From 9ca8dbcc65cfc63d6f5ef3312a33184e1d726e00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yunhong Jiang Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 12:17:53 -0700 Subject: Add the rt linux 4.1.3-rt3 as base Import the rt linux 4.1.3-rt3 as OPNFV kvm base. It's from git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rt/linux-rt-devel.git linux-4.1.y-rt and the base is: commit 0917f823c59692d751951bf5ea699a2d1e2f26a2 Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Date: Sat Jul 25 12:13:34 2015 +0200 Prepare v4.1.3-rt3 Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior We lose all the git history this way and it's not good. We should apply another opnfv project repo in future. Change-Id: I87543d81c9df70d99c5001fbdf646b202c19f423 Signed-off-by: Yunhong Jiang --- kernel/fs/file_table.c | 327 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 327 insertions(+) create mode 100644 kernel/fs/file_table.c (limited to 'kernel/fs/file_table.c') diff --git a/kernel/fs/file_table.c b/kernel/fs/file_table.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..294174dcc --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/fs/file_table.c @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ +/* + * linux/fs/file_table.c + * + * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds + * Copyright (C) 1997 David S. Miller (davem@caip.rutgers.edu) + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "internal.h" + +/* sysctl tunables... */ +struct files_stat_struct files_stat = { + .max_files = NR_FILE +}; + +/* SLAB cache for file structures */ +static struct kmem_cache *filp_cachep __read_mostly; + +static struct percpu_counter nr_files __cacheline_aligned_in_smp; + +static void file_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) +{ + struct file *f = container_of(head, struct file, f_u.fu_rcuhead); + + put_cred(f->f_cred); + kmem_cache_free(filp_cachep, f); +} + +static inline void file_free(struct file *f) +{ + percpu_counter_dec(&nr_files); + call_rcu(&f->f_u.fu_rcuhead, file_free_rcu); +} + +/* + * Return the total number of open files in the system + */ +static long get_nr_files(void) +{ + return percpu_counter_read_positive(&nr_files); +} + +/* + * Return the maximum number of open files in the system + */ +unsigned long get_max_files(void) +{ + return files_stat.max_files; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_max_files); + +/* + * Handle nr_files sysctl + */ +#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) && defined(CONFIG_PROC_FS) +int proc_nr_files(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + files_stat.nr_files = get_nr_files(); + return proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); +} +#else +int proc_nr_files(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return -ENOSYS; +} +#endif + +/* Find an unused file structure and return a pointer to it. + * Returns an error pointer if some error happend e.g. we over file + * structures limit, run out of memory or operation is not permitted. + * + * Be very careful using this. You are responsible for + * getting write access to any mount that you might assign + * to this filp, if it is opened for write. If this is not + * done, you will imbalance int the mount's writer count + * and a warning at __fput() time. + */ +struct file *get_empty_filp(void) +{ + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); + static long old_max; + struct file *f; + int error; + + /* + * Privileged users can go above max_files + */ + if (get_nr_files() >= files_stat.max_files && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + /* + * percpu_counters are inaccurate. Do an expensive check before + * we go and fail. + */ + if (percpu_counter_sum_positive(&nr_files) >= files_stat.max_files) + goto over; + } + + f = kmem_cache_zalloc(filp_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!f)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + percpu_counter_inc(&nr_files); + f->f_cred = get_cred(cred); + error = security_file_alloc(f); + if (unlikely(error)) { + file_free(f); + return ERR_PTR(error); + } + + atomic_long_set(&f->f_count, 1); + rwlock_init(&f->f_owner.lock); + spin_lock_init(&f->f_lock); + mutex_init(&f->f_pos_lock); + eventpoll_init_file(f); + /* f->f_version: 0 */ + return f; + +over: + /* Ran out of filps - report that */ + if (get_nr_files() > old_max) { + pr_info("VFS: file-max limit %lu reached\n", get_max_files()); + old_max = get_nr_files(); + } + return ERR_PTR(-ENFILE); +} + +/** + * alloc_file - allocate and initialize a 'struct file' + * + * @path: the (dentry, vfsmount) pair for the new file + * @mode: the mode with which the new file will be opened + * @fop: the 'struct file_operations' for the new file + */ +struct file *alloc_file(struct path *path, fmode_t mode, + const struct file_operations *fop) +{ + struct file *file; + + file = get_empty_filp(); + if (IS_ERR(file)) + return file; + + file->f_path = *path; + file->f_inode = path->dentry->d_inode; + file->f_mapping = path->dentry->d_inode->i_mapping; + if ((mode & FMODE_READ) && + likely(fop->read || fop->read_iter)) + mode |= FMODE_CAN_READ; + if ((mode & FMODE_WRITE) && + likely(fop->write || fop->write_iter)) + mode |= FMODE_CAN_WRITE; + file->f_mode = mode; + file->f_op = fop; + if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ) + i_readcount_inc(path->dentry->d_inode); + return file; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(alloc_file); + +/* the real guts of fput() - releasing the last reference to file + */ +static void __fput(struct file *file) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; + struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt; + struct inode *inode = file->f_inode; + + might_sleep(); + + fsnotify_close(file); + /* + * The function eventpoll_release() should be the first called + * in the file cleanup chain. + */ + eventpoll_release(file); + locks_remove_file(file); + + if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) { + if (file->f_op->fasync) + file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0); + } + ima_file_free(file); + if (file->f_op->release) + file->f_op->release(inode, file); + security_file_free(file); + if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL && + !(file->f_mode & FMODE_PATH))) { + cdev_put(inode->i_cdev); + } + fops_put(file->f_op); + put_pid(file->f_owner.pid); + if ((file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ) + i_readcount_dec(inode); + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITER) { + put_write_access(inode); + __mnt_drop_write(mnt); + } + file->f_path.dentry = NULL; + file->f_path.mnt = NULL; + file->f_inode = NULL; + file_free(file); + dput(dentry); + mntput(mnt); +} + +static LLIST_HEAD(delayed_fput_list); +static void delayed_fput(struct work_struct *unused) +{ + struct llist_node *node = llist_del_all(&delayed_fput_list); + struct llist_node *next; + + for (; node; node = next) { + next = llist_next(node); + __fput(llist_entry(node, struct file, f_u.fu_llist)); + } +} + +static void ____fput(struct callback_head *work) +{ + __fput(container_of(work, struct file, f_u.fu_rcuhead)); +} + +/* + * If kernel thread really needs to have the final fput() it has done + * to complete, call this. The only user right now is the boot - we + * *do* need to make sure our writes to binaries on initramfs has + * not left us with opened struct file waiting for __fput() - execve() + * won't work without that. Please, don't add more callers without + * very good reasons; in particular, never call that with locks + * held and never call that from a thread that might need to do + * some work on any kind of umount. + */ +void flush_delayed_fput(void) +{ + delayed_fput(NULL); +} + +static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(delayed_fput_work, delayed_fput); + +void fput(struct file *file) +{ + if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) { + struct task_struct *task = current; + + if (likely(!in_interrupt() && !(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))) { + init_task_work(&file->f_u.fu_rcuhead, ____fput); + if (!task_work_add(task, &file->f_u.fu_rcuhead, true)) + return; + /* + * After this task has run exit_task_work(), + * task_work_add() will fail. Fall through to delayed + * fput to avoid leaking *file. + */ + } + + if (llist_add(&file->f_u.fu_llist, &delayed_fput_list)) + schedule_delayed_work(&delayed_fput_work, 1); + } +} + +/* + * synchronous analog of fput(); for kernel threads that might be needed + * in some umount() (and thus can't use flush_delayed_fput() without + * risking deadlocks), need to wait for completion of __fput() and know + * for this specific struct file it won't involve anything that would + * need them. Use only if you really need it - at the very least, + * don't blindly convert fput() by kernel thread to that. + */ +void __fput_sync(struct file *file) +{ + if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) { + struct task_struct *task = current; + BUG_ON(!(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD)); + __fput(file); + } +} + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(fput); + +void put_filp(struct file *file) +{ + if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) { + security_file_free(file); + file_free(file); + } +} + +void __init files_init(unsigned long mempages) +{ + unsigned long n; + + filp_cachep = kmem_cache_create("filp", sizeof(struct file), 0, + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + + /* + * One file with associated inode and dcache is very roughly 1K. + * Per default don't use more than 10% of our memory for files. + */ + + n = (mempages * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024)) / 10; + files_stat.max_files = max_t(unsigned long, n, NR_FILE); + percpu_counter_init(&nr_files, 0, GFP_KERNEL); +} -- cgit 1.2.3-korg