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-Background
-----------
-
-Pre-virtualization security protection was largely centered on the network.
-Malicious attacks from hostile machines, would seek to exploit network based
-operating systems and applications, with the goal of compromising their
-target node.
-
-Physical security had always been a much simpler business, with most focus on
-the secure access of the data center hardware.
-In-turn security was built up in layers (defense in depth) where machines
-would be
-daisy chained with network cables via  security appliances to provide
-controlled segmentation and isolation.
-This form of security was built upon the principle of an 'air gap'
-being present,
-whereby machines were separate physical units, joined largely by the
-network stack.
-
-With the advent of virtualization (namely the hypervisor), new attack
-vectors have
-surfaced as the 'air-gap' is no longer key design aspect for security.
-Further to this elements orchestation nodes and network controllers
-lead to an even wider attack surface:
-
-* Guests breaking isolation of the hypervisor.
-
-* Unauthorized access and control of supporting orchestration nodes.
-
-* Unauthorized access and control of supporting overlay network control systems.
-
-The hypervisor and the overlay network have now become the 'Achilles heel'
-whereby all tenant data isolation is enforced within the hypervisor and its
-abstraction
-of hardware and the virtualized overlay network.
-
-This guide has been formulated, in order to assist users of the OPNFV platform
-in securing an Telco NFV / SDN environment.