Add the rt linux 4.1.3-rt3 as base

Import the rt linux 4.1.3-rt3 as OPNFV kvm base.

It's from git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rt/linux-rt-devel.git linux-4.1.y-rt and
the base is:

commit 0917f823c59692d751951bf5ea699a2d1e2f26a2
Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Date:   Sat Jul 25 12:13:34 2015 +0200

    Prepare v4.1.3-rt3

    Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>

We lose all the git history this way and it's not good. We
should apply another opnfv project repo in future.

Change-Id: I87543d81c9df70d99c5001fbdf646b202c19f423
Signed-off-by: Yunhong Jiang <yunhong.jiang@intel.com>

1 files changed, 6219 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/security/selinux/hooks.c b/kernel/security/selinux/hooks.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..212070e1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,6219 @@
+/*
+ *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
+ *
+ *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ *	      Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
+ *	      Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
+ *	      James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *					   Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ *			    <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
+ *		       Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ *	as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <net/icmp.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>		/* for local_port_range[] */
+#include <net/tcp.h>		/* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
+#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>	/* for network interface checks */
+#include <net/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/dccp.h>
+#include <linux/quota.h>
+#include <linux/un.h>		/* for Unix socket types */
+#include <net/af_unix.h>	/* for Unix socket types */
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
+#include <linux/syslog.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <linux/shm.h>
+
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netif.h"
+#include "netnode.h"
+#include "netport.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+
+/* SECMARK reference count */
+static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+int selinux_enforcing;
+
+static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long enforcing;
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
+		selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
+int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
+
+static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long enabled;
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
+		selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
+#else
+int selinux_enabled = 1;
+#endif
+
+static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
+
+/**
+ * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
+ * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
+ * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
+ * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.  If the always_check_network
+ * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
+{
+	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled.  Returns true
+ * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled.  If the
+ * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
+ * is always considered enabled.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
+{
+	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
+}
+
+static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+		sel_netif_flush();
+		sel_netnode_flush();
+		sel_netport_flush();
+		synchronize_net();
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * initialise the security for the init task
+ */
+static void cred_init_security(void)
+{
+	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tsec)
+		panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
+
+	tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+	cred->security = tsec;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get the security ID of a set of credentials
+ */
+static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	tsec = cred->security;
+	return tsec->sid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get the objective security ID of a task
+ */
+static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	u32 sid;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return sid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get the subjective security ID of the current task
+ */
+static inline u32 current_sid(void)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+
+	return tsec->sid;
+}
+
+/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
+
+static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!isec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	mutex_init(&isec->lock);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
+	isec->inode = inode;
+	isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
+	isec->task_sid = sid;
+	inode->i_security = isec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+	isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
+	kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
+}
+
+static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+
+	spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+	if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
+		list_del_init(&isec->list);
+	spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
+	 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
+	 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
+	 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
+	 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
+	 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
+	 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
+	 */
+	call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
+}
+
+static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!fsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	fsec->sid = sid;
+	fsec->fown_sid = sid;
+	file->f_security = fsec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+	file->f_security = NULL;
+	kfree(fsec);
+}
+
+static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+
+	sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sbsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
+	spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+	sbsec->sb = sb;
+	sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
+	sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sb->s_security = sbsec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	sb->s_security = NULL;
+	kfree(sbsec);
+}
+
+/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
+
+static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
+	"uses xattr",
+	"uses transition SIDs",
+	"uses task SIDs",
+	"uses genfs_contexts",
+	"not configured for labeling",
+	"uses mountpoint labeling",
+	"uses native labeling",
+};
+
+static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
+
+static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
+}
+
+enum {
+	Opt_error = -1,
+	Opt_context = 1,
+	Opt_fscontext = 2,
+	Opt_defcontext = 3,
+	Opt_rootcontext = 4,
+	Opt_labelsupport = 5,
+	Opt_nextmntopt = 6,
+};
+
+#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS	(Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
+
+static const match_table_t tokens = {
+	{Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+	{Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+	{Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+	{Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+	{Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
+	{Opt_error, NULL},
+};
+
+#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
+
+static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
+			struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
+			const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
+			struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
+			const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+	int rc;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+
+	return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
+		sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
+		sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
+		sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
+		/* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
+		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
+		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
+		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs");
+}
+
+static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+	struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
+		/* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
+		   error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
+		   the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
+		   the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
+		   assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
+		if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
+			       "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+			rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+		if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
+			if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
+				       "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
+				       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+			else
+				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
+				       "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
+				       sb->s_type->name, -rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
+		       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+
+	sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
+	if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
+		sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
+
+	/* Initialize the root inode. */
+	rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
+
+	/* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
+	   inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
+	   during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
+	   populates itself. */
+	spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+next_inode:
+	if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec =
+				list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
+					   struct inode_security_struct, list);
+		struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
+		list_del_init(&isec->list);
+		spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		inode = igrab(inode);
+		if (inode) {
+			if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
+				inode_doinit(inode);
+			iput(inode);
+		}
+		spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		goto next_inode;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
+ * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
+ * mount options, or whatever.
+ */
+static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
+				struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+{
+	int rc = 0, i;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	char *context = NULL;
+	u32 len;
+	char tmp;
+
+	security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
+
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
+
+	tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+	/* count the number of mount options for this sb */
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
+		if (tmp & 0x01)
+			opts->num_mnt_opts++;
+		tmp >>= 1;
+	}
+	/* Check if the Label support flag is set */
+	if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
+		opts->num_mnt_opts++;
+
+	opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	i = 0;
+	if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
+		struct inode *root = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root);
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
+
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
+	}
+
+	BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
+
+	return 0;
+
+out_free:
+	security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
+		      u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
+{
+	char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+
+	/* check if the old mount command had the same options */
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
+		if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
+		    (old_sid != new_sid))
+			return 1;
+
+	/* check if we were passed the same options twice,
+	 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
+	 */
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+		if (mnt_flags & flag)
+			return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
+ * labeling information.
+ */
+static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
+				struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+				unsigned long kern_flags,
+				unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int rc = 0, i;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root);
+	struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
+	u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
+	u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
+	char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
+	int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
+	int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
+
+	mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		if (!num_opts) {
+			/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
+			   after the initial policy is loaded and the security
+			   server is ready to handle calls. */
+			goto out;
+		}
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
+			"before the security server is initialized\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
+		/* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
+		 * place the results is not allowed */
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice.  Once
+	 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
+	 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
+	 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
+	 *
+	 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
+	 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
+	 * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
+	 * will be used for both mounts)
+	 */
+	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+	    && (num_opts == 0))
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
+	 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
+	 * than once with different security options.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
+		u32 sid;
+
+		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
+			continue;
+		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
+					     strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
+			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+			       mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		switch (flags[i]) {
+		case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
+			fscontext_sid = sid;
+
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
+					fscontext_sid))
+				goto out_double_mount;
+
+			sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
+			break;
+		case CONTEXT_MNT:
+			context_sid = sid;
+
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
+					context_sid))
+				goto out_double_mount;
+
+			sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
+			break;
+		case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
+			rootcontext_sid = sid;
+
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
+					rootcontext_sid))
+				goto out_double_mount;
+
+			sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
+
+			break;
+		case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
+			defcontext_sid = sid;
+
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
+					defcontext_sid))
+				goto out_double_mount;
+
+			sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
+
+			break;
+		default:
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
+		/* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
+		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
+			goto out_double_mount;
+		rc = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
+		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
+
+	if (!sbsec->behavior) {
+		/*
+		 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
+		 * filesystem type.
+		 */
+		rc = security_fs_use(sb);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING
+				"%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
+					__func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	/* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
+	if (fscontext_sid) {
+		rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
+	 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
+	 * the superblock context if not already set.
+	 */
+	if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
+		sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
+		*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+	}
+
+	if (context_sid) {
+		if (!fscontext_sid) {
+			rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
+							  cred);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			sbsec->sid = context_sid;
+		} else {
+			rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
+							     cred);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		if (!rootcontext_sid)
+			rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
+
+		sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
+		sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
+	}
+
+	if (rootcontext_sid) {
+		rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
+						     cred);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
+		root_isec->initialized = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (defcontext_sid) {
+		if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
+			sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
+			       "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
+			rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
+							     sbsec, cred);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
+		sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
+	}
+
+	rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
+	return rc;
+out_double_mount:
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different "
+	       "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
+				    const struct super_block *newsb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
+	char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+	char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+
+	if (oldflags != newflags)
+		goto mismatch;
+	if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
+		goto mismatch;
+	if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
+		goto mismatch;
+	if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
+		goto mismatch;
+	if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root)->i_security;
+		struct inode_security_struct *newroot = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root)->i_security;
+		if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
+			goto mismatch;
+	}
+	return 0;
+mismatch:
+	printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, "
+			    "different security settings for (dev %s, "
+			    "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
+	return -EBUSY;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
+					struct super_block *newsb)
+{
+	const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
+
+	int set_fscontext =	(oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
+	int set_context =	(oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
+	int set_rootcontext =	(oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
+
+	/*
+	 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
+	 * mount options.  thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
+	 */
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
+	BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
+
+	/* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
+	if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
+		return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
+
+	mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
+
+	newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
+
+	newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
+	newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
+	newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
+
+	if (set_context) {
+		u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+
+		if (!set_fscontext)
+			newsbsec->sid = sid;
+		if (!set_rootcontext) {
+			struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root);
+			struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
+			newisec->sid = sid;
+		}
+		newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
+	}
+	if (set_rootcontext) {
+		const struct inode *oldinode = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root);
+		const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
+		struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root);
+		struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
+
+		newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
+	}
+
+	sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
+	mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
+				  struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+{
+	char *p;
+	char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
+	char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
+	int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
+
+	opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
+
+	/* Standard string-based options. */
+	while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
+		int token;
+		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+
+		if (!*p)
+			continue;
+
+		token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
+
+		switch (token) {
+		case Opt_context:
+			if (context || defcontext) {
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!context) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case Opt_fscontext:
+			if (fscontext) {
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!fscontext) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case Opt_rootcontext:
+			if (rootcontext) {
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!rootcontext) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case Opt_defcontext:
+			if (context || defcontext) {
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!defcontext) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			break;
+		case Opt_labelsupport:
+			break;
+		default:
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount option\n");
+			goto out_err;
+
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!opts->mnt_opts)
+		goto out_err;
+
+	opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
+		kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (fscontext) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (context) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (rootcontext) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (defcontext) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+
+	opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
+	return 0;
+
+out_err:
+	kfree(context);
+	kfree(defcontext);
+	kfree(fscontext);
+	kfree(rootcontext);
+	return rc;
+}
+/*
+ * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
+ */
+static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	char *options = data;
+	struct security_mnt_opts opts;
+
+	security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
+
+	if (!data)
+		goto out;
+
+	BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
+
+	rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_err;
+
+out:
+	rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
+
+out_err:
+	security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
+			       struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+{
+	int i;
+	char *prefix;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
+		char *has_comma;
+
+		if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
+			has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
+		else
+			has_comma = NULL;
+
+		switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
+		case CONTEXT_MNT:
+			prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
+			break;
+		case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
+			prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
+			break;
+		case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
+			prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
+			break;
+		case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
+			prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
+			break;
+		case SBLABEL_MNT:
+			seq_putc(m, ',');
+			seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
+			continue;
+		default:
+			BUG();
+			return;
+		};
+		/* we need a comma before each option */
+		seq_putc(m, ',');
+		seq_puts(m, prefix);
+		if (has_comma)
+			seq_putc(m, '\"');
+		seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
+		if (has_comma)
+			seq_putc(m, '\"');
+	}
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct security_mnt_opts opts;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
+	if (rc) {
+		/* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
+		if (rc == -EINVAL)
+			rc = 0;
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
+
+	security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
+{
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFSOCK:
+		return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
+	case S_IFLNK:
+		return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
+	case S_IFREG:
+		return SECCLASS_FILE;
+	case S_IFBLK:
+		return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
+	case S_IFDIR:
+		return SECCLASS_DIR;
+	case S_IFCHR:
+		return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
+	case S_IFIFO:
+		return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
+
+	}
+
+	return SECCLASS_FILE;
+}
+
+static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
+{
+	return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
+}
+
+static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
+{
+	return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
+}
+
+static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
+{
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_UNIX:
+		switch (type) {
+		case SOCK_STREAM:
+		case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
+			return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
+		case SOCK_DGRAM:
+			return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
+		}
+		break;
+	case PF_INET:
+	case PF_INET6:
+		switch (type) {
+		case SOCK_STREAM:
+			if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
+				return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
+			else
+				return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+		case SOCK_DGRAM:
+			if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
+				return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
+			else
+				return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+		case SOCK_DCCP:
+			return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
+		default:
+			return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+		}
+		break;
+	case PF_NETLINK:
+		switch (protocol) {
+		case NETLINK_ROUTE:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_NFLOG:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_XFRM:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_SELINUX:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_AUDIT:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
+		default:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+		}
+	case PF_PACKET:
+		return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
+	case PF_KEY:
+		return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
+	case PF_APPLETALK:
+		return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
+	}
+
+	return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
+				u16 tclass,
+				u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char *buffer, *path;
+
+	buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(path))
+		rc = PTR_ERR(path);
+	else {
+		/* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
+		 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
+		 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
+		while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
+			path[1] = '/';
+			path++;
+		}
+		rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
+	}
+	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
+	return rc;
+}
+#else
+static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
+				u16 tclass,
+				u32 *sid)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
+static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	u32 sid;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
+	char *context = NULL;
+	unsigned len = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (isec->initialized)
+		goto out;
+
+	mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
+	if (isec->initialized)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
+		/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
+		   after the initial policy is loaded and the security
+		   server is ready to handle calls. */
+		spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		if (list_empty(&isec->list))
+			list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
+		spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	switch (sbsec->behavior) {
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
+		break;
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
+		if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
+			isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
+		   Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
+		if (opt_dentry) {
+			/* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
+			dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+		} else {
+			/* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
+			dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+		}
+		if (!dentry) {
+			/*
+			 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+			 * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
+			 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+			 * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as these
+			 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
+			 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
+			 * be used again by userspace.
+			 */
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
+		context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!context) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			dput(dentry);
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+		context[len] = '\0';
+		rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+					   context, len);
+		if (rc == -ERANGE) {
+			kfree(context);
+
+			/* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
+			rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+						   NULL, 0);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				dput(dentry);
+				goto out_unlock;
+			}
+			len = rc;
+			context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
+			if (!context) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				dput(dentry);
+				goto out_unlock;
+			}
+			context[len] = '\0';
+			rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
+						   XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+						   context, len);
+		}
+		dput(dentry);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			if (rc != -ENODATA) {
+				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  getxattr returned "
+				       "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
+				       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+				kfree(context);
+				goto out_unlock;
+			}
+			/* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
+			sid = sbsec->def_sid;
+			rc = 0;
+		} else {
+			rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
+							     sbsec->def_sid,
+							     GFP_NOFS);
+			if (rc) {
+				char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+				unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+				if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+					if (printk_ratelimit())
+						printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
+							"context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
+							"filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
+				} else {
+					printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
+					       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+					       __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+				}
+				kfree(context);
+				/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
+				rc = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		kfree(context);
+		isec->sid = sid;
+		break;
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
+		isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
+		break;
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
+		/* Default to the fs SID. */
+		isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
+
+		/* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
+		isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+		rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
+					     isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_unlock;
+		isec->sid = sid;
+		break;
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
+		isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
+		isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
+
+		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
+			/* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
+			 * procfs inodes */
+			if (opt_dentry)
+				/* Called from d_instantiate or
+				 * d_splice_alias. */
+				dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+			else
+				/* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
+				 * find a dentry. */
+				dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+			/*
+			 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+			 * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
+			 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+			 * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as
+			 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
+			 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
+			 * could be used again by userspace.
+			 */
+			if (!dentry)
+				goto out_unlock;
+			isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+			rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
+			dput(dentry);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out_unlock;
+			isec->sid = sid;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	isec->initialized = 1;
+
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
+out:
+	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
+		isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
+{
+	u32 perm = 0;
+
+	switch (sig) {
+	case SIGCHLD:
+		/* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
+		break;
+	case SIGKILL:
+		/* Cannot be caught or ignored */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
+		break;
+	case SIGSTOP:
+		/* Cannot be caught or ignored */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* All other signals. */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return perm;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check permission between a pair of credentials
+ * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
+ */
+static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
+			 const struct cred *target,
+			 u32 perms)
+{
+	u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
+ * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
+ * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
+ * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
+ */
+static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
+			 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
+			 u32 perms)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
+	u32 sid1, sid2;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	__tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security;	sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
+	__tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security;	sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
+ * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
+ * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
+ * - this uses current's subjective creds
+ */
+static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
+			    u32 perms)
+{
+	u32 sid, tsid;
+
+	sid = current_sid();
+	tsid = task_sid(tsk);
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
+}
+
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
+#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
+#endif
+
+/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
+static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
+			       int cap, int audit)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	u16 sclass;
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
+	int rc;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
+	ad.u.cap = cap;
+
+	switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
+	case 0:
+		sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk(KERN_ERR
+		       "SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
+		BUG();
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
+	if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
+		int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
+		if (rc2)
+			return rc2;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
+static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			   u32 perms)
+{
+	u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+			    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
+   The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
+   data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
+static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			  struct inode *inode,
+			  u32 perms,
+			  struct common_audit_data *adp)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	validate_creds(cred);
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
+}
+
+/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
+   the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
+   pathname if needed. */
+static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				  struct dentry *dentry,
+				  u32 av)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
+   the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
+   pathname if needed. */
+static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				const struct path *path,
+				u32 av)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+	ad.u.path = *path;
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
+static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				     struct file *file,
+				     u32 av)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
+   access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
+   descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
+   check a particular permission to the file.
+   Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
+   has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
+   access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
+   where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
+static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			 struct file *file,
+			 u32 av)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	int rc;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+
+	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_FD,
+				  FD__USE,
+				  &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
+	rc = 0;
+	if (av)
+		rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
+static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
+		      struct dentry *dentry,
+		      u16 tclass)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	u32 sid, newsid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	dsec = dir->i_security;
+	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+
+	sid = tsec->sid;
+	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+			  DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
+			  &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
+		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
+					     &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			    FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can create a key. */
+static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
+			  struct task_struct *ctx)
+{
+	u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
+}
+
+#define MAY_LINK	0
+#define MAY_UNLINK	1
+#define MAY_RMDIR	2
+
+/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
+static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
+		    struct dentry *dentry,
+		    int kind)
+
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	u32 av;
+	int rc;
+
+	dsec = dir->i_security;
+	isec = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+
+	av = DIR__SEARCH;
+	av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	switch (kind) {
+	case MAY_LINK:
+		av = FILE__LINK;
+		break;
+	case MAY_UNLINK:
+		av = FILE__UNLINK;
+		break;
+	case MAY_RMDIR:
+		av = DIR__RMDIR;
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized kind %d\n",
+			__func__, kind);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
+			     struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			     struct inode *new_dir,
+			     struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	u32 av;
+	int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
+	int rc;
+
+	old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
+	old_isec = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_security;
+	old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
+	new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+
+	ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+			  DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
+			  old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
+				  old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
+	av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
+	if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
+		av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
+		new_isec = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_security;
+		new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
+				  new_isec->sclass,
+				  (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
+static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			       struct super_block *sb,
+			       u32 perms,
+			       struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+
+	sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
+		if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
+			av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
+		if (mask & MAY_READ)
+			av |= FILE__READ;
+
+		if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
+			av |= FILE__APPEND;
+		else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+			av |= FILE__WRITE;
+
+	} else {
+		if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
+			av |= DIR__SEARCH;
+		if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+			av |= DIR__WRITE;
+		if (mask & MAY_READ)
+			av |= DIR__READ;
+	}
+
+	return av;
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+		av |= FILE__READ;
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+		if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
+			av |= FILE__APPEND;
+		else
+			av |= FILE__WRITE;
+	}
+	if (!av) {
+		/*
+		 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
+		 */
+		av = FILE__IOCTL;
+	}
+
+	return av;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
+ * open permission.
+ */
+static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
+{
+	u32 av = file_to_av(file);
+
+	if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
+		av |= FILE__OPEN;
+
+	return av;
+}
+
+/* Hook functions begin here. */
+
+static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
+{
+	u32 mysid = current_sid();
+	u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
+			    BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
+				      struct task_struct *to)
+{
+	u32 mysid = current_sid();
+	u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
+	u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
+	int rc;
+
+	if (mysid != fromsid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
+				  BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
+					  struct task_struct *to)
+{
+	u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
+	u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
+					struct task_struct *to,
+					struct file *file)
+{
+	u32 sid = task_sid(to);
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+
+	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_FD,
+				  FD__USE,
+				  &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
+			    &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+				     unsigned int mode)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
+		u32 sid = current_sid();
+		u32 csid = task_sid(child);
+		return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
+	}
+
+	return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+			  kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+}
+
+static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+			  const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+			  const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+			  const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	error = cap_capset(new, old,
+				      effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
+}
+
+/*
+ * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
+ * which was removed).
+ *
+ * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
+ * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
+ * need to control this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use of
+ * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
+ */
+
+static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+			   int cap, int audit)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
+}
+
+static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!sb)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (cmds) {
+	case Q_SYNC:
+	case Q_QUOTAON:
+	case Q_QUOTAOFF:
+	case Q_SETINFO:
+	case Q_SETQUOTA:
+		rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
+		break;
+	case Q_GETFMT:
+	case Q_GETINFO:
+	case Q_GETQUOTA:
+		rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
+		break;
+	default:
+		rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
+		break;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
+}
+
+static int selinux_syslog(int type)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL:	/* Read last kernel messages */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER:	/* Return size of the log buffer */
+		rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF:	/* Disable logging to console */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON:	/* Enable logging to console */
+	/* Set level of messages printed to console */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
+		rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE:	/* Close log */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN:	/* Open log */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ:	/* Read from log */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR:	/* Read/clear last kernel messages */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR:	/* Clear ring buffer */
+	default:
+		rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
+		break;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
+ * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
+ * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
+ *
+ * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
+ * processes that allocate mappings.
+ */
+static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
+{
+	int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
+
+	rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+			     SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		cap_sys_admin = 1;
+
+	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
+}
+
+/* binprm security operations */
+
+static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			    const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
+			    const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
+{
+	int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
+	int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!nnp && !nosuid)
+		return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
+
+	if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
+		return 0; /* No change in credentials */
+
+	/*
+	 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
+	 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
+	 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
+	 * of the current SID.
+	 */
+	rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
+	if (rc) {
+		/*
+		 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
+		 * NNP:  Operation not permitted for caller.
+		 * nosuid:  Permission denied to file.
+		 */
+		if (nnp)
+			return -EPERM;
+		else
+			return -EACCES;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
+	struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
+	 * the script interpreter */
+	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
+		return 0;
+
+	old_tsec = current_security();
+	new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
+	isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	/* Default to the current task SID. */
+	new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
+	new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
+
+	/* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
+	new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
+	new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
+	new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
+
+	if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
+		new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
+		/* Reset exec SID on execve. */
+		new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
+
+		/* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
+		rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	} else {
+		/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
+		rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+					     SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
+					     &new_tsec->sid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		/*
+		 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
+		 * transition.
+		 */
+		rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
+		if (rc)
+			new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
+	}
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+	ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
+
+	if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	} else {
+		/* Check permissions for the transition. */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		/* Check for shared state */
+		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
+			rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+					  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
+					  NULL);
+			if (rc)
+				return -EPERM;
+		}
+
+		/* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
+		 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
+		if (bprm->unsafe &
+		    (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+			struct task_struct *tracer;
+			struct task_security_struct *sec;
+			u32 ptsid = 0;
+
+			rcu_read_lock();
+			tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
+			if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
+				sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
+				ptsid = sec->sid;
+			}
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+
+			if (ptsid != 0) {
+				rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
+						  SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+						  PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+				if (rc)
+					return -EPERM;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
+		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	u32 sid, osid;
+	int atsecure = 0;
+
+	sid = tsec->sid;
+	osid = tsec->osid;
+
+	if (osid != sid) {
+		/* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
+		   the noatsecure permission is granted between
+		   the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
+		atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
+					SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+					PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
+	}
+
+	return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+}
+
+static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
+{
+	return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
+static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
+					    struct files_struct *files)
+{
+	struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
+	struct tty_struct *tty;
+	int drop_tty = 0;
+	unsigned n;
+
+	tty = get_current_tty();
+	if (tty) {
+		spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
+		if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
+			struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
+
+			/* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
+			   Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
+			   rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
+			   open file may belong to another process and we are
+			   only interested in the inode-based check here. */
+			file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
+						struct tty_file_private, list);
+			file = file_priv->file;
+			if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
+				drop_tty = 1;
+		}
+		spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
+		tty_kref_put(tty);
+	}
+	/* Reset controlling tty. */
+	if (drop_tty)
+		no_tty();
+
+	/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
+	n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
+	if (!n) /* none found? */
+		return;
+
+	devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
+	if (IS_ERR(devnull))
+		devnull = NULL;
+	/* replace all the matching ones with this */
+	do {
+		replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
+	} while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
+	if (devnull)
+		fput(devnull);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
+ */
+static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
+	struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
+	int rc, i;
+
+	new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
+	if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
+		return;
+
+	/* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
+	flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
+
+	/* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
+	current->pdeath_signal = 0;
+
+	/* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
+	 * SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
+	 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
+	 *
+	 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
+	 * controlled by the setrlimit check.  The inclusion of the init task's
+	 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
+	 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
+	 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
+	 */
+	rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			  PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
+	if (rc) {
+		/* protect against do_prlimit() */
+		task_lock(current);
+		for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
+			rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
+			initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
+			rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
+		}
+		task_unlock(current);
+		update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
+ * due to exec
+ */
+static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	struct itimerval itimer;
+	u32 osid, sid;
+	int rc, i;
+
+	osid = tsec->osid;
+	sid = tsec->sid;
+
+	if (sid == osid)
+		return;
+
+	/* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
+	 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
+	 * flush and unblock signals.
+	 *
+	 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
+	 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
+	 */
+	rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
+	if (rc) {
+		memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
+		for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+			do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
+		spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+		if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
+			__flush_signals(current);
+			flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
+			sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
+		}
+		spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+	}
+
+	/* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
+	 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
+	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+	__wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
+	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+}
+
+/* superblock security operations */
+
+static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
+}
+
+static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	superblock_free_security(sb);
+}
+
+static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
+{
+	if (plen > olen)
+		return 0;
+
+	return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
+{
+	return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+		match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+		match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+		match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+		match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
+}
+
+static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
+{
+	if (!*first) {
+		**to = ',';
+		*to += 1;
+	} else
+		*first = 0;
+	memcpy(*to, from, len);
+	*to += len;
+}
+
+static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
+				       int len)
+{
+	int current_size = 0;
+
+	if (!*first) {
+		**to = '|';
+		*to += 1;
+	} else
+		*first = 0;
+
+	while (current_size < len) {
+		if (*from != '"') {
+			**to = *from;
+			*to += 1;
+		}
+		from += 1;
+		current_size += 1;
+	}
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
+{
+	int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
+	char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
+	char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
+	int open_quote = 0;
+
+	in_curr = orig;
+	sec_curr = copy;
+
+	nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!nosec) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	nosec_save = nosec;
+	fnosec = fsec = 1;
+	in_save = in_end = orig;
+
+	do {
+		if (*in_end == '"')
+			open_quote = !open_quote;
+		if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
+				*in_end == '\0') {
+			int len = in_end - in_curr;
+
+			if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
+				take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
+			else
+				take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
+
+			in_curr = in_end + 1;
+		}
+	} while (*in_end++);
+
+	strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
+	free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	int rc, i, *flags;
+	struct security_mnt_opts opts;
+	char *secdata, **mount_options;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!data)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+		return 0;
+
+	security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
+	secdata = alloc_secdata();
+	if (!secdata)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_free_secdata;
+
+	rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_free_secdata;
+
+	mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
+	flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
+		u32 sid;
+		size_t len;
+
+		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
+			continue;
+		len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
+		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
+			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+			       mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+			goto out_free_opts;
+		}
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		switch (flags[i]) {
+		case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		case CONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
+			struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+			root_isec = d_backing_inode(sb->s_root)->i_security;
+
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		}
+		case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto out_free_opts;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+out_free_opts:
+	security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+out_free_secdata:
+	free_secdata(secdata);
+	return rc;
+out_bad_option:
+	printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
+	       "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
+	       sb->s_type->name);
+	goto out_free_opts;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
+	if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
+		return 0;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
+	return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
+	return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
+			 struct path *path,
+			 const char *type,
+			 unsigned long flags,
+			 void *data)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+		return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
+					   FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
+	else
+		return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
+}
+
+static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
+				   FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
+}
+
+/* inode security operations */
+
+static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return inode_alloc_security(inode);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	inode_free_security(inode);
+}
+
+static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+					struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
+					u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	struct inode *dir = d_backing_inode(dentry->d_parent);
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc;
+
+	tsec = cred->security;
+	dsec = dir->i_security;
+	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+
+	if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+		newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+	} else {
+		rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
+					     inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
+					     name,
+					     &newsid);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING
+				"%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
+			       __func__, -rc);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+				       const struct qstr *qstr,
+				       const char **name,
+				       void **value, size_t *len)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	u32 sid, newsid, clen;
+	int rc;
+	char *context;
+
+	dsec = dir->i_security;
+	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+
+	sid = tsec->sid;
+	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+
+	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
+	    (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
+		newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+	else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
+		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
+					     inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
+					     qstr, &newsid);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
+			       "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
+			       "ino=%ld)\n",
+			       __func__,
+			       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+		isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+		isec->sid = newsid;
+		isec->initialized = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (name)
+		*name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
+
+	if (value && len) {
+		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		*value = context;
+		*len = clen;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+				struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
+}
+
+static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
+					   u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+					   int result,
+					   unsigned flags)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	int rc;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
+	ad.u.inode = inode;
+
+	rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
+			    audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	u32 perms;
+	bool from_access;
+	unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 sid;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int rc, rc2;
+	u32 audited, denied;
+
+	from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
+	mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
+
+	/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
+	if (!mask)
+		return 0;
+
+	validate_creds(cred);
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
+
+	sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
+	audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
+				     from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
+				     &denied);
+	if (likely(!audited))
+		return rc;
+
+	rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
+	if (rc2)
+		return rc2;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
+	__u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
+
+	/* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
+	if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
+		ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
+			      ATTR_FORCE);
+		if (!ia_valid)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
+			ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
+		return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+
+	if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
+		av |= FILE__OPEN;
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+{
+	return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+		     sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
+		if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
+			if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
+				return -EPERM;
+		} else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+			/* A different attribute in the security namespace.
+			   Restrict to administrator. */
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
+	   ordinary setattr permission. */
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				  const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
+		return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
+
+	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+			  FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+			struct audit_buffer *ab;
+			size_t audit_size;
+			const char *str;
+
+			/* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
+			 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
+			if (value) {
+				str = value;
+				if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
+					audit_size = size - 1;
+				else
+					audit_size = size;
+			} else {
+				str = "";
+				audit_size = 0;
+			}
+			ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+			audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
+			audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
+			audit_log_end(ab);
+
+			return rc;
+		}
+		rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
+	}
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
+			  FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
+					  isec->sclass);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(newsid,
+			    sbsec->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			    FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
+			    &ad);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+					const void *value, size_t size,
+					int flags)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
+		/* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
+	if (rc) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
+		       "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
+		       inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+	isec->sid = newsid;
+	isec->initialized = 1;
+
+	return;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
+		return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
+
+	/* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
+	   You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
+ *
+ * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
+{
+	u32 size;
+	int error;
+	char *context = NULL;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
+	 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
+	 * use the in-core value under current policy.
+	 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
+	 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
+	 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
+	 * in-core context value, not a denial.
+	 */
+	error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+				SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+	if (!error)
+		error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
+						      &size);
+	else
+		error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+	error = size;
+	if (alloc) {
+		*buffer = context;
+		goto out_nofree;
+	}
+	kfree(context);
+out_nofree:
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+				     const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!value || !size)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+	isec->sid = newsid;
+	isec->initialized = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
+{
+	const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
+	if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
+		memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
+	return len;
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	*secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
+/* file security operations */
+
+static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	/* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
+	if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
+		mask |= MAY_APPEND;
+
+	return file_has_perm(cred, file,
+			     file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	if (!mask)
+		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
+	    fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
+		/* No change since file_open check. */
+		return 0;
+
+	return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	return file_alloc_security(file);
+}
+
+static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	file_free_security(file);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			      unsigned long arg)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int error = 0;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case FIONREAD:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FIBMAP:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FIGETBSZ:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
+		break;
+
+	case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
+		break;
+
+	/* sys_ioctl() checks */
+	case FIONBIO:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FIOASYNC:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
+		break;
+
+	case KDSKBENT:
+	case KDSKBSENT:
+		error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+					    SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+		break;
+
+	/* default case assumes that the command will go
+	 * to the file's ioctl() function.
+	 */
+	default:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
+	}
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int default_noexec;
+
+static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (default_noexec &&
+	    (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
+		/*
+		 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
+		 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
+		 * This has an additional check.
+		 */
+		rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
+		if (rc)
+			goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (file) {
+		/* read access is always possible with a mapping */
+		u32 av = FILE__READ;
+
+		/* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
+		if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
+			av |= FILE__WRITE;
+
+		if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+			av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
+
+		return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
+	}
+
+error:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
+	rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
+		u32 sid = current_sid();
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
+				  MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
+		prot = reqprot;
+
+	return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
+				   (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				 unsigned long reqprot,
+				 unsigned long prot)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
+		prot = reqprot;
+
+	if (default_noexec &&
+	    (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
+		int rc = 0;
+		if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
+		    vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
+			rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
+		} else if (!vma->vm_file &&
+			   vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
+			   vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
+			rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
+		} else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
+			/*
+			 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
+			 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
+			 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
+			 * modified content.  This typically should only
+			 * occur for text relocations.
+			 */
+			rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
+		}
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			      unsigned long arg)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int err = 0;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case F_SETFL:
+		if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
+			err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
+			break;
+		}
+		/* fall through */
+	case F_SETOWN:
+	case F_SETSIG:
+	case F_GETFL:
+	case F_GETOWN:
+	case F_GETSIG:
+	case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
+		/* Just check FD__USE permission */
+		err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
+		break;
+	case F_GETLK:
+	case F_SETLK:
+	case F_SETLKW:
+	case F_OFD_GETLK:
+	case F_OFD_SETLK:
+	case F_OFD_SETLKW:
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+	case F_GETLK64:
+	case F_SETLK64:
+	case F_SETLKW64:
+#endif
+		err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+
+	fsec = file->f_security;
+	fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				       struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
+{
+	struct file *file;
+	u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
+	u32 perm;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+
+	/* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
+	file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
+
+	fsec = file->f_security;
+
+	if (!signum)
+		perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
+	else
+		perm = signal_to_av(signum);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
+			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+	fsec = file->f_security;
+	isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
+	/*
+	 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
+	 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
+	 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
+	 * Task label is already saved in the file security
+	 * struct as its SID.
+	 */
+	fsec->isid = isec->sid;
+	fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
+	/*
+	 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
+	 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
+	 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
+	 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
+	 * new inode label or new policy.
+	 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
+	 */
+	return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
+}
+
+/* task security operations */
+
+static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
+{
+	return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
+}
+
+/*
+ * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
+	if (!tsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cred->security = tsec;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+
+	/*
+	 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
+	 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
+	 */
+	BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
+	cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
+	kfree(tsec);
+}
+
+/*
+ * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+				gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	old_tsec = old->security;
+
+	tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
+	if (!tsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	new->security = tsec;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+
+	*tsec = *old_tsec;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set the security data for a kernel service
+ * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
+ */
+static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
+			   SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
+			   KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
+			   NULL);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		tsec->sid = secid;
+		tsec->create_sid = 0;
+		tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
+		tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
+ * objective context of the specified inode
+ */
+static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
+			   SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
+			   KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
+			   NULL);
+
+	if (ret == 0)
+		tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+	u32 sid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	sid = task_sid(current);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
+	ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+			    SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
+}
+
+static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = task_sid(p);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
+		struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+	struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
+
+	/* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
+	   lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
+	   later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
+	   upon context transitions.  See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
+	if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
+		return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+				int sig, u32 secid)
+{
+	u32 perm;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!sig)
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
+	else
+		perm = signal_to_av(sig);
+	if (secid)
+		rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
+				  SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+	else
+		rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
+}
+
+static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
+				  struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	u32 sid = task_sid(p);
+
+	isec->sid = sid;
+	isec->initialized = 1;
+}
+
+/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
+			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+{
+	int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
+	struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
+
+	offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+	ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
+	if (ih == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
+	if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
+		goto out;
+
+	ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
+	ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
+	ret = 0;
+
+	if (proto)
+		*proto = ih->protocol;
+
+	switch (ih->protocol) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+		struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+			break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+		if (th == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+		struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+			break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+		if (uh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
+		struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
+
+		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+			break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
+		if (dh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
+		ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+
+/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
+			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+{
+	u8 nexthdr;
+	int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
+	struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
+	__be16 frag_off;
+
+	offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+	ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
+	if (ip6 == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
+	ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
+	ret = 0;
+
+	nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
+	offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
+	offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
+	if (offset < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (proto)
+		*proto = nexthdr;
+
+	switch (nexthdr) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+		struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+		th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+		if (th == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+		struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+		uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+		if (uh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
+		struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
+
+		dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
+		if (dh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
+		ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* includes fragments */
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+
+static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
+			     char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
+{
+	char *addrp;
+	int ret;
+
+	switch (ad->u.net->family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
+		if (ret)
+			goto parse_error;
+		addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
+				       &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
+		goto okay;
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+	case PF_INET6:
+		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
+		if (ret)
+			goto parse_error;
+		addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
+				       &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
+		goto okay;
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+	default:
+		addrp = NULL;
+		goto okay;
+	}
+
+parse_error:
+	printk(KERN_WARNING
+	       "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
+	       " unable to parse packet\n");
+	return ret;
+
+okay:
+	if (_addrp)
+		*_addrp = addrp;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
+ * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
+ * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp().  The function
+ * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
+ * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
+ * peer labels.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int err;
+	u32 xfrm_sid;
+	u32 nlbl_sid;
+	u32 nlbl_type;
+
+	err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return -EACCES;
+	err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
+	if (unlikely(err)) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING
+		       "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
+		       " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
+ * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
+ * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
+ * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
+ *
+ * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
+ * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
+ * @conn_sid.  If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
+ * of @sk_sid.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
+		err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
+	else
+		*conn_sid = sk_sid;
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* socket security operations */
+
+static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+				 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
+{
+	if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
+		*socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
+				       socksid);
+}
+
+static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
+
+	if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
+		return 0;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->sk = sk;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
+				 int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	u32 newsid;
+	u16 secclass;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (kern)
+		return 0;
+
+	secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+	rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+				      int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+
+	if (kern)
+		isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+	else {
+		err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	isec->initialized = 1;
+
+	if (sock->sk) {
+		sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		sksec->sid = isec->sid;
+		sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
+		err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
+   Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
+   permission check between the socket and the port number. */
+
+static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	u16 family;
+	int err;
+
+	err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
+	 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
+	 * check the first address now.
+	 */
+	family = sk->sk_family;
+	if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
+		char *addrp;
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		struct common_audit_data ad;
+		struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+		unsigned short snum;
+		u32 sid, node_perm;
+
+		if (family == PF_INET) {
+			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
+			addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+		} else {
+			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+			addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
+		}
+
+		if (snum) {
+			int low, high;
+
+			inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
+
+			if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
+				err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
+						      snum, &sid);
+				if (err)
+					goto out;
+				ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+				ad.u.net = &net;
+				ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
+				ad.u.net->family = family;
+				err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+						   sksec->sclass,
+						   SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
+				if (err)
+					goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		switch (sksec->sclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+			node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+
+		case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
+			node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+
+		case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
+			node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+		ad.u.net = &net;
+		ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
+		ad.u.net->family = family;
+
+		if (family == PF_INET)
+			ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+		else
+			ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+
+		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+				   sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	int err;
+
+	err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/*
+	 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
+	 */
+	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
+		struct common_audit_data ad;
+		struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+		unsigned short snum;
+		u32 sid, perm;
+
+		if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
+			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
+		} else {
+			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+			if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+		}
+
+		err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+
+		perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
+		       TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+		ad.u.net = &net;
+		ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
+		ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
+		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
+
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
+
+	err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
+
+	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+	newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
+	newisec->sid = isec->sid;
+	newisec->initialized = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				  int size)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				  int size, int flags)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+				     int optname)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
+					      struct sock *other,
+					      struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	int err;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->sk = other;
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
+			   sksec_other->sclass,
+			   UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* server child socket */
+	sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
+	err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
+				    &sksec_new->sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* connecting socket */
+	sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
+					struct socket *other)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
+			    &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
+				    char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
+				    struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	int err;
+	u32 if_sid;
+	u32 node_sid;
+
+	err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
+			   SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				       u16 family)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	char *addrp;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+	ad.u.net->family = family;
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
+		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	char *addrp;
+	u8 secmark_active;
+	u8 peerlbl_active;
+
+	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+
+	/* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
+	 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
+	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
+	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+		return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
+
+	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+		return 0;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+	ad.u.net->family = family;
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (peerlbl_active) {
+		u32 peer_sid;
+
+		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
+					       addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
+		if (err) {
+			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
+			return err;
+		}
+		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
+				   PEER__RECV, &ad);
+		if (err) {
+			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
+			return err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (secmark_active) {
+		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+					    int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	char *scontext;
+	u32 scontext_len;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
+		peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
+	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+
+	err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (scontext_len > len) {
+		err = -ERANGE;
+		goto out_len;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
+		err = -EFAULT;
+
+out_len:
+	if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
+		err = -EFAULT;
+	kfree(scontext);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+{
+	u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
+	u16 family;
+
+	if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+	else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
+		family = PF_INET6;
+	else if (sock)
+		family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+	else
+		goto out;
+
+	if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
+		selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
+	else if (skb)
+		selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
+
+out:
+	*secid = peer_secid;
+	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+	sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
+	if (!sksec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
+	sk->sk_security = sksec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	sk->sk_security = NULL;
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
+	kfree(sksec);
+}
+
+static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+	newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
+	newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
+	newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
+}
+
+static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
+{
+	if (!sk)
+		*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
+	else {
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+		*secid = sksec->sid;
+	}
+}
+
+static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
+	    sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		isec->sid = sksec->sid;
+	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				     struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	int err;
+	u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
+	u32 connsid;
+	u32 peersid;
+
+	err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	req->secid = connsid;
+	req->peer_secid = peersid;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
+				   const struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+	newsksec->sid = req->secid;
+	newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
+	/* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
+	   new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
+	   So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
+	   time it will have been created and available. */
+
+	/* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
+	 * thread with access to newsksec */
+	selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+
+	selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
+}
+
+static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
+	u32 tsid;
+
+	__tsec = current_security();
+	tsid = __tsec->sid;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+}
+
+static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+	atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+}
+
+static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
+				      struct flowi *fl)
+{
+	fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
+{
+	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
+
+	tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tunsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	tunsec->sid = current_sid();
+
+	*security = tunsec;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
+{
+	kfree(security);
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	/* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
+	 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
+	 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
+	 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
+	 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
+	 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
+{
+	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+			    TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
+{
+	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
+	 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
+	 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
+	 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
+	 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
+	 * protocols were being used */
+
+	sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
+	sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
+{
+	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int err;
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+			   TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+			   TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	tunsec->sid = sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	u32 perm;
+	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
+
+	err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
+	if (err) {
+		if (err == -EINVAL) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING
+			       "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
+			       " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
+			       sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
+			if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
+				err = 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Ignore */
+		if (err == -ENOENT)
+			err = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				       const struct net_device *indev,
+				       u16 family)
+{
+	int err;
+	char *addrp;
+	u32 peer_sid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	u8 secmark_active;
+	u8 netlbl_active;
+	u8 peerlbl_active;
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+	netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
+	ad.u.net->family = family;
+	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	if (peerlbl_active) {
+		err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
+					       addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
+		if (err) {
+			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
+			return NF_DROP;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (secmark_active)
+		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+				 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP;
+
+	if (netlbl_active)
+		/* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
+		 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
+		 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
+		 * protection */
+		if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
+			return NF_DROP;
+
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
+					 struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
+					 struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
+}
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				      u16 family)
+{
+	struct sock *sk;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	if (!netlbl_enabled())
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	/* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
+	 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
+	 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
+	sk = skb->sk;
+	if (sk) {
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+		if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
+			/* if the socket is the listening state then this
+			 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
+			 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
+			 * not the parent socket.  unfortunately, we can't
+			 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
+			 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
+			 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
+			 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
+			 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
+			 * layer).  it is far from ideal, but until we get a
+			 * security label in the packet itself this is the
+			 * best we can do. */
+			return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+		/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
+		sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		sid = sksec->sid;
+	} else
+		sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+	if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
+					struct sk_buff *skb,
+					const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
+						int ifindex,
+						u16 family)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	char *addrp;
+	u8 proto;
+
+	if (sk == NULL)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+	sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
+	ad.u.net->family = family;
+	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
+		if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
+				 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+	if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
+		return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 const struct net_device *outdev,
+					 u16 family)
+{
+	u32 secmark_perm;
+	u32 peer_sid;
+	int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
+	struct sock *sk;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	char *addrp;
+	u8 secmark_active;
+	u8 peerlbl_active;
+
+	/* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
+	 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
+	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
+	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+		return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
+
+	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	sk = skb->sk;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
+	/* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
+	 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
+	 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
+	 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
+	 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
+	 *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
+	 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
+	 *       TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
+	 *       is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
+	 *       unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
+	 *       connection. */
+	if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
+	    !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+#endif
+
+	if (sk == NULL) {
+		/* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
+		 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
+		 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
+		 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
+		if (skb->skb_iif) {
+			secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
+			if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
+				return NF_DROP;
+		} else {
+			secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+			peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+		}
+	} else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
+		/* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
+		 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet.  In
+		 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
+		 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
+		 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
+		 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
+		 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
+		 * selinux_inet_conn_request().  See also selinux_ip_output()
+		 * for similar problems. */
+		u32 skb_sid;
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
+			return NF_DROP;
+		/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
+		 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
+		 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
+		 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
+		 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
+		 * pass the packet. */
+		if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+			switch (family) {
+			case PF_INET:
+				if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+					return NF_ACCEPT;
+				break;
+			case PF_INET6:
+				if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+					return NF_ACCEPT;
+				break;
+			default:
+				return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+			}
+		}
+		if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
+			return NF_DROP;
+		secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+	} else {
+		/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
+		 * associated socket. */
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		peer_sid = sksec->sid;
+		secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+	}
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
+	ad.u.net->family = family;
+	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	if (secmark_active)
+		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+				 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+	if (peerlbl_active) {
+		u32 if_sid;
+		u32 node_sid;
+
+		if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
+			return NF_DROP;
+		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
+				 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+		if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
+			return NF_DROP;
+		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
+				 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+	}
+
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
+					   struct sk_buff *skb,
+					   const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
+					   struct sk_buff *skb,
+					   const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
+}
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+
+#endif	/* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+
+static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
+}
+
+static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
+			      struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
+			      u16 sclass)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!isec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	sid = task_sid(task);
+	isec->sclass = sclass;
+	isec->sid = sid;
+	perm->security = isec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
+	perm->security = NULL;
+	kfree(isec);
+}
+
+static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+
+	msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!msec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	msg->security = msec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
+
+	msg->security = NULL;
+	kfree(msec);
+}
+
+static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
+			u32 perms)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = ipc_perms->security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
+}
+
+static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	msg_msg_free_security(msg);
+}
+
+/* message queue security operations */
+static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+			  MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
+	if (rc) {
+		ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+	ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+			    MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
+{
+	int err;
+	int perms;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case MSG_INFO:
+		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+		return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT:
+		perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+		perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
+		break;
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int rc;
+
+	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
+	msec = msg->security;
+
+	/*
+	 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
+	 */
+	if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
+		/*
+		 * Compute new sid based on current process and
+		 * message queue this message will be stored in
+		 */
+		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
+					     NULL, &msec->sid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
+
+	/* Can this process write to the queue? */
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+			  MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
+	if (!rc)
+		/* Can this process send the message */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
+				  MSG__SEND, &ad);
+	if (!rc)
+		/* Can the message be put in the queue? */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+				  MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+				    struct task_struct *target,
+				    long type, int mode)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = task_sid(target);
+	int rc;
+
+	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
+	msec = msg->security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
+			  SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Shared Memory security operations */
+static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+			  SHM__CREATE, &ad);
+	if (rc) {
+		ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+	ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
+}
+
+static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+			    SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
+static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
+{
+	int perms;
+	int err;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SHM_INFO:
+		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+		return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT:
+		perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+		perms = SHM__SETATTR;
+		break;
+	case SHM_LOCK:
+	case SHM_UNLOCK:
+		perms = SHM__LOCK;
+		break;
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		perms = SHM__DESTROY;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
+			     char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
+{
+	u32 perms;
+
+	if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
+		perms = SHM__READ;
+	else
+		perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
+
+	return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
+}
+
+/* Semaphore security operations */
+static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+			  SEM__CREATE, &ad);
+	if (rc) {
+		ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+	ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+			    SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
+static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
+{
+	int err;
+	u32 perms;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SEM_INFO:
+		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+		return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
+	case GETPID:
+	case GETNCNT:
+	case GETZCNT:
+		perms = SEM__GETATTR;
+		break;
+	case GETVAL:
+	case GETALL:
+		perms = SEM__READ;
+		break;
+	case SETVAL:
+	case SETALL:
+		perms = SEM__WRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		perms = SEM__DESTROY;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+		perms = SEM__SETATTR;
+		break;
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT:
+		perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
+			     struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
+{
+	u32 perms;
+
+	if (alter)
+		perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
+	else
+		perms = SEM__READ;
+
+	return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	av = 0;
+	if (flag & S_IRUGO)
+		av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
+	if (flag & S_IWUGO)
+		av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
+
+	if (av == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
+}
+
+static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+	*secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
+static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (inode)
+		inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
+			       char *name, char **value)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
+	u32 sid;
+	int error;
+	unsigned len;
+
+	if (current != p) {
+		error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	__tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
+
+	if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+		sid = __tsec->sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
+		sid = __tsec->osid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+		sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+		sid = __tsec->create_sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
+		sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+		sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
+	else
+		goto invalid;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (!sid)
+		return 0;
+
+	error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+	return len;
+
+invalid:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
+			       char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct task_struct *tracer;
+	struct cred *new;
+	u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
+	int error;
+	char *str = value;
+
+	if (current != p) {
+		/* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
+		   security attributes. */
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
+	 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
+	 * above restriction is ever removed.
+	 */
+	if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+		error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+		error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
+		error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+		error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+		error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
+	else
+		error = -EINVAL;
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	/* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
+	if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
+		if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
+			str[size-1] = 0;
+			size--;
+		}
+		error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
+			if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+				struct audit_buffer *ab;
+				size_t audit_size;
+
+				/* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
+				 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
+				if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
+					audit_size = size - 1;
+				else
+					audit_size = size;
+				ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+				audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
+				audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
+				audit_log_end(ab);
+
+				return error;
+			}
+			error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
+							      &sid);
+		}
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+	}
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* Permission checking based on the specified context is
+	   performed during the actual operation (execve,
+	   open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
+	   operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
+	   checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
+	   operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
+	tsec = new->security;
+	if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
+		tsec->exec_sid = sid;
+	} else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
+		tsec->create_sid = sid;
+	} else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
+		error = may_create_key(sid, p);
+		if (error)
+			goto abort_change;
+		tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
+	} else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
+		tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
+	} else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
+		error = -EINVAL;
+		if (sid == 0)
+			goto abort_change;
+
+		/* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
+		error = -EPERM;
+		if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
+			error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
+			if (error)
+				goto abort_change;
+		}
+
+		/* Check permissions for the transition. */
+		error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				     PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
+		if (error)
+			goto abort_change;
+
+		/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
+		   Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
+		ptsid = 0;
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
+		if (tracer)
+			ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		if (tracer) {
+			error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+					     PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+			if (error)
+				goto abort_change;
+		}
+
+		tsec->sid = sid;
+	} else {
+		error = -EINVAL;
+		goto abort_change;
+	}
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return size;
+
+abort_change:
+	abort_creds(new);
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
+{
+	return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
+}
+
+static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+{
+	return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
+}
+
+static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+{
+	kfree(secdata);
+}
+
+/*
+ *	called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ *	called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	int len = 0;
+	len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
+						ctx, true);
+	if (len < 0)
+		return len;
+	*ctxlen = len;
+	return 0;
+}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
+			     unsigned long flags)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec;
+
+	ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ksec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	tsec = cred->security;
+	if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
+		ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
+	else
+		ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
+
+	k->security = ksec;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
+{
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
+
+	k->security = NULL;
+	kfree(ksec);
+}
+
+static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
+				  const struct cred *cred,
+				  unsigned perm)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	/* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
+	   permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
+	   appear to be created. */
+	if (perm == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sid = cred_sid(cred);
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	ksec = key->security;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
+	char *context = NULL;
+	unsigned len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = len;
+	*_buffer = context;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
+	.name =				"selinux",
+
+	.binder_set_context_mgr =	selinux_binder_set_context_mgr,
+	.binder_transaction =		selinux_binder_transaction,
+	.binder_transfer_binder =	selinux_binder_transfer_binder,
+	.binder_transfer_file =		selinux_binder_transfer_file,
+
+	.ptrace_access_check =		selinux_ptrace_access_check,
+	.ptrace_traceme =		selinux_ptrace_traceme,
+	.capget =			selinux_capget,
+	.capset =			selinux_capset,
+	.capable =			selinux_capable,
+	.quotactl =			selinux_quotactl,
+	.quota_on =			selinux_quota_on,
+	.syslog =			selinux_syslog,
+	.vm_enough_memory =		selinux_vm_enough_memory,
+
+	.netlink_send =			selinux_netlink_send,
+
+	.bprm_set_creds =		selinux_bprm_set_creds,
+	.bprm_committing_creds =	selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
+	.bprm_committed_creds =		selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
+	.bprm_secureexec =		selinux_bprm_secureexec,
+
+	.sb_alloc_security =		selinux_sb_alloc_security,
+	.sb_free_security =		selinux_sb_free_security,
+	.sb_copy_data =			selinux_sb_copy_data,
+	.sb_remount =			selinux_sb_remount,
+	.sb_kern_mount =		selinux_sb_kern_mount,
+	.sb_show_options =		selinux_sb_show_options,
+	.sb_statfs =			selinux_sb_statfs,
+	.sb_mount =			selinux_mount,
+	.sb_umount =			selinux_umount,
+	.sb_set_mnt_opts =		selinux_set_mnt_opts,
+	.sb_clone_mnt_opts =		selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
+	.sb_parse_opts_str = 		selinux_parse_opts_str,
+
+	.dentry_init_security =		selinux_dentry_init_security,
+
+	.inode_alloc_security =		selinux_inode_alloc_security,
+	.inode_free_security =		selinux_inode_free_security,
+	.inode_init_security =		selinux_inode_init_security,
+	.inode_create =			selinux_inode_create,
+	.inode_link =			selinux_inode_link,
+	.inode_unlink =			selinux_inode_unlink,
+	.inode_symlink =		selinux_inode_symlink,
+	.inode_mkdir =			selinux_inode_mkdir,
+	.inode_rmdir =			selinux_inode_rmdir,
+	.inode_mknod =			selinux_inode_mknod,
+	.inode_rename =			selinux_inode_rename,
+	.inode_readlink =		selinux_inode_readlink,
+	.inode_follow_link =		selinux_inode_follow_link,
+	.inode_permission =		selinux_inode_permission,
+	.inode_setattr =		selinux_inode_setattr,
+	.inode_getattr =		selinux_inode_getattr,
+	.inode_setxattr =		selinux_inode_setxattr,
+	.inode_post_setxattr =		selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
+	.inode_getxattr =		selinux_inode_getxattr,
+	.inode_listxattr =		selinux_inode_listxattr,
+	.inode_removexattr =		selinux_inode_removexattr,
+	.inode_getsecurity =		selinux_inode_getsecurity,
+	.inode_setsecurity =		selinux_inode_setsecurity,
+	.inode_listsecurity =		selinux_inode_listsecurity,
+	.inode_getsecid =		selinux_inode_getsecid,
+
+	.file_permission =		selinux_file_permission,
+	.file_alloc_security =		selinux_file_alloc_security,
+	.file_free_security =		selinux_file_free_security,
+	.file_ioctl =			selinux_file_ioctl,
+	.mmap_file =			selinux_mmap_file,
+	.mmap_addr =			selinux_mmap_addr,
+	.file_mprotect =		selinux_file_mprotect,
+	.file_lock =			selinux_file_lock,
+	.file_fcntl =			selinux_file_fcntl,
+	.file_set_fowner =		selinux_file_set_fowner,
+	.file_send_sigiotask =		selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
+	.file_receive =			selinux_file_receive,
+
+	.file_open =			selinux_file_open,
+
+	.task_create =			selinux_task_create,
+	.cred_alloc_blank =		selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
+	.cred_free =			selinux_cred_free,
+	.cred_prepare =			selinux_cred_prepare,
+	.cred_transfer =		selinux_cred_transfer,
+	.kernel_act_as =		selinux_kernel_act_as,
+	.kernel_create_files_as =	selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
+	.kernel_module_request =	selinux_kernel_module_request,
+	.task_setpgid =			selinux_task_setpgid,
+	.task_getpgid =			selinux_task_getpgid,
+	.task_getsid =			selinux_task_getsid,
+	.task_getsecid =		selinux_task_getsecid,
+	.task_setnice =			selinux_task_setnice,
+	.task_setioprio =		selinux_task_setioprio,
+	.task_getioprio =		selinux_task_getioprio,
+	.task_setrlimit =		selinux_task_setrlimit,
+	.task_setscheduler =		selinux_task_setscheduler,
+	.task_getscheduler =		selinux_task_getscheduler,
+	.task_movememory =		selinux_task_movememory,
+	.task_kill =			selinux_task_kill,
+	.task_wait =			selinux_task_wait,
+	.task_to_inode =		selinux_task_to_inode,
+
+	.ipc_permission =		selinux_ipc_permission,
+	.ipc_getsecid =			selinux_ipc_getsecid,
+
+	.msg_msg_alloc_security =	selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
+	.msg_msg_free_security =	selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
+
+	.msg_queue_alloc_security =	selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
+	.msg_queue_free_security =	selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
+	.msg_queue_associate =		selinux_msg_queue_associate,
+	.msg_queue_msgctl =		selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
+	.msg_queue_msgsnd =		selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
+	.msg_queue_msgrcv =		selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
+
+	.shm_alloc_security =		selinux_shm_alloc_security,
+	.shm_free_security =		selinux_shm_free_security,
+	.shm_associate =		selinux_shm_associate,
+	.shm_shmctl =			selinux_shm_shmctl,
+	.shm_shmat =			selinux_shm_shmat,
+
+	.sem_alloc_security =		selinux_sem_alloc_security,
+	.sem_free_security =		selinux_sem_free_security,
+	.sem_associate =		selinux_sem_associate,
+	.sem_semctl =			selinux_sem_semctl,
+	.sem_semop =			selinux_sem_semop,
+
+	.d_instantiate =		selinux_d_instantiate,
+
+	.getprocattr =			selinux_getprocattr,
+	.setprocattr =			selinux_setprocattr,
+
+	.ismaclabel =			selinux_ismaclabel,
+	.secid_to_secctx =		selinux_secid_to_secctx,
+	.secctx_to_secid =		selinux_secctx_to_secid,
+	.release_secctx =		selinux_release_secctx,
+	.inode_notifysecctx =		selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
+	.inode_setsecctx =		selinux_inode_setsecctx,
+	.inode_getsecctx =		selinux_inode_getsecctx,
+
+	.unix_stream_connect =		selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
+	.unix_may_send =		selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
+
+	.socket_create =		selinux_socket_create,
+	.socket_post_create =		selinux_socket_post_create,
+	.socket_bind =			selinux_socket_bind,
+	.socket_connect =		selinux_socket_connect,
+	.socket_listen =		selinux_socket_listen,
+	.socket_accept =		selinux_socket_accept,
+	.socket_sendmsg =		selinux_socket_sendmsg,
+	.socket_recvmsg =		selinux_socket_recvmsg,
+	.socket_getsockname =		selinux_socket_getsockname,
+	.socket_getpeername =		selinux_socket_getpeername,
+	.socket_getsockopt =		selinux_socket_getsockopt,
+	.socket_setsockopt =		selinux_socket_setsockopt,
+	.socket_shutdown =		selinux_socket_shutdown,
+	.socket_sock_rcv_skb =		selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
+	.socket_getpeersec_stream =	selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
+	.socket_getpeersec_dgram =	selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+	.sk_alloc_security =		selinux_sk_alloc_security,
+	.sk_free_security =		selinux_sk_free_security,
+	.sk_clone_security =		selinux_sk_clone_security,
+	.sk_getsecid =			selinux_sk_getsecid,
+	.sock_graft =			selinux_sock_graft,
+	.inet_conn_request =		selinux_inet_conn_request,
+	.inet_csk_clone =		selinux_inet_csk_clone,
+	.inet_conn_established =	selinux_inet_conn_established,
+	.secmark_relabel_packet =	selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
+	.secmark_refcount_inc =		selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
+	.secmark_refcount_dec =		selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
+	.req_classify_flow =		selinux_req_classify_flow,
+	.tun_dev_alloc_security =	selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security,
+	.tun_dev_free_security =	selinux_tun_dev_free_security,
+	.tun_dev_create =		selinux_tun_dev_create,
+	.tun_dev_attach_queue =		selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
+	.tun_dev_attach =		selinux_tun_dev_attach,
+	.tun_dev_open =			selinux_tun_dev_open,
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+	.xfrm_policy_alloc_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
+	.xfrm_policy_clone_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
+	.xfrm_policy_free_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
+	.xfrm_policy_delete_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
+	.xfrm_state_alloc =		selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
+	.xfrm_state_alloc_acquire =	selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
+	.xfrm_state_free_security =	selinux_xfrm_state_free,
+	.xfrm_state_delete_security =	selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
+	.xfrm_policy_lookup =		selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
+	.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =	selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
+	.xfrm_decode_session =		selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	.key_alloc =			selinux_key_alloc,
+	.key_free =			selinux_key_free,
+	.key_permission =		selinux_key_permission,
+	.key_getsecurity =		selinux_key_getsecurity,
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	.audit_rule_init =		selinux_audit_rule_init,
+	.audit_rule_known =		selinux_audit_rule_known,
+	.audit_rule_match =		selinux_audit_rule_match,
+	.audit_rule_free =		selinux_audit_rule_free,
+#endif
+};
+
+static __init int selinux_init(void)
+{
+	if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
+		selinux_enabled = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
+
+	/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
+	cred_init_security();
+
+	default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
+
+	sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
+					    sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
+					    0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	avc_init();
+
+	if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
+		panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
+
+	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
+		panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
+
+	if (selinux_enforcing)
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
+	else
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
+{
+	superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
+}
+
+void selinux_complete_init(void)
+{
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
+
+	/* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
+	iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
+}
+
+/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
+   all processes and objects when they are created. */
+security_initcall(selinux_init);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
+
+static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv4_postroute,
+		.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV4,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
+		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+	},
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv4_forward,
+		.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV4,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_FORWARD,
+		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv4_output,
+		.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV4,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv6_postroute,
+		.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV6,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
+		.priority =	NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+	},
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv6_forward,
+		.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV6,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_FORWARD,
+		.priority =	NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+};
+
+static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
+
+	err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
+	if (err)
+		panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
+{
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
+
+	nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
+}
+#endif
+
+#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
+#endif
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+static int selinux_disabled;
+
+int selinux_disable(void)
+{
+	if (ss_initialized) {
+		/* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (selinux_disabled) {
+		/* Only do this once. */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
+
+	selinux_disabled = 1;
+	selinux_enabled = 0;
+
+	reset_security_ops();
+
+	/* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
+	avc_disable();
+
+	/* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
+	selinux_nf_ip_exit();
+
+	/* Unregister selinuxfs. */
+	exit_sel_fs();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif