From 9ca8dbcc65cfc63d6f5ef3312a33184e1d726e00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yunhong Jiang Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 12:17:53 -0700 Subject: Add the rt linux 4.1.3-rt3 as base Import the rt linux 4.1.3-rt3 as OPNFV kvm base. It's from git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rt/linux-rt-devel.git linux-4.1.y-rt and the base is: commit 0917f823c59692d751951bf5ea699a2d1e2f26a2 Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Date: Sat Jul 25 12:13:34 2015 +0200 Prepare v4.1.3-rt3 Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior We lose all the git history this way and it's not good. We should apply another opnfv project repo in future. Change-Id: I87543d81c9df70d99c5001fbdf646b202c19f423 Signed-off-by: Yunhong Jiang --- kernel/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+) create mode 100644 kernel/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy (limited to 'kernel/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy') diff --git a/kernel/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/kernel/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d0d0c5783 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +What: security/ima/policy +Date: May 2008 +Contact: Mimi Zohar +Description: + The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity + Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash + values of executables and other sensitive system files + loaded into the run-time of this system. At runtime, + the policy can be constrained based on LSM specific data. + Policies are loaded into the securityfs file ima/policy + by opening the file, writing the rules one at a time and + then closing the file. The new policy takes effect after + the file ima/policy is closed. + + IMA appraisal, if configured, uses these file measurements + for local measurement appraisal. + + rule format: action [condition ...] + + action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit + condition:= base | lsm [option] + base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=] + [fowner]] + lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=] + [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] + option: [[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio] + + base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] + [FIRMWARE_CHECK] + mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC] + fsmagic:= hex value + fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6) + uid:= decimal value + fowner:=decimal value + lsm: are LSM specific + option: appraise_type:= [imasig] + + default policy: + # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0 + # SYSFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572 + # DEBUGFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720 + # TMPFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994 + # RAMFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6 + # SECURITYFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673 + + measure func=BPRM_CHECK + measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC + measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0 + measure func=MODULE_CHECK + measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK + appraise fowner=0 + + The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check, + all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files + open for read by root in do_filp_open. The default appraisal + policy appraises all files owned by root. + + Examples of LSM specific definitions: + + SELinux: + # SELINUX_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c + dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c + + dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t + dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t + dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t + dont_appraise obj_type=auditd_log_t + measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ + measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ + + Smack: + measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ -- cgit 1.2.3-korg