Add the rt linux 4.1.3-rt3 as base

Import the rt linux 4.1.3-rt3 as OPNFV kvm base.

It's from git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rt/linux-rt-devel.git linux-4.1.y-rt and
the base is:

commit 0917f823c59692d751951bf5ea699a2d1e2f26a2
Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Date:   Sat Jul 25 12:13:34 2015 +0200

    Prepare v4.1.3-rt3

    Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>

We lose all the git history this way and it's not good. We
should apply another opnfv project repo in future.

Change-Id: I87543d81c9df70d99c5001fbdf646b202c19f423
Signed-off-by: Yunhong Jiang <yunhong.jiang@intel.com>

1 files changed, 3283 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/kernel/security/selinux/ss/services.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9e2d82070
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3283 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ *	     James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *	Support for context based audit filters.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ *	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ *      Added support for NetLabel
+ *      Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
+ *
+ *  Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
+ *
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ *  Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
+ *
+ * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
+ *
+ *  Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/flex_array.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "services.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+
+int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
+int selinux_policycap_openperm;
+int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
+
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
+
+static struct sidtab sidtab;
+struct policydb policydb;
+int ss_initialized;
+
+/*
+ * The largest sequence number that has been used when
+ * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
+ * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
+ * occurs.
+ */
+static u32 latest_granting;
+
+/* Forward declaration. */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
+				    u32 *scontext_len);
+
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
+				      struct context *tcontext,
+				      u16 tclass,
+				      struct av_decision *avd);
+
+struct selinux_mapping {
+	u16 value; /* policy value */
+	unsigned num_perms;
+	u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
+};
+
+static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
+static u16 current_mapping_size;
+
+static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
+			       struct security_class_mapping *map,
+			       struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
+			       u16 *out_map_size)
+{
+	struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
+	size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
+	u16 i, j;
+	unsigned k;
+	bool print_unknown_handle = false;
+
+	/* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
+	if (!map)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	i = 0;
+	while (map[i].name)
+		i++;
+
+	/* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
+	out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!out_map)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* Store the raw class and permission values */
+	j = 0;
+	while (map[j].name) {
+		struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
+		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
+
+		/* An empty class string skips ahead */
+		if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
+			p_out->num_perms = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
+		if (!p_out->value) {
+			printk(KERN_INFO
+			       "SELinux:  Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+			       p_in->name);
+			if (pol->reject_unknown)
+				goto err;
+			p_out->num_perms = 0;
+			print_unknown_handle = true;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		k = 0;
+		while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
+			/* An empty permission string skips ahead */
+			if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
+				k++;
+				continue;
+			}
+			p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
+							    p_in->perms[k]);
+			if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
+				printk(KERN_INFO
+				       "SELinux:  Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+				       p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
+				if (pol->reject_unknown)
+					goto err;
+				print_unknown_handle = true;
+			}
+
+			k++;
+		}
+		p_out->num_perms = k;
+	}
+
+	if (print_unknown_handle)
+		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
+		       pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
+
+	*out_map_p = out_map;
+	*out_map_size = i;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	kfree(out_map);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get real, policy values from mapped values
+ */
+
+static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
+{
+	if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
+		return current_mapping[tclass].value;
+
+	return tclass;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
+ */
+static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
+{
+	u16 i;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) {
+		if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value)
+			return i;
+	}
+
+	return SECCLASS_NULL;
+}
+
+static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+			 int allow_unknown)
+{
+	if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
+		unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
+		u32 result;
+
+		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+			if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+			if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+		}
+		avd->allowed = result;
+
+		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
+			if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+		avd->auditallow = result;
+
+		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+			if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+			if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
+		 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
+		 * should audit that denial
+		 */
+		for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
+			result |= 1<<i;
+		avd->auditdeny = result;
+	}
+}
+
+int security_mls_enabled(void)
+{
+	return policydb.mls_enabled;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
+ * when it is applied to the specified source and target
+ * security contexts.
+ *
+ * xcontext is a special beast...  It is used by the validatetrans rules
+ * only.  For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
+ * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
+ * of the process performing the transition.  All other callers of
+ * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
+ */
+static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
+				struct context *tcontext,
+				struct context *xcontext,
+				struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
+{
+	u32 val1, val2;
+	struct context *c;
+	struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
+	struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
+	struct constraint_expr *e;
+	int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+	int sp = -1;
+
+	for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
+		switch (e->expr_type) {
+		case CEXPR_NOT:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 0);
+			s[sp] = !s[sp];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_AND:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_OR:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_ATTR:
+			if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+				return 0;
+			switch (e->attr) {
+			case CEXPR_USER:
+				val1 = scontext->user;
+				val2 = tcontext->user;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_TYPE:
+				val1 = scontext->type;
+				val2 = tcontext->type;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_ROLE:
+				val1 = scontext->role;
+				val2 = tcontext->role;
+				r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
+				r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
+				switch (e->op) {
+				case CEXPR_DOM:
+					s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+								  val2 - 1);
+					continue;
+				case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+					s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+								  val1 - 1);
+					continue;
+				case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+					s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+								    val2 - 1) &&
+						   !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+								    val1 - 1));
+					continue;
+				default:
+					break;
+				}
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_L1L2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L1H2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_H1L2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_H1H2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L1H1:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L2H2:
+				l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+mls_ops:
+			switch (e->op) {
+			case CEXPR_EQ:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_NEQ:
+				s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_DOM:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
+				continue;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+			break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+
+			switch (e->op) {
+			case CEXPR_EQ:
+				s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_NEQ:
+				s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
+				break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_NAMES:
+			if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+				return 0;
+			c = scontext;
+			if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
+				c = tcontext;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
+				c = xcontext;
+				if (!c) {
+					BUG();
+					return 0;
+				}
+			}
+			if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
+				val1 = c->user;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
+				val1 = c->role;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
+				val1 = c->type;
+			else {
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+
+			switch (e->op) {
+			case CEXPR_EQ:
+				s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_NEQ:
+				s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+				break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			BUG();
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	BUG_ON(sp != 0);
+	return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
+ * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
+ */
+static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+	struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
+	char **permission_names = args;
+
+	BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
+
+	permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
+				    struct context *tcontext,
+				    u16 tclass,
+				    u32 permissions,
+				    const char *reason)
+{
+	struct common_datum *common_dat;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	char *tclass_name;
+	char *scontext_name = NULL;
+	char *tcontext_name = NULL;
+	char *permission_names[32];
+	int index;
+	u32 length;
+	bool need_comma = false;
+
+	if (!permissions)
+		return;
+
+	tclass_name = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
+	tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
+
+	/* init permission_names */
+	if (common_dat &&
+	    hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
+			dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
+			dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
+	if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
+				     &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
+				     &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* audit a message */
+	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
+			     GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+	if (!ab)
+		goto out;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
+			 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
+			 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
+
+	for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+		u32 mask = (1 << index);
+
+		if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
+				 need_comma ? "," : "",
+				 permission_names[index]
+				 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
+		need_comma = true;
+	}
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+	/* release scontext/tcontext */
+	kfree(tcontext_name);
+	kfree(scontext_name);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
+ * on boundary constraint.
+ */
+static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
+				     struct context *tcontext,
+				     u16 tclass,
+				     struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct context lo_scontext;
+	struct context lo_tcontext;
+	struct av_decision lo_avd;
+	struct type_datum *source;
+	struct type_datum *target;
+	u32 masked = 0;
+
+	source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+				    scontext->type - 1);
+	BUG_ON(!source);
+
+	target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+				    tcontext->type - 1);
+	BUG_ON(!target);
+
+	if (source->bounds) {
+		memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
+
+		memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
+		lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
+
+		context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
+					  tcontext,
+					  tclass,
+					  &lo_avd);
+		if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
+			return;		/* no masked permission */
+		masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+	}
+
+	if (target->bounds) {
+		memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
+
+		memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
+		lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
+
+		context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
+					  &lo_tcontext,
+					  tclass,
+					  &lo_avd);
+		if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
+			return;		/* no masked permission */
+		masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+	}
+
+	if (source->bounds && target->bounds) {
+		memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
+		/*
+		 * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
+		 * set up.
+		 */
+
+		context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
+					  &lo_tcontext,
+					  tclass,
+					  &lo_avd);
+		if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
+			return;		/* no masked permission */
+		masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+	}
+
+	if (masked) {
+		/* mask violated permissions */
+		avd->allowed &= ~masked;
+
+		/* audit masked permissions */
+		security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
+					tclass, masked, "bounds");
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
+ * the permissions in a particular class.
+ */
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
+				      struct context *tcontext,
+				      u16 tclass,
+				      struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct constraint_node *constraint;
+	struct role_allow *ra;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+	struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+	struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+	unsigned int i, j;
+
+	avd->allowed = 0;
+	avd->auditallow = 0;
+	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+
+	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
+		if (printk_ratelimit())
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+	/*
+	 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
+	 * this permission check, then use it.
+	 */
+	avkey.target_class = tclass;
+	avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
+	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
+	BUG_ON(!sattr);
+	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
+	BUG_ON(!tattr);
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+			avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+			avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+			     node;
+			     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
+				if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
+					avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
+				else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
+					avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
+				else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+					avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
+			}
+
+			/* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
+			cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
+
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
+	 * the MLS policy).
+	 */
+	constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
+	while (constraint) {
+		if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
+		    !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
+					  constraint->expr)) {
+			avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
+		}
+		constraint = constraint->next;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If checking process transition permission and the
+	 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
+	 * pair.
+	 */
+	if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
+	    (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
+	    scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
+		for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+			if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
+			    tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (!ra)
+			avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the given source and target types have boundary
+	 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
+	 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
+	 */
+	type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
+				 tclass, avd);
+}
+
+static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
+					   struct context *ncontext,
+					   struct context *tcontext,
+					   u16 tclass)
+{
+	char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
+	u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
+
+	if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen))
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen))
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
+		goto out;
+	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+		  "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
+		  " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+		  o, n, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+out:
+	kfree(o);
+	kfree(n);
+	kfree(t);
+
+	if (!selinux_enforcing)
+		return 0;
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+				 u16 orig_tclass)
+{
+	struct context *ocontext;
+	struct context *ncontext;
+	struct context *tcontext;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+	struct constraint_node *constraint;
+	u16 tclass;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+
+	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized class %d\n",
+			__func__, tclass);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+	ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
+	if (!ocontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, oldsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
+	if (!ncontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, newsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, tasksid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
+	while (constraint) {
+		if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
+					  constraint->expr)) {
+			rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
+							     tcontext, tclass);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		constraint = constraint->next;
+	}
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
+ * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
+ * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
+ * Otherwise, it returns error code.
+ *
+ * @oldsid : current security identifier
+ * @newsid : destinated security identifier
+ */
+int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
+{
+	struct context *old_context, *new_context;
+	struct type_datum *type;
+	int index;
+	int rc;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
+	if (!old_context) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+		       __func__, old_sid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
+	if (!new_context) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+		       __func__, new_sid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+	/* type/domain unchanged */
+	if (old_context->type == new_context->type)
+		goto out;
+
+	index = new_context->type;
+	while (true) {
+		type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+					  index - 1);
+		BUG_ON(!type);
+
+		/* not bounded anymore */
+		rc = -EPERM;
+		if (!type->bounds)
+			break;
+
+		/* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
+		rc = 0;
+		if (type->bounds == old_context->type)
+			break;
+
+		index = type->bounds;
+	}
+
+	if (rc) {
+		char *old_name = NULL;
+		char *new_name = NULL;
+		u32 length;
+
+		if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
+					      &old_name, &length) &&
+		    !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
+					      &new_name, &length)) {
+			audit_log(current->audit_context,
+				  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+				  "op=security_bounded_transition "
+				  "seresult=denied "
+				  "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
+				  old_name, new_name);
+		}
+		kfree(new_name);
+		kfree(old_name);
+	}
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	avd->allowed = 0;
+	avd->auditallow = 0;
+	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+	avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+	avd->flags = 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ *
+ * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
+ * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
+ */
+void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
+			 u32 tsid,
+			 u16 orig_tclass,
+			 struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	u16 tclass;
+	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	avd_init(avd);
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		goto allow;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, ssid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* permissive domain? */
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
+		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
+
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, tsid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+	if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+		if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+			goto allow;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
+	map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return;
+allow:
+	avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
+			      u32 tsid,
+			      u16 tclass,
+			      struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	avd_init(avd);
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		goto allow;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, ssid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* permissive domain? */
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
+		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
+
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, tsid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
+		if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+			goto allow;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
+ out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return;
+allow:
+	avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
+ * allocated string of the correct size.  Set `*scontext'
+ * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
+ * the length of the string.
+ */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	char *scontextp;
+
+	if (scontext)
+		*scontext = NULL;
+	*scontext_len = 0;
+
+	if (context->len) {
+		*scontext_len = context->len;
+		if (scontext) {
+			*scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!(*scontext))
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Compute the size of the context. */
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
+
+	if (!scontext)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
+	scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!scontextp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	*scontext = scontextp;
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
+	 */
+	sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
+		sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
+		sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
+		sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
+	scontextp += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) +
+		     1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) +
+		     1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
+
+	mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
+
+	*scontextp = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
+
+const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
+{
+	if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
+		return NULL;
+	return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
+}
+
+static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
+					u32 *scontext_len, int force)
+{
+	struct context *context;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (scontext)
+		*scontext = NULL;
+	*scontext_len  = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
+			char *scontextp;
+
+			*scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
+			if (!scontext)
+				goto out;
+			scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!scontextp) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]);
+			*scontext = scontextp;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  called before initial "
+		       "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	if (force)
+		context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
+	else
+		context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	if (!context) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, sid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
+out_unlock:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+out:
+	return rc;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size.  Set @scontext
+ * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
+}
+
+int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Caveat:  Mutates scontext.
+ */
+static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
+				    struct sidtab *sidtabp,
+				    char *scontext,
+				    u32 scontext_len,
+				    struct context *ctx,
+				    u32 def_sid)
+{
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	context_init(ctx);
+
+	/* Parse the security context. */
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	scontextp = (char *) scontext;
+
+	/* Extract the user. */
+	p = scontextp;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+
+	if (*p == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
+	if (!usrdatum)
+		goto out;
+
+	ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+	/* Extract role. */
+	scontextp = p;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+
+	if (*p == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
+	if (!role)
+		goto out;
+	ctx->role = role->value;
+
+	/* Extract type. */
+	scontextp = p;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+	oldc = *p;
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
+	if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
+		goto out;
+
+	ctx->type = typdatum->value;
+
+	rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
+		goto out;
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	if (rc)
+		context_destroy(ctx);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+					u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
+					int force)
+{
+	char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
+	struct context context;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/* An empty security context is never valid. */
+	if (!scontext_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+			if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
+				*sid = i;
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+		*sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	/* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
+	scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags);
+	if (!scontext2)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
+	scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
+
+	if (force) {
+		/* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
+		if (!str)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2,
+				      scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
+	if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
+		context.str = str;
+		context.len = scontext_len;
+		str = NULL;
+	} else if (rc)
+		goto out_unlock;
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
+	context_destroy(&context);
+out_unlock:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+out:
+	kfree(scontext2);
+	kfree(str);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @gfp: context for the allocation
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
+			    gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+					    sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
+ * falling back to specified default if needed.
+ *
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
+ * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
+ * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
+ * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+				    u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+					    sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
+}
+
+int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+				  u32 *sid)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+					    sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
+}
+
+static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
+	struct context *scontext,
+	struct context *tcontext,
+	u16 tclass,
+	struct context *newcontext)
+{
+	char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
+	u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
+
+	if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen))
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen))
+		goto out;
+	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+		  "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=%s"
+		  " scontext=%s"
+		  " tcontext=%s"
+		  " tclass=%s",
+		  n, s, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+out:
+	kfree(s);
+	kfree(t);
+	kfree(n);
+	if (!selinux_enforcing)
+		return 0;
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
+				  u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
+				  const char *objname)
+{
+	struct filename_trans ft;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
+
+	/*
+	 * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
+	 * like /dev or /var/run.  This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
+	 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
+	 */
+	if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
+		return;
+
+	ft.stype = stype;
+	ft.ttype = ttype;
+	ft.tclass = tclass;
+	ft.name = objname;
+
+	otype = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &ft);
+	if (otype)
+		newcontext->type = otype->otype;
+}
+
+static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
+				u32 tsid,
+				u16 orig_tclass,
+				u32 specified,
+				const char *objname,
+				u32 *out_sid,
+				bool kern)
+{
+	struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
+	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
+	struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+	u16 tclass;
+	int rc = 0;
+	bool sock;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		switch (orig_tclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
+			*out_sid = ssid;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*out_sid = tsid;
+			break;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	context_init(&newcontext);
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	if (kern) {
+		tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+		sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
+	} else {
+		tclass = orig_tclass;
+		sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass));
+	}
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, ssid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, tsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim)
+		cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+	/* Set the user identity. */
+	switch (specified) {
+	case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+		if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+			newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+		} else {
+			/* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
+			/* Use the process user identity. */
+			newcontext.user = scontext->user;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+		/* Use the related object owner. */
+		newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Set the role to default values. */
+	if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
+		newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+		newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
+	} else {
+		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
+			newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+		else
+			newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Set the type to default values. */
+	if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
+		newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+		newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+	} else {
+		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
+			/* Use the type of process. */
+			newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+		} else {
+			/* Use the type of the related object. */
+			newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
+	avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+	avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+	avkey.target_class = tclass;
+	avkey.specified = specified;
+	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+
+	/* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
+	if (!avdatum) {
+		node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
+		for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
+			if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
+				avdatum = &node->datum;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (avdatum) {
+		/* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
+		newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
+	}
+
+	/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
+	if (objname)
+		filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
+				      tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
+
+	/* Check for class-specific changes. */
+	if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
+		/* Look for a role transition rule. */
+		for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; roletr = roletr->next) {
+			if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
+			    (roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
+			    (roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
+				/* Use the role transition rule. */
+				newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Set the MLS attributes.
+	   This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
+	rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
+			     &newcontext, sock);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/* Check the validity of the context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
+		rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
+							tcontext,
+							tclass,
+							&newcontext);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	/* Obtain the sid for the context. */
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+out_unlock:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	context_destroy(&newcontext);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
+ * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+				    qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
+}
+
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+				    objname, out_sid, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
+ * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
+			u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass,
+			u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
+				    out_sid, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
+ * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
+			u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass,
+			u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
+				    out_sid, false);
+}
+
+/* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
+static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
+		     struct context *context,
+		     void *arg)
+{
+	struct sidtab *s = arg;
+
+	if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
+		return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
+	else
+		return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
+{
+	char *s;
+	u32 len;
+
+	if (selinux_enforcing)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
+		kfree(s);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct convert_context_args {
+	struct policydb *oldp;
+	struct policydb *newp;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Convert the values in the security context
+ * structure `c' from the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->newp'.  Verify that the
+ * context is valid under the new policy.
+ */
+static int convert_context(u32 key,
+			   struct context *c,
+			   void *p)
+{
+	struct convert_context_args *args;
+	struct context oldc;
+	struct ocontext *oc;
+	struct mls_range *range;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	char *s;
+	u32 len;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (key <= SECINITSID_NUM)
+		goto out;
+
+	args = p;
+
+	if (c->str) {
+		struct context ctx;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!s)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
+					      c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
+		kfree(s);
+		if (!rc) {
+			printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
+			       c->str);
+			/* Replace string with mapped representation. */
+			kfree(c->str);
+			memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
+			goto out;
+		} else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+			/* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
+			rc = 0;
+			goto out;
+		} else {
+			/* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:   Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
+			       c->str, -rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Convert the user. */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
+				  sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, c->user - 1));
+	if (!usrdatum)
+		goto bad;
+	c->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+	/* Convert the role. */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
+			      sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, c->role - 1));
+	if (!role)
+		goto bad;
+	c->role = role->value;
+
+	/* Convert the type. */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
+				  sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, c->type - 1));
+	if (!typdatum)
+		goto bad;
+	c->type = typdatum->value;
+
+	/* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
+	if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
+		rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	} else if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && !args->newp->mls_enabled) {
+		/*
+		 * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
+		 * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
+		 * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
+		 */
+		mls_context_destroy(c);
+	} else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
+		/*
+		 * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
+		 * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
+		 * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
+		 * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
+		 * initial SIDs.
+		 */
+		oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
+		while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+			oc = oc->next;
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (!oc) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to look up"
+				" the initial SIDs list\n");
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		range = &oc->context[0].range;
+		rc = mls_range_set(c, range);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
+		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	context_destroy(&oldc);
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	/* Map old representation to string and save it. */
+	rc = context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	context_destroy(&oldc);
+	context_destroy(c);
+	c->str = s;
+	c->len = len;
+	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
+	       c->str);
+	rc = 0;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static void security_load_policycaps(void)
+{
+	selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
+	selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
+	selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
+}
+
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
+
+/**
+ * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
+ * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
+ * This function will flush the access vector cache after
+ * loading the new policy.
+ */
+int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb;
+	struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
+	struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
+	struct convert_context_args args;
+	u32 seqno;
+	u16 map_size;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
+
+	oldpolicydb = kzalloc(2 * sizeof(*oldpolicydb), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!oldpolicydb) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		avtab_cache_init();
+		rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
+		if (rc) {
+			avtab_cache_destroy();
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		policydb.len = len;
+		rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
+					 &current_mapping,
+					 &current_mapping_size);
+		if (rc) {
+			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
+			avtab_cache_destroy();
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
+		if (rc) {
+			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
+			avtab_cache_destroy();
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		security_load_policycaps();
+		ss_initialized = 1;
+		seqno = ++latest_granting;
+		selinux_complete_init();
+		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+		selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
+		selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
+		selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+#if 0
+	sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
+#endif
+
+	rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	newpolicydb->len = len;
+	/* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
+	if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
+		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
+	else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
+		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
+
+	rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
+	if (rc) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
+		policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	rc = security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb);
+	if (rc) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to preserve booleans\n");
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Clone the SID table. */
+	sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
+
+	rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
+	 * in the new SID table.
+	 */
+	args.oldp = &policydb;
+	args.newp = newpolicydb;
+	rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
+	if (rc) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to convert the internal"
+			" representation of contexts in the new SID"
+			" table\n");
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
+	memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof(policydb));
+	sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
+
+	/* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
+	write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
+	memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(policydb));
+	sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
+	security_load_policycaps();
+	oldmap = current_mapping;
+	current_mapping = map;
+	current_mapping_size = map_size;
+	seqno = ++latest_granting;
+	write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
+	policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb);
+	sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
+	kfree(oldmap);
+
+	avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+	selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+	selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
+	selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
+	selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
+
+	rc = 0;
+	goto out;
+
+err:
+	kfree(map);
+	sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
+	policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
+
+out:
+	kfree(oldpolicydb);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+size_t security_policydb_len(void)
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	len = policydb.len;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
+ * @protocol: protocol number
+ * @port: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
+	while (c) {
+		if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
+		    c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
+		    c->u.port.high_port >= port)
+			break;
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		if (!c->sid[0]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+						   &c->context[0],
+						   &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*out_sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else {
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+	}
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
+ * @name: interface name
+ * @if_sid: interface SID
+ */
+int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
+	while (c) {
+		if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
+			break;
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+						  &c->context[0],
+						  &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+						   &c->context[1],
+						   &c->sid[1]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*if_sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else
+		*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
+{
+	int i, fail = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
+			fail = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	return !fail;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
+ * @domain: communication domain aka address family
+ * @addrp: address
+ * @addrlen: address length in bytes
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
+		      void *addrp,
+		      u32 addrlen,
+		      u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	switch (domain) {
+	case AF_INET: {
+		u32 addr;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
+			goto out;
+
+		addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
+
+		c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
+		while (c) {
+			if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
+				break;
+			c = c->next;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case AF_INET6:
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
+			goto out;
+		c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
+		while (c) {
+			if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
+						c->u.node6.mask))
+				break;
+			c = c->next;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		rc = 0;
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		if (!c->sid[0]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+						   &c->context[0],
+						   &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*out_sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else {
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#define SIDS_NEL 25
+
+/**
+ * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
+ * @fromsid: starting SID
+ * @username: username
+ * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
+ * @nel: number of elements in @sids
+ *
+ * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
+ * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
+ * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
+ * array containing the set of SIDs.  Set *@nel to the
+ * number of elements in the array.
+ */
+
+int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
+			   char *username,
+			   u32 **sids,
+			   u32 *nel)
+{
+	struct context *fromcon, usercon;
+	u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
+	u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
+	struct user_datum *user;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
+	int rc = 0, i, j;
+
+	*sids = NULL;
+	*nel = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		goto out;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	context_init(&usercon);
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
+	if (!fromcon)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
+	if (!user)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	usercon.user = user->value;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!mysids)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
+		role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
+		usercon.role = i + 1;
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
+			usercon.type = j + 1;
+
+			if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
+				continue;
+
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out_unlock;
+			if (mynel < maxnel) {
+				mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+			} else {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
+				mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
+				if (!mysids2)
+					goto out_unlock;
+				memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
+				kfree(mysids);
+				mysids = mysids2;
+				mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out_unlock:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	if (rc || !mynel) {
+		kfree(mysids);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!mysids2) {
+		kfree(mysids);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
+		struct av_decision dummy_avd;
+		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
+					  SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
+					  PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
+					  &dummy_avd);
+		if (!rc)
+			mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+	kfree(mysids);
+	*sids = mysids2;
+	*nel = j;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
+ * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
+ * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
+ *
+ * The caller must acquire the policy_rwlock before calling this function.
+ */
+static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+				       char *path,
+				       u16 orig_sclass,
+				       u32 *sid)
+{
+	int len;
+	u16 sclass;
+	struct genfs *genfs;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	int rc, cmp = 0;
+
+	while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
+		path++;
+
+	sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
+	*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+	for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+		cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
+		if (cmp <= 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOENT;
+	if (!genfs || cmp)
+		goto out;
+
+	for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+		len = strlen(c->u.name);
+		if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
+		    (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
+			break;
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOENT;
+	if (!c)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!c->sid[0]) {
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	*sid = c->sid[0];
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
+ * it afterward.
+ */
+int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+		       char *path,
+		       u16 orig_sclass,
+		       u32 *sid)
+{
+	int retval;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	retval = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return retval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
+ * @sb: superblock in question
+ */
+int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+	while (c) {
+		if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
+			break;
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
+		if (!c->sid[0]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0],
+						   &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else {
+		rc = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
+					  &sbsec->sid);
+		if (rc) {
+			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+			rc = 0;
+		} else {
+			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
+{
+	int i, rc;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	*names = NULL;
+	*values = NULL;
+
+	rc = 0;
+	*len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	if (!*len)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	*names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*names)
+		goto err;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	*values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*values)
+		goto err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
+		size_t name_len;
+
+		(*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+		name_len = strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i)) + 1;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		(*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!(*names)[i])
+			goto err;
+
+		strncpy((*names)[i], sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), name_len);
+		(*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+err:
+	if (*names) {
+		for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
+			kfree((*names)[i]);
+	}
+	kfree(*values);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+
+int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
+{
+	int i, rc;
+	int lenp, seqno = 0;
+	struct cond_node *cur;
+
+	write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	rc = -EFAULT;
+	lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	if (len != lenp)
+		goto out;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
+			audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
+				AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				"bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
+				sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+				!!values[i],
+				policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
+				from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+				audit_get_sessionid(current));
+		}
+		if (values[i])
+			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
+		else
+			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
+	}
+
+	for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	seqno = ++latest_granting;
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
+	if (!rc) {
+		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+		selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
+		selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
+{
+	int rc;
+	int len;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	rc = -EFAULT;
+	len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	if (bool >= len)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
+	char **bnames = NULL;
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+	struct cond_node *cur;
+
+	rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+	for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
+		booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
+		if (booldatum)
+			booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
+	}
+	for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (bnames) {
+		for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
+			kfree(bnames[i]);
+	}
+	kfree(bnames);
+	kfree(bvalues);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
+ * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
+ */
+int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
+{
+	struct context *context1;
+	struct context *context2;
+	struct context newcon;
+	char *s;
+	u32 len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = 0;
+	if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
+		*new_sid = sid;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	context_init(&newcon);
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	if (!context1) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, sid);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
+	if (!context2) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, mls_sid);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	newcon.user = context1->user;
+	newcon.role = context1->role;
+	newcon.type = context1->type;
+	rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
+		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
+		if (rc) {
+			if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
+				audit_log(current->audit_context,
+					  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+					  "op=security_sid_mls_copy "
+					  "invalid_context=%s", s);
+				kfree(s);
+			}
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
+out_unlock:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	context_destroy(&newcon);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
+ * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
+ * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
+ * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
+ * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
+ * returns zero.  Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
+ * returns a negative value.  A table summarizing the behavior is below:
+ *
+ *                                 | function return |      @sid
+ *   ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
+ *   no peer labels                |        0        |    SECSID_NULL
+ *   single peer label             |        0        |    <peer_label>
+ *   multiple, consistent labels   |        0        |    <peer_label>
+ *   multiple, inconsistent labels |    -<errno>     |    SECSID_NULL
+ *
+ */
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+				 u32 xfrm_sid,
+				 u32 *peer_sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct context *nlbl_ctx;
+	struct context *xfrm_ctx;
+
+	*peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	/* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
+	 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
+	 * single or absent peer SID/label */
+	if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+		*peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
+	 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
+	 * is present */
+	if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
+		*peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
+	 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
+	 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
+	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
+	if (!nlbl_ctx) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, nlbl_sid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
+	if (!xfrm_ctx) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, xfrm_sid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
+	 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
+	 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
+	 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
+	 * expressive */
+	*peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+	struct class_datum *datum = d;
+	char *name = k, **classes = args;
+	int value = datum->value - 1;
+
+	classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!classes[value])
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	*nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
+	*classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*classes)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
+			*classes);
+	if (rc) {
+		int i;
+		for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
+			kfree((*classes)[i]);
+		kfree(*classes);
+	}
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+	struct perm_datum *datum = d;
+	char *name = k, **perms = args;
+	int value = datum->value - 1;
+
+	perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!perms[value])
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
+{
+	int rc, i;
+	struct class_datum *match;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
+	if (!match) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized class %s\n",
+			__func__, class);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	*nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
+	*perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*perms)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (match->comdatum) {
+		rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
+				get_permissions_callback, *perms);
+		if (rc)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
+			*perms);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+
+err:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
+		kfree((*perms)[i]);
+	kfree(*perms);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
+{
+	return policydb.reject_unknown;
+}
+
+int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
+{
+	return policydb.allow_unknown;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
+ * @req_cap: capability
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
+ * capability specified by @req_cap.  Returns true (1) if the capability is
+ * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
+ *
+ */
+int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+struct selinux_audit_rule {
+	u32 au_seqno;
+	struct context au_ctxt;
+};
+
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
+{
+	struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+
+	if (rule) {
+		context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
+		kfree(rule);
+	}
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+{
+	struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
+	struct role_datum *roledatum;
+	struct type_datum *typedatum;
+	struct user_datum *userdatum;
+	struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	*rule = NULL;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	switch (field) {
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+		/* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
+		if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+		/* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
+		if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* only the above fields are valid */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tmprule)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
+
+	switch (field) {
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
+		if (!userdatum)
+			goto out;
+		tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
+		if (!roledatum)
+			goto out;
+		tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
+		if (!typedatum)
+			goto out;
+		tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+		rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	if (rc) {
+		selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
+		tmprule = NULL;
+	}
+
+	*rule = tmprule;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+		switch (f->type) {
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
+			     struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+	struct context *ctxt;
+	struct mls_level *level;
+	struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+	int match = 0;
+
+	if (unlikely(!rule)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
+		match = -ESTALE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			  sid);
+		match = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
+	   without a match */
+	switch (field) {
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+		switch (op) {
+		case Audit_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
+			break;
+		case Audit_not_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+		switch (op) {
+		case Audit_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
+			break;
+		case Audit_not_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+		switch (op) {
+		case Audit_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
+			break;
+		case Audit_not_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+		level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
+			  field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
+			 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
+		switch (op) {
+		case Audit_equal:
+			match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					     level);
+			break;
+		case Audit_not_equal:
+			match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					      level);
+			break;
+		case Audit_lt:
+			match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					       level) &&
+				 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					       level));
+			break;
+		case Audit_le:
+			match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					      level);
+			break;
+		case Audit_gt:
+			match = (mls_level_dom(level,
+					      &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
+				 !mls_level_eq(level,
+					       &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
+			break;
+		case Audit_ge:
+			match = mls_level_dom(level,
+					      &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return match;
+}
+
+static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
+
+static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
+		err = aurule_callback();
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int __init aurule_init(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
+	if (err)
+		panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
+
+	return err;
+}
+__initcall(aurule_init);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
+ * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache.  This function assumes @secattr has
+ * already been initialized.
+ *
+ */
+static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+				      u32 sid)
+{
+	u32 *sid_cache;
+
+	sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (sid_cache == NULL)
+		return;
+	secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
+		kfree(sid_cache);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	*sid_cache = sid;
+	secattr->cache->free = kfree;
+	secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
+	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
+ * SELinux SID.  If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
+ * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation.  If possible the
+ * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
+ * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
+ * conversion for future lookups.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+				   u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct context *ctx;
+	struct context ctx_new;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
+		*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
+	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
+		*sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
+		rc = -EIDRM;
+		ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
+		if (ctx == NULL)
+			goto out;
+
+		context_init(&ctx_new);
+		ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
+		ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
+		ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
+		mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
+		if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
+			rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(&ctx_new, secattr);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		rc = -EIDRM;
+		if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new))
+			goto out_free;
+
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+
+		security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
+
+		ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
+	} else
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return 0;
+out_free:
+	ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct context *ctx;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	rc = -ENOENT;
+	ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
+				  GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (secattr->domain == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
+	mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
+	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+/**
+ * security_read_policy - read the policy.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ */
+int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct policy_file fp;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*len = security_policydb_len();
+
+	*data = vmalloc_user(*len);
+	if (!*data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	fp.data = *data;
+	fp.len = *len;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp);
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	*len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;
+	return 0;
+
+}