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-rw-r--r--kernel/certs/.gitignore4
-rw-r--r--kernel/certs/Kconfig42
-rw-r--r--kernel/certs/Makefile94
-rw-r--r--kernel/certs/system_certificates.S23
-rw-r--r--kernel/certs/system_keyring.c157
5 files changed, 320 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/certs/.gitignore b/kernel/certs/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f51aea4a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/certs/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+#
+# Generated files
+#
+x509_certificate_list
diff --git a/kernel/certs/Kconfig b/kernel/certs/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b030b9c7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/certs/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+menu "Certificates for signature checking"
+
+config MODULE_SIG_KEY
+ string "File name or PKCS#11 URI of module signing key"
+ default "certs/signing_key.pem"
+ depends on MODULE_SIG
+ help
+ Provide the file name of a private key/certificate in PEM format,
+ or a PKCS#11 URI according to RFC7512. The file should contain, or
+ the URI should identify, both the certificate and its corresponding
+ private key.
+
+ If this option is unchanged from its default "certs/signing_key.pem",
+ then the kernel will automatically generate the private key and
+ certificate as described in Documentation/module-signing.txt
+
+config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ bool "Provide system-wide ring of trusted keys"
+ depends on KEYS
+ help
+ Provide a system keyring to which trusted keys can be added. Keys in
+ the keyring are considered to be trusted. Keys may be added at will
+ by the kernel from compiled-in data and from hardware key stores, but
+ userspace may only add extra keys if those keys can be verified by
+ keys already in the keyring.
+
+ Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking.
+
+config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
+ string "Additional X.509 keys for default system keyring"
+ depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ help
+ If set, this option should be the filename of a PEM-formatted file
+ containing trusted X.509 certificates to be included in the default
+ system keyring. Any certificate used for module signing is implicitly
+ also trusted.
+
+ NOTE: If you previously provided keys for the system keyring in the
+ form of DER-encoded *.x509 files in the top-level build directory,
+ those are no longer used. You will need to set this option instead.
+
+endmenu
diff --git a/kernel/certs/Makefile b/kernel/certs/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..28ac694dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/certs/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+#
+# Makefile for the linux kernel signature checking certificates.
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
+
+$(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
+
+# GCC doesn't include .incbin files in -MD generated dependencies (PR#66871)
+$(obj)/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
+
+# Cope with signing_key.x509 existing in $(srctree) not $(objtree)
+AFLAGS_system_certificates.o := -I$(srctree)
+
+quiet_cmd_extract_certs = EXTRACT_CERTS $(patsubst "%",%,$(2))
+ cmd_extract_certs = scripts/extract-cert $(2) $@ || ( rm $@; exit 1)
+
+targets += x509_certificate_list
+$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: scripts/extract-cert $(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_FILENAME) FORCE
+ $(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
+endif
+
+clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
+###############################################################################
+#
+# If module signing is requested, say by allyesconfig, but a key has not been
+# supplied, then one will need to be generated to make sure the build does not
+# fail and that the kernel may be used afterwards.
+#
+###############################################################################
+ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH
+$(error Could not determine digest type to use from kernel config)
+endif
+
+# We do it this way rather than having a boolean option for enabling an
+# external private key, because 'make randconfig' might enable such a
+# boolean option and we unfortunately can't make it depend on !RANDCONFIG.
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY),"certs/signing_key.pem")
+$(obj)/signing_key.pem: $(obj)/x509.genkey
+ @echo "###"
+ @echo "### Now generating an X.509 key pair to be used for signing modules."
+ @echo "###"
+ @echo "### If this takes a long time, you might wish to run rngd in the"
+ @echo "### background to keep the supply of entropy topped up. It"
+ @echo "### needs to be run as root, and uses a hardware random"
+ @echo "### number generator if one is available."
+ @echo "###"
+ openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) -days 36500 \
+ -batch -x509 -config $(obj)/x509.genkey \
+ -outform PEM -out $(obj)/signing_key.pem \
+ -keyout $(obj)/signing_key.pem 2>&1
+ @echo "###"
+ @echo "### Key pair generated."
+ @echo "###"
+
+$(obj)/x509.genkey:
+ @echo Generating X.509 key generation config
+ @echo >$@ "[ req ]"
+ @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096"
+ @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
+ @echo >>$@ "prompt = no"
+ @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only"
+ @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts"
+ @echo >>$@
+ @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
+ @echo >>$@ "#O = Unspecified company"
+ @echo >>$@ "CN = Build time autogenerated kernel key"
+ @echo >>$@ "#emailAddress = unspecified.user@unspecified.company"
+ @echo >>$@
+ @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]"
+ @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE"
+ @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature"
+ @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
+ @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"
+endif
+
+$(eval $(call config_filename,MODULE_SIG_KEY))
+
+# If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY isn't a PKCS#11 URI, depend on it
+ifeq ($(patsubst pkcs11:%,%,$(firstword $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME))),$(firstword $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME)))
+X509_DEP := $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME)
+endif
+
+# GCC PR#66871 again.
+$(obj)/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/signing_key.x509
+
+targets += signing_key.x509
+$(obj)/signing_key.x509: scripts/extract-cert $(X509_DEP) FORCE
+ $(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY))
+endif
diff --git a/kernel/certs/system_certificates.S b/kernel/certs/system_certificates.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9216e8c81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/certs/system_certificates.S
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+
+ __INITRODATA
+
+ .align 8
+ .globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list)
+VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list):
+__cert_list_start:
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+ .incbin "certs/signing_key.x509"
+#endif
+ .incbin "certs/x509_certificate_list"
+__cert_list_end:
+
+ .align 8
+ .globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list_size)
+VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list_size):
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+ .quad __cert_list_end - __cert_list_start
+#else
+ .long __cert_list_end - __cert_list_start
+#endif
diff --git a/kernel/certs/system_keyring.c b/kernel/certs/system_keyring.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2570598b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/certs/system_keyring.c
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+/* System trusted keyring for trusted public keys
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+
+struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring);
+
+extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
+extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
+
+/*
+ * Load the compiled-in keys
+ */
+static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
+{
+ pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyring\n");
+
+ system_trusted_keyring =
+ keyring_alloc(".system_keyring",
+ KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
+ ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
+ panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
+
+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_trusted_keyring->flags);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
+ */
+device_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init);
+
+/*
+ * Load the compiled-in list of X.509 certificates.
+ */
+static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
+{
+ key_ref_t key;
+ const u8 *p, *end;
+ size_t plen;
+
+ pr_notice("Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates\n");
+
+ p = system_certificate_list;
+ end = p + system_certificate_list_size;
+ while (p < end) {
+ /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more
+ * than 256 bytes in size.
+ */
+ if (end - p < 4)
+ goto dodgy_cert;
+ if (p[0] != 0x30 &&
+ p[1] != 0x82)
+ goto dodgy_cert;
+ plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
+ plen += 4;
+ if (plen > end - p)
+ goto dodgy_cert;
+
+ key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
+ "asymmetric",
+ NULL,
+ p,
+ plen,
+ ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+ KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
+ PTR_ERR(key));
+ } else {
+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key_ref_to_ptr(key)->flags);
+ pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
+ key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+ key_ref_put(key);
+ }
+ p += plen;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+dodgy_cert:
+ pr_err("Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+
+/**
+ * Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * @data: The data to be verified.
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
+ * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
+ */
+int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+ bool trusted;
+ int ret;
+
+ pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+ return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+
+ /* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
+ if (pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) {
+ pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!trusted) {
+ pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
+ ret = -ENOKEY;
+ }
+
+error:
+ pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_verify_data);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */