Kernel bump from 4.1.3-rt to 4.1.7-rt.

These changes brings a vanilla kernel from kernel.org, and the patch
applied for rt is patch-4.1.7-rt8.patch. No further changes needed.

Change-Id: Id8dd03c2ddd971e4d1d69b905f3069737053b700
Signed-off-by: José Pekkarinen <jose.pekkarinen@nokia.com>

25 files changed, 386 insertions, 299 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/kernel/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index 48304b89b..0cdc154a2 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -1193,6 +1193,10 @@ static efi_status_t setup_e820(struct boot_params *params,
 		unsigned int e820_type = 0;
 		unsigned long m = efi->efi_memmap;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		m |= (u64)efi->efi_memmap_hi << 32;
+#endif
+
 		d = (efi_memory_desc_t *)(m + (i * efi->efi_memdesc_size));
 		switch (d->type) {
 		case EFI_RESERVED_TYPE:
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h b/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h
index 8b22422fb..74a2a8dc9 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h
@@ -14,15 +14,11 @@
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
-extern pte_t kasan_zero_pte[];
-extern pte_t kasan_zero_pmd[];
-extern pte_t kasan_zero_pud[];
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
-void __init kasan_map_early_shadow(pgd_t *pgd);
+void __init kasan_early_init(void);
 void __init kasan_init(void);
 #else
-static inline void kasan_map_early_shadow(pgd_t *pgd) { }
+static inline void kasan_early_init(void) { }
 static inline void kasan_init(void) { }
 #endif
 
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 883f6b933..e997f70f8 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ extern struct static_key rdpmc_always_available;
 
 static inline void load_mm_cr4(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
-	if (static_key_true(&rdpmc_always_available) ||
+	if (static_key_false(&rdpmc_always_available) ||
 	    atomic_read(&mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed))
 		cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
 	else
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/sigcontext.h b/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/sigcontext.h
index 6fe6b182c..9dfce4e04 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/sigcontext.h
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/sigcontext.h
@@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ struct sigcontext {
 	unsigned long ip;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	unsigned short cs;
-	unsigned short __pad2;	/* Was called gs, but was always zero. */
-	unsigned short __pad1;	/* Was called fs, but was always zero. */
-	unsigned short ss;
+	unsigned short gs;
+	unsigned short fs;
+	unsigned short __pad0;
 	unsigned long err;
 	unsigned long trapno;
 	unsigned long oldmask;
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h b/kernel/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
index 16dc4e8a2..d8b9f9081 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
@@ -177,24 +177,9 @@ struct sigcontext {
 	__u64 rip;
 	__u64 eflags;		/* RFLAGS */
 	__u16 cs;
-
-	/*
-	 * Prior to 2.5.64 ("[PATCH] x86-64 updates for 2.5.64-bk3"),
-	 * Linux saved and restored fs and gs in these slots.  This
-	 * was counterproductive, as fsbase and gsbase were never
-	 * saved, so arch_prctl was presumably unreliable.
-	 *
-	 * If these slots are ever needed for any other purpose, there
-	 * is some risk that very old 64-bit binaries could get
-	 * confused.  I doubt that many such binaries still work,
-	 * though, since the same patch in 2.5.64 also removed the
-	 * 64-bit set_thread_area syscall, so it appears that there is
-	 * no TLS API that works in both pre- and post-2.5.64 kernels.
-	 */
-	__u16 __pad2;		/* Was gs. */
-	__u16 __pad1;		/* Was fs. */
-
-	__u16 ss;
+	__u16 gs;
+	__u16 fs;
+	__u16 __pad0;
 	__u64 err;
 	__u64 trapno;
 	__u64 oldmask;
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
index dcb52850a..cde732c1b 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
@@ -1424,7 +1424,7 @@ static inline void __x2apic_disable(void)
 {
 	u64 msr;
 
-	if (cpu_has_apic)
+	if (!cpu_has_apic)
 		return;
 
 	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_APICBASE, msr);
@@ -1483,10 +1483,13 @@ void x2apic_setup(void)
 
 static __init void x2apic_disable(void)
 {
-	u32 x2apic_id;
+	u32 x2apic_id, state = x2apic_state;
 
-	if (x2apic_state != X2APIC_ON)
-		goto out;
+	x2apic_mode = 0;
+	x2apic_state = X2APIC_DISABLED;
+
+	if (state != X2APIC_ON)
+		return;
 
 	x2apic_id = read_apic_id();
 	if (x2apic_id >= 255)
@@ -1494,9 +1497,6 @@ static __init void x2apic_disable(void)
 
 	__x2apic_disable();
 	register_lapic_address(mp_lapic_addr);
-out:
-	x2apic_state = X2APIC_DISABLED;
-	x2apic_mode = 0;
 }
 
 static __init void x2apic_enable(void)
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_cqm.c b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_cqm.c
index e4d1b8b73..cb77b11bc 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_cqm.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_cqm.c
@@ -934,6 +934,14 @@ static u64 intel_cqm_event_count(struct perf_event *event)
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
+	 * Getting up-to-date values requires an SMP IPI which is not
+	 * possible if we're being called in interrupt context. Return
+	 * the cached values instead.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(in_interrupt()))
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
 	 * Notice that we don't perform the reading of an RMID
 	 * atomically, because we can't hold a spin lock across the
 	 * IPIs.
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c
index 464ffd69b..00db1aad1 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ void dump_trace(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
 		unsigned long *stack, unsigned long bp,
 		const struct stacktrace_ops *ops, void *data)
 {
-	const unsigned cpu = get_cpu();
+	const unsigned cpu = get_cpu_light();
 	int graph = 0;
 	u32 *prev_esp;
 
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ void dump_trace(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
 			break;
 		touch_nmi_watchdog();
 	}
-	put_cpu();
+	put_cpu_light();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_trace);
 
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
index 5f1c6266e..c331e3fef 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ void dump_trace(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
 		unsigned long *stack, unsigned long bp,
 		const struct stacktrace_ops *ops, void *data)
 {
-	const unsigned cpu = get_cpu();
+	const unsigned cpu = get_cpu_light();
 	struct thread_info *tinfo;
 	unsigned long *irq_stack = (unsigned long *)per_cpu(irq_stack_ptr, cpu);
 	unsigned long dummy;
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ void dump_trace(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
 	 * This handles the process stack:
 	 */
 	bp = ops->walk_stack(tinfo, stack, bp, ops, data, NULL, &graph);
-	put_cpu();
+	put_cpu_light();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_trace);
 
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ show_stack_log_lvl(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
 	int cpu;
 	int i;
 
-	preempt_disable();
+	migrate_disable();
 	cpu = smp_processor_id();
 
 	irq_stack_end	= (unsigned long *)(per_cpu(irq_stack_ptr, cpu));
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ show_stack_log_lvl(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
 			pr_cont(" %016lx", *stack++);
 		touch_nmi_watchdog();
 	}
-	preempt_enable();
+	migrate_enable();
 
 	pr_cont("\n");
 	show_trace_log_lvl(task, regs, sp, bp, log_lvl);
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
index 9bf907020..8a3445bdf 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
@@ -809,8 +809,6 @@ do_preempt_schedule_irq:
 restore_c_regs_and_iret:
 	RESTORE_C_REGS
 	REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK 8
-
-irq_return:
 	INTERRUPT_RETURN
 
 ENTRY(native_iret)
@@ -1431,11 +1429,12 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
 	 *  If the variable is not set and the stack is not the NMI
 	 *  stack then:
 	 *    o Set the special variable on the stack
-	 *    o Copy the interrupt frame into a "saved" location on the stack
-	 *    o Copy the interrupt frame into a "copy" location on the stack
+	 *    o Copy the interrupt frame into an "outermost" location on the
+	 *      stack
+	 *    o Copy the interrupt frame into an "iret" location on the stack
 	 *    o Continue processing the NMI
 	 *  If the variable is set or the previous stack is the NMI stack:
-	 *    o Modify the "copy" location to jump to the repeate_nmi
+	 *    o Modify the "iret" location to jump to the repeat_nmi
 	 *    o return back to the first NMI
 	 *
 	 * Now on exit of the first NMI, we first clear the stack variable
@@ -1444,32 +1443,151 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
 	 * a nested NMI that updated the copy interrupt stack frame, a
 	 * jump will be made to the repeat_nmi code that will handle the second
 	 * NMI.
+	 *
+	 * However, espfix prevents us from directly returning to userspace
+	 * with a single IRET instruction.  Similarly, IRET to user mode
+	 * can fault.  We therefore handle NMIs from user space like
+	 * other IST entries.
 	 */
 
 	/* Use %rdx as our temp variable throughout */
 	pushq_cfi %rdx
 	CFI_REL_OFFSET rdx, 0
 
+	testb	$3, CS-RIP+8(%rsp)
+	jz	.Lnmi_from_kernel
+
 	/*
-	 * If %cs was not the kernel segment, then the NMI triggered in user
-	 * space, which means it is definitely not nested.
+	 * NMI from user mode.  We need to run on the thread stack, but we
+	 * can't go through the normal entry paths: NMIs are masked, and
+	 * we don't want to enable interrupts, because then we'll end
+	 * up in an awkward situation in which IRQs are on but NMIs
+	 * are off.
 	 */
-	cmpl $__KERNEL_CS, 16(%rsp)
-	jne first_nmi
+
+	SWAPGS
+	cld
+	movq	%rsp, %rdx
+	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(kernel_stack), %rsp
+	pushq	5*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->ss */
+	pushq	4*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->rsp */
+	pushq	3*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->flags */
+	pushq	2*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->cs */
+	pushq	1*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->rip */
+	pushq   $-1		/* pt_regs->orig_ax */
+	pushq   %rdi		/* pt_regs->di */
+	pushq   %rsi		/* pt_regs->si */
+	pushq   (%rdx)		/* pt_regs->dx */
+	pushq   %rcx		/* pt_regs->cx */
+	pushq   %rax		/* pt_regs->ax */
+	pushq   %r8		/* pt_regs->r8 */
+	pushq   %r9		/* pt_regs->r9 */
+	pushq   %r10		/* pt_regs->r10 */
+	pushq   %r11		/* pt_regs->r11 */
+	pushq	%rbx		/* pt_regs->rbx */
+	pushq	%rbp		/* pt_regs->rbp */
+	pushq	%r12		/* pt_regs->r12 */
+	pushq	%r13		/* pt_regs->r13 */
+	pushq	%r14		/* pt_regs->r14 */
+	pushq	%r15		/* pt_regs->r15 */
 
 	/*
-	 * Check the special variable on the stack to see if NMIs are
-	 * executing.
+	 * At this point we no longer need to worry about stack damage
+	 * due to nesting -- we're on the normal thread stack and we're
+	 * done with the NMI stack.
+	 */
+	movq	%rsp, %rdi
+	movq	$-1, %rsi
+	call	do_nmi
+
+	/*
+	 * Return back to user mode.  We must *not* do the normal exit
+	 * work, because we don't want to enable interrupts.  Fortunately,
+	 * do_nmi doesn't modify pt_regs.
+	 */
+	SWAPGS
+	jmp	restore_c_regs_and_iret
+
+.Lnmi_from_kernel:
+	/*
+	 * Here's what our stack frame will look like:
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------------+
+	 * | original SS                                             |
+	 * | original Return RSP                                     |
+	 * | original RFLAGS                                         |
+	 * | original CS                                             |
+	 * | original RIP                                            |
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------------+
+	 * | temp storage for rdx                                    |
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------------+
+	 * | "NMI executing" variable                                |
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------------+
+	 * | iret SS          } Copied from "outermost" frame        |
+	 * | iret Return RSP  } on each loop iteration; overwritten  |
+	 * | iret RFLAGS      } by a nested NMI to force another     |
+	 * | iret CS          } iteration if needed.                 |
+	 * | iret RIP         }                                      |
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------------+
+	 * | outermost SS          } initialized in first_nmi;       |
+	 * | outermost Return RSP  } will not be changed before      |
+	 * | outermost RFLAGS      } NMI processing is done.         |
+	 * | outermost CS          } Copied to "iret" frame on each  |
+	 * | outermost RIP         } iteration.                      |
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------------+
+	 * | pt_regs                                                 |
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------------+
+	 *
+	 * The "original" frame is used by hardware.  Before re-enabling
+	 * NMIs, we need to be done with it, and we need to leave enough
+	 * space for the asm code here.
+	 *
+	 * We return by executing IRET while RSP points to the "iret" frame.
+	 * That will either return for real or it will loop back into NMI
+	 * processing.
+	 *
+	 * The "outermost" frame is copied to the "iret" frame on each
+	 * iteration of the loop, so each iteration starts with the "iret"
+	 * frame pointing to the final return target.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * Determine whether we're a nested NMI.
+	 *
+	 * If we interrupted kernel code between repeat_nmi and
+	 * end_repeat_nmi, then we are a nested NMI.  We must not
+	 * modify the "iret" frame because it's being written by
+	 * the outer NMI.  That's okay; the outer NMI handler is
+	 * about to about to call do_nmi anyway, so we can just
+	 * resume the outer NMI.
+	 */
+
+	movq	$repeat_nmi, %rdx
+	cmpq	8(%rsp), %rdx
+	ja	1f
+	movq	$end_repeat_nmi, %rdx
+	cmpq	8(%rsp), %rdx
+	ja	nested_nmi_out
+1:
+
+	/*
+	 * Now check "NMI executing".  If it's set, then we're nested.
+	 * This will not detect if we interrupted an outer NMI just
+	 * before IRET.
 	 */
 	cmpl $1, -8(%rsp)
 	je nested_nmi
 
 	/*
-	 * Now test if the previous stack was an NMI stack.
-	 * We need the double check. We check the NMI stack to satisfy the
-	 * race when the first NMI clears the variable before returning.
-	 * We check the variable because the first NMI could be in a
-	 * breakpoint routine using a breakpoint stack.
+	 * Now test if the previous stack was an NMI stack.  This covers
+	 * the case where we interrupt an outer NMI after it clears
+	 * "NMI executing" but before IRET.  We need to be careful, though:
+	 * there is one case in which RSP could point to the NMI stack
+	 * despite there being no NMI active: naughty userspace controls
+	 * RSP at the very beginning of the SYSCALL targets.  We can
+	 * pull a fast one on naughty userspace, though: we program
+	 * SYSCALL to mask DF, so userspace cannot cause DF to be set
+	 * if it controls the kernel's RSP.  We set DF before we clear
+	 * "NMI executing".
 	 */
 	lea	6*8(%rsp), %rdx
 	/* Compare the NMI stack (rdx) with the stack we came from (4*8(%rsp)) */
@@ -1480,25 +1598,21 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
 	cmpq	%rdx, 4*8(%rsp)
 	/* If it is below the NMI stack, it is a normal NMI */
 	jb	first_nmi
-	/* Ah, it is within the NMI stack, treat it as nested */
+
+	/* Ah, it is within the NMI stack. */
+
+	testb	$(X86_EFLAGS_DF >> 8), (3*8 + 1)(%rsp)
+	jz	first_nmi	/* RSP was user controlled. */
+
+	/* This is a nested NMI. */
 
 	CFI_REMEMBER_STATE
 
 nested_nmi:
 	/*
-	 * Do nothing if we interrupted the fixup in repeat_nmi.
-	 * It's about to repeat the NMI handler, so we are fine
-	 * with ignoring this one.
+	 * Modify the "iret" frame to point to repeat_nmi, forcing another
+	 * iteration of NMI handling.
 	 */
-	movq $repeat_nmi, %rdx
-	cmpq 8(%rsp), %rdx
-	ja 1f
-	movq $end_repeat_nmi, %rdx
-	cmpq 8(%rsp), %rdx
-	ja nested_nmi_out
-
-1:
-	/* Set up the interrupted NMIs stack to jump to repeat_nmi */
 	leaq -1*8(%rsp), %rdx
 	movq %rdx, %rsp
 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 1*8
@@ -1517,60 +1631,23 @@ nested_nmi_out:
 	popq_cfi %rdx
 	CFI_RESTORE rdx
 
-	/* No need to check faults here */
+	/* We are returning to kernel mode, so this cannot result in a fault. */
 	INTERRUPT_RETURN
 
 	CFI_RESTORE_STATE
 first_nmi:
-	/*
-	 * Because nested NMIs will use the pushed location that we
-	 * stored in rdx, we must keep that space available.
-	 * Here's what our stack frame will look like:
-	 * +-------------------------+
-	 * | original SS             |
-	 * | original Return RSP     |
-	 * | original RFLAGS         |
-	 * | original CS             |
-	 * | original RIP            |
-	 * +-------------------------+
-	 * | temp storage for rdx    |
-	 * +-------------------------+
-	 * | NMI executing variable  |
-	 * +-------------------------+
-	 * | copied SS               |
-	 * | copied Return RSP       |
-	 * | copied RFLAGS           |
-	 * | copied CS               |
-	 * | copied RIP              |
-	 * +-------------------------+
-	 * | Saved SS                |
-	 * | Saved Return RSP        |
-	 * | Saved RFLAGS            |
-	 * | Saved CS                |
-	 * | Saved RIP               |
-	 * +-------------------------+
-	 * | pt_regs                 |
-	 * +-------------------------+
-	 *
-	 * The saved stack frame is used to fix up the copied stack frame
-	 * that a nested NMI may change to make the interrupted NMI iret jump
-	 * to the repeat_nmi. The original stack frame and the temp storage
-	 * is also used by nested NMIs and can not be trusted on exit.
-	 */
-	/* Do not pop rdx, nested NMIs will corrupt that part of the stack */
+	/* Restore rdx. */
 	movq (%rsp), %rdx
 	CFI_RESTORE rdx
 
-	/* Set the NMI executing variable on the stack. */
+	/* Set "NMI executing" on the stack. */
 	pushq_cfi $1
 
-	/*
-	 * Leave room for the "copied" frame
-	 */
+	/* Leave room for the "iret" frame */
 	subq $(5*8), %rsp
 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 5*8
 
-	/* Copy the stack frame to the Saved frame */
+	/* Copy the "original" frame to the "outermost" frame */
 	.rept 5
 	pushq_cfi 11*8(%rsp)
 	.endr
@@ -1578,6 +1655,7 @@ first_nmi:
 
 	/* Everything up to here is safe from nested NMIs */
 
+repeat_nmi:
 	/*
 	 * If there was a nested NMI, the first NMI's iret will return
 	 * here. But NMIs are still enabled and we can take another
@@ -1586,16 +1664,21 @@ first_nmi:
 	 * it will just return, as we are about to repeat an NMI anyway.
 	 * This makes it safe to copy to the stack frame that a nested
 	 * NMI will update.
-	 */
-repeat_nmi:
-	/*
-	 * Update the stack variable to say we are still in NMI (the update
-	 * is benign for the non-repeat case, where 1 was pushed just above
-	 * to this very stack slot).
+	 *
+	 * RSP is pointing to "outermost RIP".  gsbase is unknown, but, if
+	 * we're repeating an NMI, gsbase has the same value that it had on
+	 * the first iteration.  paranoid_entry will load the kernel
+	 * gsbase if needed before we call do_nmi.
+	 *
+	 * Set "NMI executing" in case we came back here via IRET.
 	 */
 	movq $1, 10*8(%rsp)
 
-	/* Make another copy, this one may be modified by nested NMIs */
+	/*
+	 * Copy the "outermost" frame to the "iret" frame.  NMIs that nest
+	 * here must not modify the "iret" frame while we're writing to
+	 * it or it will end up containing garbage.
+	 */
 	addq $(10*8), %rsp
 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -10*8
 	.rept 5
@@ -1606,9 +1689,9 @@ repeat_nmi:
 end_repeat_nmi:
 
 	/*
-	 * Everything below this point can be preempted by a nested
-	 * NMI if the first NMI took an exception and reset our iret stack
-	 * so that we repeat another NMI.
+	 * Everything below this point can be preempted by a nested NMI.
+	 * If this happens, then the inner NMI will change the "iret"
+	 * frame to point back to repeat_nmi.
 	 */
 	pushq_cfi $-1		/* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */
 	ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
@@ -1623,29 +1706,11 @@ end_repeat_nmi:
 	call paranoid_entry
 	DEFAULT_FRAME 0
 
-	/*
-	 * Save off the CR2 register. If we take a page fault in the NMI then
-	 * it could corrupt the CR2 value. If the NMI preempts a page fault
-	 * handler before it was able to read the CR2 register, and then the
-	 * NMI itself takes a page fault, the page fault that was preempted
-	 * will read the information from the NMI page fault and not the
-	 * origin fault. Save it off and restore it if it changes.
-	 * Use the r12 callee-saved register.
-	 */
-	movq %cr2, %r12
-
 	/* paranoidentry do_nmi, 0; without TRACE_IRQS_OFF */
 	movq %rsp,%rdi
 	movq $-1,%rsi
 	call do_nmi
 
-	/* Did the NMI take a page fault? Restore cr2 if it did */
-	movq %cr2, %rcx
-	cmpq %rcx, %r12
-	je 1f
-	movq %r12, %cr2
-1:
-	
 	testl %ebx,%ebx				/* swapgs needed? */
 	jnz nmi_restore
 nmi_swapgs:
@@ -1653,12 +1718,27 @@ nmi_swapgs:
 nmi_restore:
 	RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
 	RESTORE_C_REGS
-	/* Pop the extra iret frame at once */
+
+	/* Point RSP at the "iret" frame. */
 	REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK 6*8
 
-	/* Clear the NMI executing stack variable */
-	movq $0, 5*8(%rsp)
-	jmp irq_return
+	/*
+	 * Clear "NMI executing".  Set DF first so that we can easily
+	 * distinguish the remaining code between here and IRET from
+	 * the SYSCALL entry and exit paths.  On a native kernel, we
+	 * could just inspect RIP, but, on paravirt kernels,
+	 * INTERRUPT_RETURN can translate into a jump into a
+	 * hypercall page.
+	 */
+	std
+	movq	$0, 5*8(%rsp)		/* clear "NMI executing" */
+
+	/*
+	 * INTERRUPT_RETURN reads the "iret" frame and exits the NMI
+	 * stack in a single instruction.  We are returning to kernel
+	 * mode, so this cannot result in a fault.
+	 */
+	INTERRUPT_RETURN
 	CFI_ENDPROC
 END(nmi)
 
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 5a4668136..f129a9af6 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -161,11 +161,12 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
 	/* Kill off the identity-map trampoline */
 	reset_early_page_tables();
 
-	kasan_map_early_shadow(early_level4_pgt);
-
-	/* clear bss before set_intr_gate with early_idt_handler */
 	clear_bss();
 
+	clear_page(init_level4_pgt);
+
+	kasan_early_init();
+
 	for (i = 0; i < NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS; i++)
 		set_intr_gate(i, early_idt_handler_array[i]);
 	load_idt((const struct desc_ptr *)&idt_descr);
@@ -177,12 +178,9 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
 	 */
 	load_ucode_bsp();
 
-	clear_page(init_level4_pgt);
 	/* set init_level4_pgt kernel high mapping*/
 	init_level4_pgt[511] = early_level4_pgt[511];
 
-	kasan_map_early_shadow(init_level4_pgt);
-
 	x86_64_start_reservations(real_mode_data);
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index df7e78057..7e5da2cbe 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -516,38 +516,9 @@ ENTRY(phys_base)
 	/* This must match the first entry in level2_kernel_pgt */
 	.quad   0x0000000000000000
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
-#define FILL(VAL, COUNT)				\
-	.rept (COUNT) ;					\
-	.quad	(VAL) ;					\
-	.endr
-
-NEXT_PAGE(kasan_zero_pte)
-	FILL(kasan_zero_page - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE, 512)
-NEXT_PAGE(kasan_zero_pmd)
-	FILL(kasan_zero_pte - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE, 512)
-NEXT_PAGE(kasan_zero_pud)
-	FILL(kasan_zero_pmd - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE, 512)
-
-#undef FILL
-#endif
-
-
 #include "../../x86/xen/xen-head.S"
 	
 	__PAGE_ALIGNED_BSS
 NEXT_PAGE(empty_zero_page)
 	.skip PAGE_SIZE
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
-/*
- * This page used as early shadow. We don't use empty_zero_page
- * at early stages, stack instrumentation could write some garbage
- * to this page.
- * Latter we reuse it as zero shadow for large ranges of memory
- * that allowed to access, but not instrumented by kasan
- * (vmalloc/vmemmap ...).
- */
-NEXT_PAGE(kasan_zero_page)
-	.skip PAGE_SIZE
-#endif
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
index c3e985d17..d05bd2e2e 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -408,15 +408,15 @@ static void default_do_nmi(struct pt_regs *regs)
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(default_do_nmi);
 
 /*
- * NMIs can hit breakpoints which will cause it to lose its
- * NMI context with the CPU when the breakpoint does an iret.
- */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
-/*
- * For i386, NMIs use the same stack as the kernel, and we can
- * add a workaround to the iret problem in C (preventing nested
- * NMIs if an NMI takes a trap). Simply have 3 states the NMI
- * can be in:
+ * NMIs can page fault or hit breakpoints which will cause it to lose
+ * its NMI context with the CPU when the breakpoint or page fault does an IRET.
+ *
+ * As a result, NMIs can nest if NMIs get unmasked due an IRET during
+ * NMI processing.  On x86_64, the asm glue protects us from nested NMIs
+ * if the outer NMI came from kernel mode, but we can still nest if the
+ * outer NMI came from user mode.
+ *
+ * To handle these nested NMIs, we have three states:
  *
  *  1) not running
  *  2) executing
@@ -430,15 +430,14 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(default_do_nmi);
  * (Note, the latch is binary, thus multiple NMIs triggering,
  *  when one is running, are ignored. Only one NMI is restarted.)
  *
- * If an NMI hits a breakpoint that executes an iret, another
- * NMI can preempt it. We do not want to allow this new NMI
- * to run, but we want to execute it when the first one finishes.
- * We set the state to "latched", and the exit of the first NMI will
- * perform a dec_return, if the result is zero (NOT_RUNNING), then
- * it will simply exit the NMI handler. If not, the dec_return
- * would have set the state to NMI_EXECUTING (what we want it to
- * be when we are running). In this case, we simply jump back
- * to rerun the NMI handler again, and restart the 'latched' NMI.
+ * If an NMI executes an iret, another NMI can preempt it. We do not
+ * want to allow this new NMI to run, but we want to execute it when the
+ * first one finishes.  We set the state to "latched", and the exit of
+ * the first NMI will perform a dec_return, if the result is zero
+ * (NOT_RUNNING), then it will simply exit the NMI handler. If not, the
+ * dec_return would have set the state to NMI_EXECUTING (what we want it
+ * to be when we are running). In this case, we simply jump back to
+ * rerun the NMI handler again, and restart the 'latched' NMI.
  *
  * No trap (breakpoint or page fault) should be hit before nmi_restart,
  * thus there is no race between the first check of state for NOT_RUNNING
@@ -461,49 +460,36 @@ enum nmi_states {
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(enum nmi_states, nmi_state);
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, nmi_cr2);
 
-#define nmi_nesting_preprocess(regs)					\
-	do {								\
-		if (this_cpu_read(nmi_state) != NMI_NOT_RUNNING) {	\
-			this_cpu_write(nmi_state, NMI_LATCHED);		\
-			return;						\
-		}							\
-		this_cpu_write(nmi_state, NMI_EXECUTING);		\
-		this_cpu_write(nmi_cr2, read_cr2());			\
-	} while (0);							\
-	nmi_restart:
-
-#define nmi_nesting_postprocess()					\
-	do {								\
-		if (unlikely(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2) != read_cr2()))	\
-			write_cr2(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2));		\
-		if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))			\
-			goto nmi_restart;				\
-	} while (0)
-#else /* x86_64 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 /*
- * In x86_64 things are a bit more difficult. This has the same problem
- * where an NMI hitting a breakpoint that calls iret will remove the
- * NMI context, allowing a nested NMI to enter. What makes this more
- * difficult is that both NMIs and breakpoints have their own stack.
- * When a new NMI or breakpoint is executed, the stack is set to a fixed
- * point. If an NMI is nested, it will have its stack set at that same
- * fixed address that the first NMI had, and will start corrupting the
- * stack. This is handled in entry_64.S, but the same problem exists with
- * the breakpoint stack.
+ * In x86_64, we need to handle breakpoint -> NMI -> breakpoint.  Without
+ * some care, the inner breakpoint will clobber the outer breakpoint's
+ * stack.
  *
- * If a breakpoint is being processed, and the debug stack is being used,
- * if an NMI comes in and also hits a breakpoint, the stack pointer
- * will be set to the same fixed address as the breakpoint that was
- * interrupted, causing that stack to be corrupted. To handle this case,
- * check if the stack that was interrupted is the debug stack, and if
- * so, change the IDT so that new breakpoints will use the current stack
- * and not switch to the fixed address. On return of the NMI, switch back
- * to the original IDT.
+ * If a breakpoint is being processed, and the debug stack is being
+ * used, if an NMI comes in and also hits a breakpoint, the stack
+ * pointer will be set to the same fixed address as the breakpoint that
+ * was interrupted, causing that stack to be corrupted. To handle this
+ * case, check if the stack that was interrupted is the debug stack, and
+ * if so, change the IDT so that new breakpoints will use the current
+ * stack and not switch to the fixed address. On return of the NMI,
+ * switch back to the original IDT.
  */
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, update_debug_stack);
+#endif
 
-static inline void nmi_nesting_preprocess(struct pt_regs *regs)
+dotraplinkage notrace void
+do_nmi(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 {
+	if (this_cpu_read(nmi_state) != NMI_NOT_RUNNING) {
+		this_cpu_write(nmi_state, NMI_LATCHED);
+		return;
+	}
+	this_cpu_write(nmi_state, NMI_EXECUTING);
+	this_cpu_write(nmi_cr2, read_cr2());
+nmi_restart:
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	/*
 	 * If we interrupted a breakpoint, it is possible that
 	 * the nmi handler will have breakpoints too. We need to
@@ -514,22 +500,8 @@ static inline void nmi_nesting_preprocess(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		debug_stack_set_zero();
 		this_cpu_write(update_debug_stack, 1);
 	}
-}
-
-static inline void nmi_nesting_postprocess(void)
-{
-	if (unlikely(this_cpu_read(update_debug_stack))) {
-		debug_stack_reset();
-		this_cpu_write(update_debug_stack, 0);
-	}
-}
 #endif
 
-dotraplinkage notrace void
-do_nmi(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
-{
-	nmi_nesting_preprocess(regs);
-
 	nmi_enter();
 
 	inc_irq_stat(__nmi_count);
@@ -539,8 +511,17 @@ do_nmi(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 
 	nmi_exit();
 
-	/* On i386, may loop back to preprocess */
-	nmi_nesting_postprocess();
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (unlikely(this_cpu_read(update_debug_stack))) {
+		debug_stack_reset();
+		this_cpu_write(update_debug_stack, 0);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (unlikely(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2) != read_cr2()))
+		write_cr2(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2));
+	if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
+		goto nmi_restart;
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_nmi);
 
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 6e338e3b1..971743774 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -453,6 +453,7 @@ static int prefer_mwait_c1_over_halt(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 static void mwait_idle(void)
 {
 	if (!current_set_polling_and_test()) {
+		trace_cpu_idle_rcuidle(1, smp_processor_id());
 		if (this_cpu_has(X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR)) {
 			smp_mb(); /* quirk */
 			clflush((void *)&current_thread_info()->flags);
@@ -464,6 +465,7 @@ static void mwait_idle(void)
 			__sti_mwait(0, 0);
 		else
 			local_irq_enable();
+		trace_cpu_idle_rcuidle(PWR_EVENT_EXIT, smp_processor_id());
 	} else {
 		local_irq_enable();
 	}
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
index 74c44c4f0..12c28f79e 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
@@ -93,8 +93,15 @@ int restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs, struct sigcontext __user *sc)
 		COPY(r15);
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 		COPY_SEG_CPL3(cs);
 		COPY_SEG_CPL3(ss);
+#else /* !CONFIG_X86_32 */
+		/* Kernel saves and restores only the CS segment register on signals,
+		 * which is the bare minimum needed to allow mixed 32/64-bit code.
+		 * App's signal handler can save/restore other segments if needed. */
+		COPY_SEG_CPL3(cs);
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
 
 		get_user_ex(tmpflags, &sc->flags);
 		regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~FIX_EFLAGS) | (tmpflags & FIX_EFLAGS);
@@ -154,9 +161,8 @@ int setup_sigcontext(struct sigcontext __user *sc, void __user *fpstate,
 #else /* !CONFIG_X86_32 */
 		put_user_ex(regs->flags, &sc->flags);
 		put_user_ex(regs->cs, &sc->cs);
-		put_user_ex(0, &sc->__pad2);
-		put_user_ex(0, &sc->__pad1);
-		put_user_ex(regs->ss, &sc->ss);
+		put_user_ex(0, &sc->gs);
+		put_user_ex(0, &sc->fs);
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
 
 		put_user_ex(fpstate, &sc->fpstate);
@@ -450,19 +456,9 @@ static int __setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig,
 
 	regs->sp = (unsigned long)frame;
 
-	/*
-	 * Set up the CS and SS registers to run signal handlers in
-	 * 64-bit mode, even if the handler happens to be interrupting
-	 * 32-bit or 16-bit code.
-	 *
-	 * SS is subtle.  In 64-bit mode, we don't need any particular
-	 * SS descriptor, but we do need SS to be valid.  It's possible
-	 * that the old SS is entirely bogus -- this can happen if the
-	 * signal we're trying to deliver is #GP or #SS caused by a bad
-	 * SS value.
-	 */
+	/* Set up the CS register to run signal handlers in 64-bit mode,
+	   even if the handler happens to be interrupting 32-bit code. */
 	regs->cs = __USER_CS;
-	regs->ss = __USER_DS;
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h b/kernel/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h
index 9d28383fc..c4ea87eed 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_apic_vid_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
 
 static inline bool kvm_apic_has_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	return vcpu->arch.apic->pending_events;
+	return kvm_vcpu_has_lapic(vcpu) && vcpu->arch.apic->pending_events;
 }
 
 bool kvm_apic_pending_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector);
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/kernel/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index 4860906c6..9a54dbe98 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -11,7 +11,19 @@
 extern pgd_t early_level4_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
 extern struct range pfn_mapped[E820_X_MAX];
 
-extern unsigned char kasan_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE];
+static pud_t kasan_zero_pud[PTRS_PER_PUD] __page_aligned_bss;
+static pmd_t kasan_zero_pmd[PTRS_PER_PMD] __page_aligned_bss;
+static pte_t kasan_zero_pte[PTRS_PER_PTE] __page_aligned_bss;
+
+/*
+ * This page used as early shadow. We don't use empty_zero_page
+ * at early stages, stack instrumentation could write some garbage
+ * to this page.
+ * Latter we reuse it as zero shadow for large ranges of memory
+ * that allowed to access, but not instrumented by kasan
+ * (vmalloc/vmemmap ...).
+ */
+static unsigned char kasan_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE] __page_aligned_bss;
 
 static int __init map_range(struct range *range)
 {
@@ -36,7 +48,7 @@ static void __init clear_pgds(unsigned long start,
 		pgd_clear(pgd_offset_k(start));
 }
 
-void __init kasan_map_early_shadow(pgd_t *pgd)
+static void __init kasan_map_early_shadow(pgd_t *pgd)
 {
 	int i;
 	unsigned long start = KASAN_SHADOW_START;
@@ -73,7 +85,7 @@ static int __init zero_pmd_populate(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,
 	while (IS_ALIGNED(addr, PMD_SIZE) && addr + PMD_SIZE <= end) {
 		WARN_ON(!pmd_none(*pmd));
 		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pte)
-					| __PAGE_KERNEL_RO));
+					| _KERNPG_TABLE));
 		addr += PMD_SIZE;
 		pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
 	}
@@ -99,7 +111,7 @@ static int __init zero_pud_populate(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr,
 	while (IS_ALIGNED(addr, PUD_SIZE) && addr + PUD_SIZE <= end) {
 		WARN_ON(!pud_none(*pud));
 		set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pmd)
-					| __PAGE_KERNEL_RO));
+					| _KERNPG_TABLE));
 		addr += PUD_SIZE;
 		pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr);
 	}
@@ -124,7 +136,7 @@ static int __init zero_pgd_populate(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
 	while (IS_ALIGNED(addr, PGDIR_SIZE) && addr + PGDIR_SIZE <= end) {
 		WARN_ON(!pgd_none(*pgd));
 		set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pud)
-					| __PAGE_KERNEL_RO));
+					| _KERNPG_TABLE));
 		addr += PGDIR_SIZE;
 		pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
 	}
@@ -166,6 +178,26 @@ static struct notifier_block kasan_die_notifier = {
 };
 #endif
 
+void __init kasan_early_init(void)
+{
+	int i;
+	pteval_t pte_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL;
+	pmdval_t pmd_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE;
+	pudval_t pud_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++)
+		kasan_zero_pte[i] = __pte(pte_val);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++)
+		kasan_zero_pmd[i] = __pmd(pmd_val);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++)
+		kasan_zero_pud[i] = __pud(pud_val);
+
+	kasan_map_early_shadow(early_level4_pgt);
+	kasan_map_early_shadow(init_level4_pgt);
+}
+
 void __init kasan_init(void)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -176,6 +208,7 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
 
 	memcpy(early_level4_pgt, init_level4_pgt, sizeof(early_level4_pgt));
 	load_cr3(early_level4_pgt);
+	__flush_tlb_all();
 
 	clear_pgds(KASAN_SHADOW_START, KASAN_SHADOW_END);
 
@@ -202,5 +235,6 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
 	memset(kasan_zero_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
 
 	load_cr3(init_level4_pgt);
+	__flush_tlb_all();
 	init_task.kasan_depth = 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/kernel/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index 9d518d693..844b06d67 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -126,3 +126,10 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
 		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
 	}
 }
+
+const char *arch_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MPX)
+		return "[mpx]";
+	return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c b/kernel/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c
index c439ec478..4d1c11c07 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c
@@ -18,26 +18,9 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/fpu-internal.h>
 
-static const char *mpx_mapping_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
-{
-	return "[mpx]";
-}
-
-static struct vm_operations_struct mpx_vma_ops = {
-	.name = mpx_mapping_name,
-};
-
-static int is_mpx_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
-{
-	return (vma->vm_ops == &mpx_vma_ops);
-}
-
 /*
  * This is really a simplified "vm_mmap". it only handles MPX
  * bounds tables (the bounds directory is user-allocated).
- *
- * Later on, we use the vma->vm_ops to uniquely identify these
- * VMAs.
  */
 static unsigned long mpx_mmap(unsigned long len)
 {
@@ -83,7 +66,6 @@ static unsigned long mpx_mmap(unsigned long len)
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	vma->vm_ops = &mpx_vma_ops;
 
 	if (vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
 		up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
@@ -661,7 +643,7 @@ static int zap_bt_entries(struct mm_struct *mm,
 		 * so stop immediately and return an error.  This
 		 * probably results in a SIGSEGV.
 		 */
-		if (!is_mpx_vma(vma))
+		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MPX))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		len = min(vma->vm_end, end) - addr;
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/kernel/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index 3250f2371..90b924acd 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static void flush_tlb_func(void *info)
 		} else {
 			unsigned long addr;
 			unsigned long nr_pages =
-				f->flush_end - f->flush_start / PAGE_SIZE;
+				(f->flush_end - f->flush_start) / PAGE_SIZE;
 			addr = f->flush_start;
 			while (addr < f->flush_end) {
 				__flush_tlb_single(addr);
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/kernel/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
index 02744df57..841ea05e1 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
@@ -946,6 +946,11 @@ u64 efi_mem_attributes(unsigned long phys_addr)
 
 static int __init arch_parse_efi_cmdline(char *str)
 {
+	if (!str) {
+		pr_warn("need at least one option\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	if (parse_option_str(str, "old_map"))
 		set_bit(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP, &efi.flags);
 	if (parse_option_str(str, "debug"))
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig b/kernel/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig
index e88fda867..484145368 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ config XEN
 	select PARAVIRT_CLOCK
 	select XEN_HAVE_PVMMU
 	depends on X86_64 || (X86_32 && X86_PAE)
-	depends on X86_TSC
+	depends on X86_LOCAL_APIC && X86_TSC
 	help
 	  This is the Linux Xen port.  Enabling this will allow the
 	  kernel to boot in a paravirtualized environment under the
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ config XEN
 config XEN_DOM0
 	def_bool y
 	depends on XEN && PCI_XEN && SWIOTLB_XEN
-	depends on X86_LOCAL_APIC && X86_IO_APIC && ACPI && PCI
+	depends on X86_IO_APIC && ACPI && PCI
 
 config XEN_PVHVM
 	def_bool y
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/xen/Makefile b/kernel/arch/x86/xen/Makefile
index 7322755f3..4b6e29ac0 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/xen/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/xen/Makefile
@@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ CFLAGS_mmu.o			:= $(nostackp)
 obj-y		:= enlighten.o setup.o multicalls.o mmu.o irq.o \
 			time.o xen-asm.o xen-asm_$(BITS).o \
 			grant-table.o suspend.o platform-pci-unplug.o \
-			p2m.o
+			p2m.o apic.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_EVENT_TRACING) += trace.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_SMP)		+= smp.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS)+= spinlock.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_DEBUG_FS)	+= debugfs.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_DOM0)		+= apic.o vga.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_DOM0)		+= vga.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SWIOTLB_XEN)	+= pci-swiotlb-xen.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_EFI)		+= efi.o
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c b/kernel/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
index 46957ead3..a671e8372 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
@@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ static void set_aliased_prot(void *v, pgprot_t prot)
 	pte_t pte;
 	unsigned long pfn;
 	struct page *page;
+	unsigned char dummy;
 
 	ptep = lookup_address((unsigned long)v, &level);
 	BUG_ON(ptep == NULL);
@@ -492,6 +493,32 @@ static void set_aliased_prot(void *v, pgprot_t prot)
 
 	pte = pfn_pte(pfn, prot);
 
+	/*
+	 * Careful: update_va_mapping() will fail if the virtual address
+	 * we're poking isn't populated in the page tables.  We don't
+	 * need to worry about the direct map (that's always in the page
+	 * tables), but we need to be careful about vmap space.  In
+	 * particular, the top level page table can lazily propagate
+	 * entries between processes, so if we've switched mms since we
+	 * vmapped the target in the first place, we might not have the
+	 * top-level page table entry populated.
+	 *
+	 * We disable preemption because we want the same mm active when
+	 * we probe the target and when we issue the hypercall.  We'll
+	 * have the same nominal mm, but if we're a kernel thread, lazy
+	 * mm dropping could change our pgd.
+	 *
+	 * Out of an abundance of caution, this uses __get_user() to fault
+	 * in the target address just in case there's some obscure case
+	 * in which the target address isn't readable.
+	 */
+
+	preempt_disable();
+
+	pagefault_disable();	/* Avoid warnings due to being atomic. */
+	__get_user(dummy, (unsigned char __user __force *)v);
+	pagefault_enable();
+
 	if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)v, pte, 0))
 		BUG();
 
@@ -503,6 +530,8 @@ static void set_aliased_prot(void *v, pgprot_t prot)
 				BUG();
 	} else
 		kmap_flush_unused();
+
+	preempt_enable();
 }
 
 static void xen_alloc_ldt(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries)
@@ -510,6 +539,17 @@ static void xen_alloc_ldt(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries)
 	const unsigned entries_per_page = PAGE_SIZE / LDT_ENTRY_SIZE;
 	int i;
 
+	/*
+	 * We need to mark the all aliases of the LDT pages RO.  We
+	 * don't need to call vm_flush_aliases(), though, since that's
+	 * only responsible for flushing aliases out the TLBs, not the
+	 * page tables, and Xen will flush the TLB for us if needed.
+	 *
+	 * To avoid confusing future readers: none of this is necessary
+	 * to load the LDT.  The hypervisor only checks this when the
+	 * LDT is faulted in due to subsequent descriptor access.
+	 */
+
 	for(i = 0; i < entries; i += entries_per_page)
 		set_aliased_prot(ldt + i, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
 }
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h b/kernel/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
index 9e195c683..bef30cbb5 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
@@ -101,17 +101,15 @@ struct dom0_vga_console_info;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_DOM0
 void __init xen_init_vga(const struct dom0_vga_console_info *, size_t size);
-void __init xen_init_apic(void);
 #else
 static inline void __init xen_init_vga(const struct dom0_vga_console_info *info,
 				       size_t size)
 {
 }
-static inline void __init xen_init_apic(void)
-{
-}
 #endif
 
+void __init xen_init_apic(void);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_EFI
 extern void xen_efi_init(void);
 #else