diff options
author | 2015-08-04 12:17:53 -0700 | |
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committer | 2015-08-04 15:44:42 -0700 | |
commit | 9ca8dbcc65cfc63d6f5ef3312a33184e1d726e00 (patch) | |
tree | 1c9cafbcd35f783a87880a10f85d1a060db1a563 /kernel/net/ipv4/syncookies.c | |
parent | 98260f3884f4a202f9ca5eabed40b1354c489b29 (diff) |
Add the rt linux 4.1.3-rt3 as base
Import the rt linux 4.1.3-rt3 as OPNFV kvm base.
It's from git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rt/linux-rt-devel.git linux-4.1.y-rt and
the base is:
commit 0917f823c59692d751951bf5ea699a2d1e2f26a2
Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Date: Sat Jul 25 12:13:34 2015 +0200
Prepare v4.1.3-rt3
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
We lose all the git history this way and it's not good. We
should apply another opnfv project repo in future.
Change-Id: I87543d81c9df70d99c5001fbdf646b202c19f423
Signed-off-by: Yunhong Jiang <yunhong.jiang@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/net/ipv4/syncookies.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 401 |
1 files changed, 401 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/net/ipv4/syncookies.c b/kernel/net/ipv4/syncookies.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..df849e5a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/net/ipv4/syncookies.c @@ -0,0 +1,401 @@ +/* + * Syncookies implementation for the Linux kernel + * + * Copyright (C) 1997 Andi Kleen + * Based on ideas by D.J.Bernstein and Eric Schenk. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#include <linux/tcp.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/cryptohash.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <net/tcp.h> +#include <net/route.h> + +extern int sysctl_tcp_syncookies; + +static u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-4+SHA_DIGEST_WORDS] __read_mostly; + +#define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */ +#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1) + +/* TCP Timestamp: 6 lowest bits of timestamp sent in the cookie SYN-ACK + * stores TCP options: + * + * MSB LSB + * | 31 ... 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 2 1 0 | + * | Timestamp | ECN | SACK | WScale | + * + * When we receive a valid cookie-ACK, we look at the echoed tsval (if + * any) to figure out which TCP options we should use for the rebuilt + * connection. + * + * A WScale setting of '0xf' (which is an invalid scaling value) + * means that original syn did not include the TCP window scaling option. + */ +#define TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK 0xf +#define TS_OPT_SACK BIT(4) +#define TS_OPT_ECN BIT(5) +/* There is no TS_OPT_TIMESTAMP: + * if ACK contains timestamp option, we already know it was + * requested/supported by the syn/synack exchange. + */ +#define TSBITS 6 +#define TSMASK (((__u32)1 << TSBITS) - 1) + +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [16 + 5 + SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS], + ipv4_cookie_scratch); + +static u32 cookie_hash(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport, + u32 count, int c) +{ + __u32 *tmp; + + net_get_random_once(syncookie_secret, sizeof(syncookie_secret)); + + tmp = this_cpu_ptr(ipv4_cookie_scratch); + memcpy(tmp + 4, syncookie_secret[c], sizeof(syncookie_secret[c])); + tmp[0] = (__force u32)saddr; + tmp[1] = (__force u32)daddr; + tmp[2] = ((__force u32)sport << 16) + (__force u32)dport; + tmp[3] = count; + sha_transform(tmp + 16, (__u8 *)tmp, tmp + 16 + 5); + + return tmp[17]; +} + + +/* + * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we encode + * tcp options in the lower bits of the timestamp value that will be + * sent in the syn-ack. + * Since subsequent timestamps use the normal tcp_time_stamp value, we + * must make sure that the resulting initial timestamp is <= tcp_time_stamp. + */ +__u32 cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock *req) +{ + struct inet_request_sock *ireq; + u32 ts, ts_now = tcp_time_stamp; + u32 options = 0; + + ireq = inet_rsk(req); + + options = ireq->wscale_ok ? ireq->snd_wscale : TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK; + if (ireq->sack_ok) + options |= TS_OPT_SACK; + if (ireq->ecn_ok) + options |= TS_OPT_ECN; + + ts = ts_now & ~TSMASK; + ts |= options; + if (ts > ts_now) { + ts >>= TSBITS; + ts--; + ts <<= TSBITS; + ts |= options; + } + return ts; +} + + +static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, + __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 data) +{ + /* + * Compute the secure sequence number. + * The output should be: + * HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24) + * + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24). + * Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every + * minute by 1. + * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the + * MSS into the second hash value. + */ + u32 count = tcp_cookie_time(); + return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + + sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) + + ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data) + & COOKIEMASK)); +} + +/* + * This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie. + * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of + * range. This must be checked by the caller. + * + * The count value used to generate the cookie must be less than + * MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE minutes in the past. + * The return value (__u32)-1 if this test fails. + */ +static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, + __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq) +{ + u32 diff, count = tcp_cookie_time(); + + /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */ + cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq; + + /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */ + diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) -1 >> COOKIEBITS); + if (diff >= MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE) + return (__u32)-1; + + return (cookie - + cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count - diff, 1)) + & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */ +} + +/* + * MSS Values are chosen based on the 2011 paper + * 'An Analysis of TCP Maximum Segement Sizes' by S. Alcock and R. Nelson. + * Values .. + * .. lower than 536 are rare (< 0.2%) + * .. between 537 and 1299 account for less than < 1.5% of observed values + * .. in the 1300-1349 range account for about 15 to 20% of observed mss values + * .. exceeding 1460 are very rare (< 0.04%) + * + * 1460 is the single most frequently announced mss value (30 to 46% depending + * on monitor location). Table must be sorted. + */ +static __u16 const msstab[] = { + 536, + 1300, + 1440, /* 1440, 1452: PPPoE */ + 1460, +}; + +/* + * Generate a syncookie. mssp points to the mss, which is returned + * rounded down to the value encoded in the cookie. + */ +u32 __cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th, + u16 *mssp) +{ + int mssind; + const __u16 mss = *mssp; + + for (mssind = ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) - 1; mssind ; mssind--) + if (mss >= msstab[mssind]) + break; + *mssp = msstab[mssind]; + + return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph->saddr, iph->daddr, + th->source, th->dest, ntohl(th->seq), + mssind); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_init_sequence); + +__u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, + __u16 *mssp) +{ + const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb); + const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); + + tcp_synq_overflow(sk); + NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESSENT); + + return __cookie_v4_init_sequence(iph, th, mssp); +} + +/* + * Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie. + * Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not. + */ +int __cookie_v4_check(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th, + u32 cookie) +{ + __u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1; + __u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, iph->saddr, iph->daddr, + th->source, th->dest, seq); + + return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_check); + +static struct sock *get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct request_sock *req, + struct dst_entry *dst) +{ + struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); + struct sock *child; + + child = icsk->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst); + if (child) { + atomic_set(&req->rsk_refcnt, 1); + inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, child); + } else { + reqsk_free(req); + } + return child; +} + + +/* + * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we stored + * additional tcp options in the timestamp. + * This extracts these options from the timestamp echo. + * + * return false if we decode a tcp option that is disabled + * on the host. + */ +bool cookie_timestamp_decode(struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt) +{ + /* echoed timestamp, lowest bits contain options */ + u32 options = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr; + + if (!tcp_opt->saw_tstamp) { + tcp_clear_options(tcp_opt); + return true; + } + + if (!sysctl_tcp_timestamps) + return false; + + tcp_opt->sack_ok = (options & TS_OPT_SACK) ? TCP_SACK_SEEN : 0; + + if (tcp_opt->sack_ok && !sysctl_tcp_sack) + return false; + + if ((options & TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK) == TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK) + return true; /* no window scaling */ + + tcp_opt->wscale_ok = 1; + tcp_opt->snd_wscale = options & TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK; + + return sysctl_tcp_window_scaling != 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_timestamp_decode); + +bool cookie_ecn_ok(const struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt, + const struct net *net, const struct dst_entry *dst) +{ + bool ecn_ok = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr & TS_OPT_ECN; + + if (!ecn_ok) + return false; + + if (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn) + return true; + + return dst_feature(dst, RTAX_FEATURE_ECN); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_ecn_ok); + +struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct ip_options *opt = &TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4.opt; + struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt; + struct inet_request_sock *ireq; + struct tcp_request_sock *treq; + struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); + const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); + __u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1; + struct sock *ret = sk; + struct request_sock *req; + int mss; + struct rtable *rt; + __u8 rcv_wscale; + struct flowi4 fl4; + + if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst) + goto out; + + if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk)) + goto out; + + mss = __cookie_v4_check(ip_hdr(skb), th, cookie); + if (mss == 0) { + NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED); + goto out; + } + + NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESRECV); + + /* check for timestamp cookie support */ + memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt)); + tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, 0, NULL); + + if (!cookie_timestamp_decode(&tcp_opt)) + goto out; + + ret = NULL; + req = inet_reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops, sk); /* for safety */ + if (!req) + goto out; + + ireq = inet_rsk(req); + treq = tcp_rsk(req); + treq->rcv_isn = ntohl(th->seq) - 1; + treq->snt_isn = cookie; + req->mss = mss; + ireq->ir_num = ntohs(th->dest); + ireq->ir_rmt_port = th->source; + sk_rcv_saddr_set(req_to_sk(req), ip_hdr(skb)->daddr); + sk_daddr_set(req_to_sk(req), ip_hdr(skb)->saddr); + ireq->ir_mark = inet_request_mark(sk, skb); + ireq->snd_wscale = tcp_opt.snd_wscale; + ireq->sack_ok = tcp_opt.sack_ok; + ireq->wscale_ok = tcp_opt.wscale_ok; + ireq->tstamp_ok = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp; + req->ts_recent = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsval : 0; + treq->snt_synack = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr : 0; + treq->tfo_listener = false; + + ireq->ir_iif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if; + + /* We throwed the options of the initial SYN away, so we hope + * the ACK carries the same options again (see RFC1122 4.2.3.8) + */ + ireq->opt = tcp_v4_save_options(skb); + + if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) { + reqsk_free(req); + goto out; + } + + req->num_retrans = 0; + + /* + * We need to lookup the route here to get at the correct + * window size. We should better make sure that the window size + * hasn't changed since we received the original syn, but I see + * no easy way to do this. + */ + flowi4_init_output(&fl4, sk->sk_bound_dev_if, ireq->ir_mark, + RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, IPPROTO_TCP, + inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk), + opt->srr ? opt->faddr : ireq->ir_rmt_addr, + ireq->ir_loc_addr, th->source, th->dest); + security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4)); + rt = ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk), &fl4); + if (IS_ERR(rt)) { + reqsk_free(req); + goto out; + } + + /* Try to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack did. */ + req->window_clamp = tp->window_clamp ? :dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_WINDOW); + + tcp_select_initial_window(tcp_full_space(sk), req->mss, + &req->rcv_wnd, &req->window_clamp, + ireq->wscale_ok, &rcv_wscale, + dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_INITRWND)); + + ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale; + ireq->ecn_ok = cookie_ecn_ok(&tcp_opt, sock_net(sk), &rt->dst); + + ret = get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst); + /* ip_queue_xmit() depends on our flow being setup + * Normal sockets get it right from inet_csk_route_child_sock() + */ + if (ret) + inet_sk(ret)->cork.fl.u.ip4 = fl4; +out: return ret; +} |