From d438301ca7244e66d5082312e3e84fcfb219f11b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sofia Wallin Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 14:49:15 +0100 Subject: Adjusted the docs repo structure for D release work Change-Id: I9befe06c424c726e17d754bc480413b2430549ba Signed-off-by: Sofia Wallin --- .../opnfvsecguide/introduction/background.rst | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/development/opnfvsecguide/introduction/background.rst (limited to 'docs/development/opnfvsecguide/introduction/background.rst') diff --git a/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/introduction/background.rst b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/introduction/background.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bd7e44d01 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/development/opnfvsecguide/introduction/background.rst @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +Background +---------- + +Pre-virtualization security protection was largely centered on the network. +Malicious attacks from hostile machines, would seek to exploit network based +operating systems and applications, with the goal of compromising their +target node. + +Physical security had always been a much simpler business, with most focus on +the secure access of the data center hardware. +In-turn security was built up in layers (defense in depth) where machines +would be +daisy chained with network cables via security appliances to provide +controlled segmentation and isolation. +This form of security was built upon the principle of an 'air gap' +being present, +whereby machines were separate physical units, joined largely by the +network stack. + +With the advent of virtualization (namely the hypervisor), new attack +vectors have +surfaced as the 'air-gap' is no longer key design aspect for security. +Further to this elements orchestation nodes and network controllers +lead to an even wider attack surface: + +* Guests breaking isolation of the hypervisor. + +* Unauthorized access and control of supporting orchestration nodes. + +* Unauthorized access and control of supporting overlay network control systems. + +The hypervisor and the overlay network have now become the 'Achilles heel' +whereby all tenant data isolation is enforced within the hypervisor and its +abstraction +of hardware and the virtualized overlay network. + +This guide has been formulated, in order to assist users of the OPNFV platform +in securing an Telco NFV / SDN environment. -- cgit 1.2.3-korg