/copy security structure. + * @sk_getsecid: + * Retrieve the LSM-specific secid for the sock to enable caching of network + * authorizations. + * @sock_graft: + * Sets the socket's isec sid to the sock's sid. + * @inet_conn_request: + * Sets the openreq's sid to socket's sid with MLS portion taken from peer sid. + * @inet_csk_clone: + * Sets the new child socket's sid to the openreq sid. + * @inet_conn_established: + * Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb. + * @secmark_relabel_packet: + * check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to the given secid + * @security_secmark_refcount_inc + * tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded + * @security_secmark_refcount_dec + * tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded + * @req_classify_flow: + * Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid. + * @tun_dev_alloc_security: + * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN + * device. + * @security pointer to a security structure pointer. + * Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. + * @tun_dev_free_security: + * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN + * device. + * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure + * @tun_dev_create: + * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device. + * @tun_dev_attach_queue: + * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue. + * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure. + * @tun_dev_attach: + * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state + * associated with the TUN device's sock structure. + * @sk contains the existing sock structure. + * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure. + * @tun_dev_open: + * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state + * associated with the TUN device's security structure. + * @security pointer to the TUN devices's security structure. + * @skb_owned_by: + * This hook sets the packet's owning sock. + * @skb is the packet. + * @sk the sock which owns the packet. + * + * Security hooks for XFRM operations. + * + * @xfrm_policy_alloc_security: + * @ctxp is a pointer to the xfrm_sec_ctx being added to Security Policy + * Database used by the XFRM system. + * @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by + * the user-level policy update program (e.g., setkey). + * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security + * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated. + * Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate, legal context) + * @gfp is to specify the context for the allocation + * @xfrm_policy_clone_security: + * @old_ctx contains an existing xfrm_sec_ctx. + * @new_ctxp contains a new xfrm_sec_ctx being cloned from old. + * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the + * information from the old_ctx structure. + * Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate). + * @xfrm_policy_free_security: + * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx + * Deallocate xp->security. + * @xfrm_policy_delete_security: + * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx. + * Authorize deletion of xp->security. + * @xfrm_state_alloc: + * @x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association + * Database by the XFRM system. + * @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by + * the user-level SA generation program (e.g., setkey or racoon). + * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security + * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the + * context to correspond to sec_ctx. Return 0 if operation was successful + * (memory to allocate, legal context). + * @xfrm_state_alloc_acquire: + * @x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association + * Database by the XFRM system. + * @polsec contains the policy's security context. + * @secid contains the secid from which to take the mls portion of the + * context. + * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security + * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the + * context to correspond to secid. Return 0 if operation was successful + * (memory to allocate, legal context). + * @xfrm_state_free_security: + * @x contains the xfrm_state. + * Deallocate x->security. + * @xfrm_state_delete_security: + * @x contains the xfrm_state. + * Authorize deletion of x->security. + * @xfrm_policy_lookup: + * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx for which the access control is being + * checked. + * @fl_secid contains the flow security label that is used to authorize + * access to the policy xp. + * @dir contains the direction of the flow (input or output). + * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing + * XFRMs on a packet. The hook is called when selecting either a + * per-socket policy or a generic xfrm policy. + * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno + * on other errors. + * @xfrm_state_pol_flow_match: + * @x contains the state to match. + * @xp contains the policy to check for a match. + * @fl contains the flow to check for a match. + * Return 1 if there is a match. + * @xfrm_decode_session: + * @skb points to skb to decode. + * @secid points to the flow key secid to set. + * @ckall says if all xfrms used should be checked for same secid. + * Return 0 if ckall is zero or all xfrms used have the same secid. + * + * Security hooks affecting all Key Management operations + * + * @key_alloc: + * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does + * not have a serial number assigned at this point. + * @key points to the key. + * @flags is the allocation flags + * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. + * @key_free: + * Notification of destruction; free security data. + * @key points to the key. + * No return value. + * @key_permission: + * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a + * key. + * @key_ref refers to the key (key pointer + possession attribute bit). + * @cred points to the credentials to provide the context against which to + * evaluate the security data on the key. + * @perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key. + * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. + * @key_getsecurity: + * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key + * for the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function + * allocates the storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller + * should free it. + * @key points to the key to be queried. + * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the + * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs). + * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if + * an error. + * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label. + * + * Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations. + * + * @ipc_permission: + * Check permissions for access to IPC + * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure + * @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @ipc_getsecid: + * Get the secid associated with the ipc object. + * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure. + * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved. + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. + * + * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues + * @msg_msg_alloc_security: + * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field. + * The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first + * created. + * @msg contains the message structure to be modified. + * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. + * @msg_msg_free_security: + * Deallocate the security structure for this message. + * @msg contains the message structure to be modified. + * + * Security hooks for System V IPC Message Queues + * + * @msg_queue_alloc_security: + * Allocate and attach a security structure to the + * msq->q_perm.security field. The security field is initialized to + * NULL when the structure is first created. + * @msq contains the message queue structure to be modified. + * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. + * @msg_queue_free_security: + * Deallocate security structure for this message queue. + * @msq contains the message queue structure to be modified. + * @msg_queue_associate: + * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the + * msgget system call. This hook is only called when returning the + * message queue identifier for an existing message queue, not when a + * new message queue is created. + * @msq contains the message queue to act upon. + * @msqflg contains the operation control flags. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @msg_queue_msgctl: + * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd + * is to be performed on the message queue @msq. + * The @msq may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or MSG_INFO. + * @msq contains the message queue to act upon. May be NULL. + * @cmd contains the operation to be performed. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @msg_queue_msgsnd: + * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message + * queue, @msq. + * @msq contains the message queue to send message to. + * @msg contains the message to be enqueued. + * @msqflg contains operational flags. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @msg_queue_msgrcv: + * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message + * queue, @msq. The @target task structure contains a pointer to the + * process that will be receiving the message (not equal to the current + * process when inline receives are being performed). + * @msq contains the message queue to retrieve message from. + * @msg contains the message destination. + * @target contains the task structure for recipient process. + * @type contains the type of message requested. + * @mode contains the operational flags. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * + * Security hooks for System V Shared Memory Segments + * + * @shm_alloc_security: + * Allocate and attach a security structure to the shp->shm_perm.security + * field. The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is + * first created. + * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified. + * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. + * @shm_free_security: + * Deallocate the security struct for this memory segment. + * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified. + * @shm_associate: + * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the + * shmget system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared + * memory region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared + * memory region is created. + * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified. + * @shmflg contains the operation control flags. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @shm_shmctl: + * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by + * @cmd is to be performed on the shared memory region @shp. + * The @shp may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or SHM_INFO. + * @shp contains shared memory structure to be modified. + * @cmd contains the operation to be performed. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @shm_shmat: + * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the + * shared memory segment @shp to the data segment of the calling process. + * The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr. + * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified. + * @shmaddr contains the address to attach memory region to. + * @shmflg contains the operational flags. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * + * Security hooks for System V Semaphores + * + * @sem_alloc_security: + * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sma->sem_perm.security + * field. The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is + * first created. + * @sma contains the semaphore structure + * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. + * @sem_free_security: + * deallocate security struct for this semaphore + * @sma contains the semaphore structure. + * @sem_associate: + * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget + * system call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore + * identifier for an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be + * created. + * @sma contains the semaphore structure. + * @semflg contains the operation control flags. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @sem_semctl: + * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be + * performed on the semaphore @sma. The @sma may be NULL, e.g. for + * IPC_INFO or SEM_INFO. + * @sma contains the semaphore structure. May be NULL. + * @cmd contains the operation to be performed. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @sem_semop + * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the + * semaphore set @sma. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set + * may be modified. + * @sma contains the semaphore structure. + * @sops contains the operations to perform. + * @nsops contains the number of operations to perform. + * @alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * + * @binder_set_context_mgr + * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager. + * @mgr contains the task_struct for the task being registered. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @binder_transaction + * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call + * to @to. + * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task. + * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task. + * @binder_transfer_binder + * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to. + * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task. + * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task. + * @binder_transfer_file + * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to. + * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task. + * @file contains the struct file being transferred. + * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task. + * + * @ptrace_access_check: + * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the + * @child process. + * Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check + * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of + * tracing check during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of + * binprm_security_ops if the process is being traced and its security + * attributes would be changed by the execve. + * @child contains the task_struct structure for the target process. + * @mode contains the PTRACE_MODE flags indicating the form of access. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @ptrace_traceme: + * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the + * current process before allowing the current process to present itself + * to the @parent process for tracing. + * @parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @capget: + * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for + * the @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to + * determine if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets + * of the @target process. + * @target contains the task_struct structure for target process. + * @effective contains the effective capability set. + * @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set. + * @permitted contains the permitted capability set. + * Return 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained. + * @capset: + * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for + * the current process. + * @new contains the new credentials structure for target process. + * @old contains the current credentials structure for target process. + * @effective contains the effective capability set. + * @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set. + * @permitted contains the permitted capability set. + * Return 0 and update @new if permission is granted. + * @capable: + * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated + * credentials. + * @cred contains the credentials to use. + * @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in + * @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. + * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not + * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk. + * @syslog: + * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing + * logging to the console. + * See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of the @type values. + * @type contains the type of action. + * @from_file indicates the context of action (if it came from /proc). + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @settime: + * Check permission to change the system time. + * struct timespec and timezone are defined in include/linux/time.h + * @ts contains new time + * @tz contains new timezone + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @vm_enough_memory: + * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping. + * @mm contains the mm struct it is being added to. + * @pages contains the number of pages. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * + * @ismaclabel: + * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name + * represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC + * attribute otherwise returns 0. + * @name full extended attribute name to check against + * LSM as a MAC label. + * + * @secid_to_secctx: + * Convert secid to security context. If secdata is NULL the length of + * the result will be returned in seclen, but no secdata will be returned. + * This does mean that the length could change between calls to check the + * length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the secdata. + * @secid contains the security ID. + * @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security context. + * @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data + * @secctx_to_secid: + * Convert security context to secid. + * @secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID. + * @secdata contains the security context. + * + * @release_secctx: + * Release the security context. + * @secdata contains the security context. + * @seclen contains the length of the security context. + * + * Security hooks for Audit + * + * @audit_rule_init: + * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. + * @field contains the required Audit action. Fields flags are defined in include/linux/audit.h + * @op contains the operator the rule uses. + * @rulestr contains the context where the rule will be applied to. + * @lsmrule contains a pointer to receive the result. + * Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, + * -EINVAL in case of an invalid rule. + * + * @audit_rule_known: + * Specifies whether given @rule contains any fields related to current LSM. + * @rule contains the audit rule of interest. + * Return 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise. + * + * @audit_rule_match: + * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved + * by @audit_rule_known. + * @secid contains the security id in question. + * @field contains the field which relates to current LSM. + * @op contains the operator that will be used for matching. + * @rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against. + * @actx points to the audit context associated with the check. + * Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure. + * + * @audit_rule_free: + * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by + * audit_rule_init. + * @rule contains the allocated rule + * + * @inode_notifysecctx: + * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode + * should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the + * security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes + * this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the + * value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the + * file's attributes to the client. + * + * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. + * + * @inode we wish to set the security context of. + * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode. + * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx. + * + * @inode_setsecctx: + * Change the security context of an inode. Updates the + * incore security context managed by the security module and invokes the + * fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing + * xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes + * this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the + * backing filesystem to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR + * operation. + * + * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. + * + * @dentry contains the inode we wish to set the security context of. + * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode. + * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx. + * + * @inode_getsecctx: + * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security + * context for the given @inode. + * + * @inode we wish to get the security context of. + * @ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context. + * @ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx. + * This is the main security structure. + */ +struct security_operations { + char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1]; + + int (*binder_set_context_mgr) (struct task_struct *mgr); + int (*binder_transaction) (struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to); + int (*binder_transfer_binder) (struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to); + int (*binder_transfer_file) (struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to, struct file *file); + + int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode); + int (*ptrace_traceme) (struct task_struct *parent); + int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target, + kernel_cap_t *effective, + kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted); + int (*capset) (struct cred *new, + const struct cred *old, + const kernel_cap_t *effective, + const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + const kernel_cap_t *permitted); + int (*capable) (const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, int audit); + int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); + int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry); + int (*syslog) (int type); + int (*settime) (const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz); + int (*vm_enough_memory) (struct mm_struct *mm, long pages); + + int (*bprm_set_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm); + int (*bprm_check_security) (struct linux_binprm *bprm); + int (*bprm_secureexec) (struct linux_binprm *bprm); + void (*bprm_committing_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm); + void (*bprm_committed_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm); + + int (*sb_alloc_security) (struct super_block *sb); + void (*sb_free_security) (struct super_block *sb); + int (*sb_copy_data) (char *orig, char *copy); + int (*sb_remount) (struct super_block *sb, void *data); + int (*sb_kern_mount) (struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data); + int (*sb_show_options) (struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb); + int (*sb_statfs) (struct dentry *dentry); + int (*sb_mount) (const char *dev_name, struct path *path, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data); + int (*sb_umount) (struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags); + int (*sb_pivotroot) (struct path *old_path, + struct path *new_path); + int (*sb_set_mnt_opts) (struct super_block *sb, + struct security_mnt_opts *opts, + unsigned long kern_flags, + unsigned long *set_kern_flags); + int (*sb_clone_mnt_opts) (const struct super_block *oldsb, + struct super_block *newsb); + int (*sb_parse_opts_str) (char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts); + int (*dentry_init_security) (struct dentry *dentry, int mode, + struct qstr *name, void **ctx, + u32 *ctxlen); + + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH + int (*path_unlink) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry); + int (*path_mkdir) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode); + int (*path_rmdir) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry); + int (*path_mknod) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, + unsigned int dev); + int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path); + int (*path_symlink) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name); + int (*path_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry); + int (*path_rename) (struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry); + int (*path_chmod) (struct path *path, umode_t mode); + int (*path_chown) (struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid); + int (*path_chroot) (struct path *path); +#endif + + int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode); + void (*inode_free_security) (struct inode *inode); + int (*inode_init_security) (struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, + void **value, size_t *len); + int (*inode_create) (struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode); + int (*inode_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry); + int (*inode_unlink) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); + int (*inode_symlink) (struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name); + int (*inode_mkdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode); + int (*inode_rmdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); + int (*inode_mknod) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode, dev_t dev); + int (*inode_rename) (struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry); + int (*inode_readlink) (struct dentry *dentry); + int (*inode_follow_link) (struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd); + int (*inode_permission) (struct inode *inode, int mask); + int (*inode_setattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); + int (*inode_getattr) (const struct path *path); + int (*inode_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags); + void (*inode_post_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags); + int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); + int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry); + int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); + int (*inode_need_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry); + int (*inode_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry); + int (*inode_getsecurity) (const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc); + int (*inode_setsecurity) (struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); + int (*inode_listsecurity) (struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size); + void (*inode_getsecid) (const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); + + int (*file_permission) (struct file *file, int mask); + int (*file_alloc_security) (struct file *file); + void (*file_free_security) (struct file *file); + int (*file_ioctl) (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg); + int (*mmap_addr) (unsigned long addr); + int (*mmap_file) (struct file *file, + unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags); + int (*file_mprotect) (struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot); + int (*file_lock) (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd); + int (*file_fcntl) (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg); + void (*file_set_fowner) (struct file *file); + int (*file_send_sigiotask) (struct task_struct *tsk, + struct fown_struct *fown, int sig); + int (*file_receive) (struct file *file); + int (*file_open) (struct file *file, const struct cred *cred); + + int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags); + void (*task_free) (struct task_struct *task); + int (*cred_alloc_blank) (struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); + void (*cred_free) (struct cred *cred); + int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + gfp_t gfp); + void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); + int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid); + int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); + int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size); + int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name); + int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file); + int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + int flags); + int (*task_setpgid) (struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); + int (*task_getpgid) (struct task_struct *p); + int (*task_getsid) (struct task_struct *p); + void (*task_getsecid) (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); + int (*task_setnice) (struct task_struct *p, int nice); + int (*task_setioprio) (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); + int (*task_getioprio) (struct task_struct *p); + int (*task_setrlimit) (struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, + struct rlimit *new_rlim); + int (*task_setscheduler) (struct task_struct *p); + int (*task_getscheduler) (struct task_struct *p); + int (*task_movememory) (struct task_struct *p); + int (*task_kill) (struct task_struct *p, + struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid); + int (*task_wait) (struct task_struct *p); + int (*task_prctl) (int option, unsigned long arg2, + unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, + unsigned long arg5); + void (*task_to_inode) (struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); + + int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag); + void (*ipc_getsecid) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid); + + int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg *msg); + void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg *msg); + + int (*msg_queue_alloc_security) (struct msg_queue *msq); + void (*msg_queue_free_security) (struct msg_queue *msq); + int (*msg_queue_associate) (struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg); + int (*msg_queue_msgctl) (struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd); + int (*msg_queue_msgsnd) (struct msg_queue *msq, + struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg); + int (*msg_queue_msgrcv) (struct msg_queue *msq, + struct msg_msg *msg, + struct task_struct *target, + long type, int mode); + + int (*shm_alloc_security) (struct shmid_kernel *shp); + void (*shm_free_security) (struct shmid_kernel *shp); + int (*shm_associate) (struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg); + int (*shm_shmctl) (struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd); + int (*shm_shmat) (struct shmid_kernel *shp, + char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg); + + int (*sem_alloc_security) (struct sem_array *sma); + void (*sem_free_security) (struct sem_array *sma); + int (*sem_associate) (struct sem_array *sma, int semflg); + int (*sem_semctl) (struct sem_array *sma, int cmd); + int (*sem_semop) (struct sem_array *sma, + struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter); + + int (*netlink_send) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); + + void (*d_instantiate) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode); + + int (*getprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); + int (*setprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size); + int (*ismaclabel) (const char *name); + int (*secid_to_secctx) (u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); + int (*secctx_to_secid) (const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); + void (*release_secctx) (char *secdata, u32 seclen); + + int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); + int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); + int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK + int (*unix_stream_connect) (struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk); + int (*unix_may_send) (struct socket *sock, struct socket *other); + + int (*socket_create) (int family, int type, int protocol, int kern); + int (*socket_post_create) (struct socket *sock, int family, + int type, int protocol, int kern); + int (*socket_bind) (struct socket *sock, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen); + int (*socket_connect) (struct socket *sock, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen); + int (*socket_listen) (struct socket *sock, int backlog); + int (*socket_accept) (struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock); + int (*socket_sendmsg) (struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size); + int (*socket_recvmsg) (struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags); + int (*socket_getsockname) (struct socket *sock); + int (*socket_getpeername) (struct socket *sock); + int (*socket_getsockopt) (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname); + int (*socket_setsockopt) (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname); + int (*socket_shutdown) (struct socket *sock, int how); + int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); + int (*socket_getpeersec_stream) (struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len); + int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram) (struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid); + int (*sk_alloc_security) (struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority); + void (*sk_free_security) (struct sock *sk); + void (*sk_clone_security) (const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk); + void (*sk_getsecid) (struct sock *sk, u32 *secid); + void (*sock_graft) (struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent); + int (*inet_conn_request) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct request_sock *req); + void (*inet_csk_clone) (struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req); + void (*inet_conn_established) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); + int (*secmark_relabel_packet) (u32 secid); + void (*secmark_refcount_inc) (void); + void (*secmark_refcount_dec) (void); + void (*req_classify_flow) (const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl); + int (*tun_dev_alloc_security) (void **security); + void (*tun_dev_free_security) (void *security); + int (*tun_dev_create) (void); + int (*tun_dev_attach_queue) (void *security); + int (*tun_dev_attach) (struct sock *sk, void *security); + int (*tun_dev_open) (void *security); +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM + int (*xfrm_policy_alloc_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, gfp_t gfp); + int (*xfrm_policy_clone_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctx); + void (*xfrm_policy_free_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); + int (*xfrm_policy_delete_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); + int (*xfrm_state_alloc) (struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); + int (*xfrm_state_alloc_acquire) (struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, + u32 secid); + void (*xfrm_state_free_security) (struct xfrm_state *x); + int (*xfrm_state_delete_security) (struct xfrm_state *x); + int (*xfrm_policy_lookup) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir); + int (*xfrm_state_pol_flow_match) (struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_policy *xp, + const struct flowi *fl); + int (*xfrm_decode_session) (struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid, int ckall); +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ + + /* key management security hooks */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + int (*key_alloc) (struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags); + void (*key_free) (struct key *key); + int (*key_permission) (key_ref_t key_ref, + const struct cred *cred, + unsigned perm); + int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer); +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + int (*audit_rule_init) (u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); + int (*audit_rule_known) (struct audit_krule *krule); + int (*audit_rule_match) (u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule, + struct audit_context *actx); + void (*audit_rule_free) (void *lsmrule); +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ +}; + +/* prototypes */ +extern int security_init(void); +extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops); +extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops); +extern void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops); + + +/* Security operations */ +int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr); +int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to); +int security_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to); +int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to, struct file *file); +int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode); +int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent); +int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, + kernel_cap_t *effective, + kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + kernel_cap_t *permitted); +int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + const kernel_cap_t *effective, + const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + const kernel_cap_t *permitted); +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap); +int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap); +int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); +int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry); +int security_syslog(int type); +int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz); +int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages); +int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +int security_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb); +void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb); +int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy); +int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data); +int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data); +int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb); +int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry); +int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data); +int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags); +int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path); +int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, + struct security_mnt_opts *opts, + unsigned long kern_flags, + unsigned long *set_kern_flags); +int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, + struct super_block *newsb); +int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts); +int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, + struct qstr *name, void **ctx, + u32 *ctxlen); + +int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode); +void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode); +int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data); +int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, + void **value, size_t *len); +int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode); +int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry); +int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); +int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name); +int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode); +int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); +int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev); +int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, + unsigned int flags); +int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry); +int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd); +int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask); +int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); +int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path); +int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags); +void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags); +int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); +int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry); +int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); +int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry); +int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry); +int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc); +int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); +int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size); +void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); +int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask); +int security_file_alloc(struct file *file); +void security_file_free(struct file *file); +int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); +int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags); +int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr); +int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot); +int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd); +int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); +void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file); +int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct fown_struct *fown, int sig); +int security_file_receive(struct file *file); +int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred); +int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags); +void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task); +int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); +void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred); +int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); +void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); +int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid); +int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); +int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size); +int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); +int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file); +int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + int flags); +int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); +int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p); +int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p); +void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); +int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice); +int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); +int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p); +int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, + struct rlimit *new_rlim); +int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p); +int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p); +int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p); +int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, + int sig, u32 secid); +int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p); +int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); +void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); +int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag); +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid); +int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg); +void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg); +int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq); +void security_msg_queue_free(struct msg_queue *msq); +int security_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg); +int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd); +int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, + struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg); +int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, + struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode); +int security_shm_alloc(struct shmid_kernel *shp); +void security_shm_free(struct shmid_kernel *shp); +int security_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg); +int security_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd); +int security_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg); +int security_sem_alloc(struct sem_array *sma); +void security_sem_free(struct sem_array *sma); +int security_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg); +int security_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd); +int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops, + unsigned nsops, int alter); +void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode); +int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); +int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size); +int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); +int security_ismaclabel(const char *name); +int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); +void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen); + +int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); +int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); +int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ +struct security_mnt_opts { +}; + +static inline void security_init_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) +{ +} + +static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) +{ +} + +/* + * This is the default capabilities functionality. Most of these functions + * are just stubbed out, but a few must call the proper capable code. + */ + +static inline int security_init(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to, + struct file *file) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, + unsigned int mode) +{ + return cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); +} + +static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) +{ + return cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); +} + +static inline int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, + kernel_cap_t *effective, + kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + kernel_cap_t *permitted) +{ + return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); +} + +static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new, + const struct cred *old, + const kernel_cap_t *effective, + const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + const kernel_cap_t *permitted) +{ + return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted); +} + +static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +{ + return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); +} + +static inline int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { + return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); +} + +static inline int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, + struct super_block *sb) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_syslog(int type) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, + const struct timezone *tz) +{ + return cap_settime(ts, tz); +} + +static inline int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) +{ + return cap_vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); +} + +static inline int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + return cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); +} + +static inline int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ +} + +static inline void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ +} + +static inline int security_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + return cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm); +} + +static inline int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) +{ } + +static inline int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, + struct super_block *sb) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, + void *data) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, + struct path *new_path) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, + struct security_mnt_opts *opts, + unsigned long kern_flags, + unsigned long *set_kern_flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, + struct super_block *newsb) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) +{ } + +static inline int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, + int mode, + struct qstr *name, + void **ctx, + u32 *ctxlen) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + + +static inline int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, + struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + const initxattrs xattrs, + void *fs_data) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, + struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + const char **name, + void **value, size_t *len) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static inline int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *dentry, + int mode) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *dentry, + int mode, dev_t dev) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, + struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *new_dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry, + unsigned int flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, + struct nameidata *nd) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct iattr *attr) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + return cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); +} + +static inline void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ } + +static inline int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *name) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *name) +{ + return cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); +} + +static inline int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return cap_inode_need_killpriv(dentry); +} + +static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return cap_inode_killpriv(dentry); +} + +static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; +} + +static inline int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_file_free(struct file *file) +{ } + +static inline int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) +{ + return cap_mmap_addr(addr); +} + +static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) +{ + return; +} + +static inline int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct fown_struct *fown, + int sig) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_file_receive(struct file *file) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file, + const struct cred *cred) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) +{ } + +static inline int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) +{ } + +static inline int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, + const struct cred *old, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, + const struct cred *old) +{ +} + +static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *cred, + struct inode *inode) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, + char *buf, size_t size) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, + const struct cred *old, + int flags) +{ + return cap_task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags); +} + +static inline int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; +} + +static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) +{ + return cap_task_setnice(p, nice); +} + +static inline int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) +{ + return cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio); +} + +static inline int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, + unsigned int resource, + struct rlimit *new_rlim) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return cap_task_setscheduler(p); +} + +static inline int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, + struct siginfo *info, int sig, + u32 secid) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, + unsigned long arg3, + unsigned long arg4, + unsigned long arg5) +{ + return cap_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg3, arg5); +} + +static inline void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) +{ } + +static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, + short flag) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; +} + +static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) +{ } + +static inline int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_msg_queue_free(struct msg_queue *msq) +{ } + +static inline int security_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, + int msqflg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, + struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, + struct msg_msg *msg, + struct task_struct *target, + long type, int mode) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_shm_alloc(struct shmid_kernel *shp) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_shm_free(struct shmid_kernel *shp) +{ } + +static inline int security_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, + int shmflg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, + char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_sem_alloc(struct sem_array *sma) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_sem_free(struct sem_array *sma) +{ } + +static inline int security_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, + struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, + int alter) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) +{ } + +static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +static inline int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return cap_netlink_send(sk, skb); +} + +static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, + u32 seclen, + u32 *secid) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) +{ +} + +static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} +static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} +static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK + +int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk); +int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other); +int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern); +int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, + int type, int protocol, int kern); +int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen); +int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen); +int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog); +int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock); +int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size); +int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, + int size, int flags); +int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock); +int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock); +int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname); +int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname); +int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how); +int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); +int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, + int __user *optlen, unsigned len); +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid); +int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority); +void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk); +void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk); +void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl); +void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl); +void security_sock_graft(struct sock*sk, struct socket *parent); +int security_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req); +void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, + const struct request_sock *req); +void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb); +int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid); +void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void); +void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void); +int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security); +void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security); +int security_tun_dev_create(void); +int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security); +int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security); +int security_tun_dev_open(void *security); + +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ +static inline int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, + struct sock *other, + struct sock *newsk) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, + struct socket *other) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_socket_create(int family, int type, + int protocol, int kern) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, + int family, + int type, + int protocol, int kern) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, + struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, + struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, + struct socket *newsock) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size, + int flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, + int level, int optname) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, + int level, int optname) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) +{ + return 0; +} +static inline int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, + int __user *optlen, unsigned len) +{ + return -ENOPROTOOPT; +} + +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) +{ + return -ENOPROTOOPT; +} + +static inline int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) +{ +} + +static inline void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) +{ +} + +static inline void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl) +{ +} + +static inline void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl) +{ +} + +static inline void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) +{ +} + +static inline int security_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, + const struct request_sock *req) +{ +} + +static inline void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +} + +static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void) +{ +} + +static inline void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void) +{ +} + +static inline int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) +{ +} + +static inline int security_tun_dev_create(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM + +int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, gfp_t gfp); +int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp); +void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); +int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); +int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); +int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid); +int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x); +void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x); +int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir); +int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_policy *xp, + const struct flowi *fl); +int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid); +void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl); + +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ + +static inline int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old, struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +{ +} + +static inline int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) +{ +} + +static inline int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_policy *xp, const struct flowi *fl) +{ + return 1; +} + +static inline int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl) +{ +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH +int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry); +int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode); +int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry); +int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, + unsigned int dev); +int security_path_truncate(struct path *path); +int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name); +int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry); +int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, + unsigned int flags); +int security_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode); +int security_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid); +int security_path_chroot(struct path *path); +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ +static inline int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_path_truncate(struct path *path) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct path *new_dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, + struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct path *new_dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry, + unsigned int flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_path_chroot(struct path *path) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + +int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags); +void security_key_free(struct key *key); +int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, + const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm); +int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer); + +#else + +static inline int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, + const struct cred *cred, + unsigned long flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_key_free(struct key *key) +{ +} + +static inline int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, + const struct cred *cred, + unsigned perm) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) +{ + *_buffer = NULL; + return 0; +} + +#endif +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule, + struct audit_context *actx); +void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); + +#else + +static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, + void **lsmrule) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) +{ } + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS + +extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode, + struct dentry *parent, void *data, + const struct file_operations *fops); +extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent); +extern void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry); + +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITYFS */ + +static inline struct dentry *securityfs_create_dir(const char *name, + struct dentry *parent) +{ + return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); +} + +static inline struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, + umode_t mode, + struct dentry *parent, + void *data, + const struct file_operations *fops) +{ + return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); +} + +static inline void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry) +{} + +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + +static inline char *alloc_secdata(void) +{ + return (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); +} + +static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata) +{ + free_page((unsigned long)secdata); +} + +#else + +static inline char *alloc_secdata(void) +{ + return (char *)1; +} + +static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata) +{ } +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA +extern int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, + unsigned int mode); +extern int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent); +extern void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task); +extern int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); +#else +static inline int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, + unsigned int mode) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task) +{ +} + +static inline int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, + unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, + unsigned long arg5) +{ + return -ENOSYS; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA */ + +#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */ + |