diff options
author | José Pekkarinen <jose.pekkarinen@nokia.com> | 2016-04-11 10:41:07 +0300 |
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committer | José Pekkarinen <jose.pekkarinen@nokia.com> | 2016-04-13 08:17:18 +0300 |
commit | e09b41010ba33a20a87472ee821fa407a5b8da36 (patch) | |
tree | d10dc367189862e7ca5c592f033dc3726e1df4e3 /kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface.h | |
parent | f93b97fd65072de626c074dbe099a1fff05ce060 (diff) |
These changes are the raw update to linux-4.4.6-rt14. Kernel sources
are taken from kernel.org, and rt patch from the rt wiki download page.
During the rebasing, the following patch collided:
Force tick interrupt and get rid of softirq magic(I70131fb85).
Collisions have been removed because its logic was found on the
source already.
Change-Id: I7f57a4081d9deaa0d9ccfc41a6c8daccdee3b769
Signed-off-by: José Pekkarinen <jose.pekkarinen@nokia.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface.h')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface.h | 219 |
1 files changed, 210 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface.h b/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface.h index 3400dbaec..62ca03ef5 100644 --- a/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface.h +++ b/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface.h @@ -3,12 +3,38 @@ * * Guest OS interface to x86 Xen. * - * Copyright (c) 2004, K A Fraser + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy + * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to + * deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the + * rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or + * sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in + * all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, + * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING + * FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER + * DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, K A Fraser */ #ifndef _ASM_X86_XEN_INTERFACE_H #define _ASM_X86_XEN_INTERFACE_H +/* + * XEN_GUEST_HANDLE represents a guest pointer, when passed as a field + * in a struct in memory. + * XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM represent a guest pointer, when passed as an + * hypercall argument. + * XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM and XEN_GUEST_HANDLE are the same on X86 but + * they might not be on other architectures. + */ #ifdef __XEN__ #define __DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(name, type) \ typedef struct { type *p; } __guest_handle_ ## name @@ -88,13 +114,16 @@ DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_ulong_t); * start of the GDT because some stupid OSes export hard-coded selector values * in their ABI. These hard-coded values are always near the start of the GDT, * so Xen places itself out of the way, at the far end of the GDT. + * + * NB The LDT is set using the MMUEXT_SET_LDT op of HYPERVISOR_mmuext_op */ #define FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_PAGE 14 #define FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_BYTE (FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_PAGE * 4096) #define FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_ENTRY (FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_BYTE / 8) /* - * Send an array of these to HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table() + * Send an array of these to HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table(). + * Terminate the array with a sentinel entry, with traps[].address==0. * The privilege level specifies which modes may enter a trap via a software * interrupt. On x86/64, since rings 1 and 2 are unavailable, we allocate * privilege levels as follows: @@ -118,10 +147,41 @@ struct trap_info { DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE_STRUCT(trap_info); struct arch_shared_info { - unsigned long max_pfn; /* max pfn that appears in table */ - /* Frame containing list of mfns containing list of mfns containing p2m. */ - unsigned long pfn_to_mfn_frame_list_list; - unsigned long nmi_reason; + /* + * Number of valid entries in the p2m table(s) anchored at + * pfn_to_mfn_frame_list_list and/or p2m_vaddr. + */ + unsigned long max_pfn; + /* + * Frame containing list of mfns containing list of mfns containing p2m. + * A value of 0 indicates it has not yet been set up, ~0 indicates it + * has been set to invalid e.g. due to the p2m being too large for the + * 3-level p2m tree. In this case the linear mapper p2m list anchored + * at p2m_vaddr is to be used. + */ + xen_pfn_t pfn_to_mfn_frame_list_list; + unsigned long nmi_reason; + /* + * Following three fields are valid if p2m_cr3 contains a value + * different from 0. + * p2m_cr3 is the root of the address space where p2m_vaddr is valid. + * p2m_cr3 is in the same format as a cr3 value in the vcpu register + * state and holds the folded machine frame number (via xen_pfn_to_cr3) + * of a L3 or L4 page table. + * p2m_vaddr holds the virtual address of the linear p2m list. All + * entries in the range [0...max_pfn[ are accessible via this pointer. + * p2m_generation will be incremented by the guest before and after each + * change of the mappings of the p2m list. p2m_generation starts at 0 + * and a value with the least significant bit set indicates that a + * mapping update is in progress. This allows guest external software + * (e.g. in Dom0) to verify that read mappings are consistent and + * whether they have changed since the last check. + * Modifying a p2m element in the linear p2m list is allowed via an + * atomic write only. + */ + unsigned long p2m_cr3; /* cr3 value of the p2m address space */ + unsigned long p2m_vaddr; /* virtual address of the p2m list */ + unsigned long p2m_generation; /* generation count of p2m mapping */ }; #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ @@ -137,13 +197,31 @@ struct arch_shared_info { /* * The following is all CPU context. Note that the fpu_ctxt block is filled * in by FXSAVE if the CPU has feature FXSR; otherwise FSAVE is used. + * + * Also note that when calling DOMCTL_setvcpucontext and VCPU_initialise + * for HVM and PVH guests, not all information in this structure is updated: + * + * - For HVM guests, the structures read include: fpu_ctxt (if + * VGCT_I387_VALID is set), flags, user_regs, debugreg[*] + * + * - PVH guests are the same as HVM guests, but additionally use ctrlreg[3] to + * set cr3. All other fields not used should be set to 0. */ struct vcpu_guest_context { /* FPU registers come first so they can be aligned for FXSAVE/FXRSTOR. */ struct { char x[512]; } fpu_ctxt; /* User-level FPU registers */ -#define VGCF_I387_VALID (1<<0) -#define VGCF_HVM_GUEST (1<<1) -#define VGCF_IN_KERNEL (1<<2) +#define VGCF_I387_VALID (1<<0) +#define VGCF_IN_KERNEL (1<<2) +#define _VGCF_i387_valid 0 +#define VGCF_i387_valid (1<<_VGCF_i387_valid) +#define _VGCF_in_kernel 2 +#define VGCF_in_kernel (1<<_VGCF_in_kernel) +#define _VGCF_failsafe_disables_events 3 +#define VGCF_failsafe_disables_events (1<<_VGCF_failsafe_disables_events) +#define _VGCF_syscall_disables_events 4 +#define VGCF_syscall_disables_events (1<<_VGCF_syscall_disables_events) +#define _VGCF_online 5 +#define VGCF_online (1<<_VGCF_online) unsigned long flags; /* VGCF_* flags */ struct cpu_user_regs user_regs; /* User-level CPU registers */ struct trap_info trap_ctxt[256]; /* Virtual IDT */ @@ -172,6 +250,129 @@ struct vcpu_guest_context { #endif }; DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE_STRUCT(vcpu_guest_context); + +/* AMD PMU registers and structures */ +struct xen_pmu_amd_ctxt { + /* + * Offsets to counter and control MSRs (relative to xen_pmu_arch.c.amd). + * For PV(H) guests these fields are RO. + */ + uint32_t counters; + uint32_t ctrls; + + /* Counter MSRs */ +#if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L + uint64_t regs[]; +#elif defined(__GNUC__) + uint64_t regs[0]; +#endif +}; + +/* Intel PMU registers and structures */ +struct xen_pmu_cntr_pair { + uint64_t counter; + uint64_t control; +}; + +struct xen_pmu_intel_ctxt { + /* + * Offsets to fixed and architectural counter MSRs (relative to + * xen_pmu_arch.c.intel). + * For PV(H) guests these fields are RO. + */ + uint32_t fixed_counters; + uint32_t arch_counters; + + /* PMU registers */ + uint64_t global_ctrl; + uint64_t global_ovf_ctrl; + uint64_t global_status; + uint64_t fixed_ctrl; + uint64_t ds_area; + uint64_t pebs_enable; + uint64_t debugctl; + + /* Fixed and architectural counter MSRs */ +#if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L + uint64_t regs[]; +#elif defined(__GNUC__) + uint64_t regs[0]; +#endif +}; + +/* Sampled domain's registers */ +struct xen_pmu_regs { + uint64_t ip; + uint64_t sp; + uint64_t flags; + uint16_t cs; + uint16_t ss; + uint8_t cpl; + uint8_t pad[3]; +}; + +/* PMU flags */ +#define PMU_CACHED (1<<0) /* PMU MSRs are cached in the context */ +#define PMU_SAMPLE_USER (1<<1) /* Sample is from user or kernel mode */ +#define PMU_SAMPLE_REAL (1<<2) /* Sample is from realmode */ +#define PMU_SAMPLE_PV (1<<3) /* Sample from a PV guest */ + +/* + * Architecture-specific information describing state of the processor at + * the time of PMU interrupt. + * Fields of this structure marked as RW for guest should only be written by + * the guest when PMU_CACHED bit in pmu_flags is set (which is done by the + * hypervisor during PMU interrupt). Hypervisor will read updated data in + * XENPMU_flush hypercall and clear PMU_CACHED bit. + */ +struct xen_pmu_arch { + union { + /* + * Processor's registers at the time of interrupt. + * WO for hypervisor, RO for guests. + */ + struct xen_pmu_regs regs; + /* + * Padding for adding new registers to xen_pmu_regs in + * the future + */ +#define XENPMU_REGS_PAD_SZ 64 + uint8_t pad[XENPMU_REGS_PAD_SZ]; + } r; + + /* WO for hypervisor, RO for guest */ + uint64_t pmu_flags; + + /* + * APIC LVTPC register. + * RW for both hypervisor and guest. + * Only APIC_LVT_MASKED bit is loaded by the hypervisor into hardware + * during XENPMU_flush or XENPMU_lvtpc_set. + */ + union { + uint32_t lapic_lvtpc; + uint64_t pad; + } l; + + /* + * Vendor-specific PMU registers. + * RW for both hypervisor and guest (see exceptions above). + * Guest's updates to this field are verified and then loaded by the + * hypervisor into hardware during XENPMU_flush + */ + union { + struct xen_pmu_amd_ctxt amd; + struct xen_pmu_intel_ctxt intel; + + /* + * Padding for contexts (fixed parts only, does not include + * MSR banks that are specified by offsets) + */ +#define XENPMU_CTXT_PAD_SZ 128 + uint8_t pad[XENPMU_CTXT_PAD_SZ]; + } c; +}; + #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ /* |