diff options
author | 2016-04-11 10:41:07 +0300 | |
---|---|---|
committer | 2016-04-13 08:17:18 +0300 | |
commit | e09b41010ba33a20a87472ee821fa407a5b8da36 (patch) | |
tree | d10dc367189862e7ca5c592f033dc3726e1df4e3 /kernel/kernel/ptrace.c | |
parent | f93b97fd65072de626c074dbe099a1fff05ce060 (diff) |
These changes are the raw update to linux-4.4.6-rt14. Kernel sources
are taken from kernel.org, and rt patch from the rt wiki download page.
During the rebasing, the following patch collided:
Force tick interrupt and get rid of softirq magic(I70131fb85).
Collisions have been removed because its logic was found on the
source already.
Change-Id: I7f57a4081d9deaa0d9ccfc41a6c8daccdee3b769
Signed-off-by: José Pekkarinen <jose.pekkarinen@nokia.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/kernel/ptrace.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/kernel/ptrace.c | 63 |
1 files changed, 53 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/kernel/ptrace.c index b8d001b89..1004af706 100644 --- a/kernel/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -129,12 +129,14 @@ static bool ptrace_freeze_traced(struct task_struct *task) spin_lock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock); if (task_is_traced(task) && !__fatal_signal_pending(task)) { - raw_spin_lock_irq(&task->pi_lock); + unsigned long flags; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&task->pi_lock, flags); if (task->state & __TASK_TRACED) task->state = __TASK_TRACED; else task->saved_state = __TASK_TRACED; - raw_spin_unlock_irq(&task->pi_lock); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&task->pi_lock, flags); ret = true; } spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock); @@ -224,6 +226,14 @@ static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode) static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; + int dumpable = 0; + kuid_t caller_uid; + kgid_t caller_gid; + + if (!(mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) == !(mode & PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)) { + WARN(1, "denying ptrace access check without PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS\n"); + return -EPERM; + } /* May we inspect the given task? * This check is used both for attaching with ptrace @@ -233,18 +243,33 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) * because setting up the necessary parent/child relationship * or halting the specified task is impossible. */ - int dumpable = 0; + /* Don't let security modules deny introspection */ if (same_thread_group(task, current)) return 0; rcu_read_lock(); + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) { + caller_uid = cred->fsuid; + caller_gid = cred->fsgid; + } else { + /* + * Using the euid would make more sense here, but something + * in userland might rely on the old behavior, and this + * shouldn't be a security problem since + * PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS implies that the caller explicitly + * used a syscall that requests access to another process + * (and not a filesystem syscall to procfs). + */ + caller_uid = cred->uid; + caller_gid = cred->gid; + } tcred = __task_cred(task); - if (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) && - uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) && - uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) && - gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) && - gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) && - gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid)) + if (uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->euid) && + uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->suid) && + uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->uid) && + gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->egid) && + gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) && + gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid)) goto ok; if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode)) goto ok; @@ -311,7 +336,7 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, goto out; task_lock(task); - retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); + retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS); task_unlock(task); if (retval) goto unlock_creds; @@ -561,6 +586,19 @@ static int ptrace_setoptions(struct task_struct *child, unsigned long data) if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK) return -EINVAL; + if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) { + if (!config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) || + !config_enabled(CONFIG_SECCOMP)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + if (seccomp_mode(¤t->seccomp) != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED || + current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP) + return -EPERM; + } + /* Avoid intermediate state when all opts are cleared */ flags = child->ptrace; flags &= ~(PTRACE_O_MASK << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT); @@ -1008,6 +1046,11 @@ int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request, break; } #endif + + case PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER: + ret = seccomp_get_filter(child, addr, datavp); + break; + default: break; } |